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ABSTRACT 
 
Examining the Inner Experience of Three Individuals with Major Depressive 
Disorder and Three Individuals with Bipolar Disorder 
 
By 
 
Janell M. Mihelic 
 
Dr. Christopher Heavey, Examination Committee Chair 
Director of General Education 
Associate Professor, Psychology 
 
 
 The diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder (MDD) and bipolar disorder 
(BD) provide a description of expected experiences of individuals diagnosed with those 
disorders (e.g., sadness, expansive mood, difficulty concentrating).  However, much 
remains unknown about the inner experience of individuals with these disorders which 
may prove crucial in understanding and treating these disorders.  The present study 
examined the inner experience of three individuals with MDD and three individuals with 
BD using the Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) method (Hurlburt 1990, 1993, 
2011).   Results were not suggestive of any clear, consistent patterns of inner experience 
either within the MDD or BD groups or across the two groups of mood disordered 
individuals.   However, five out of six participants had difficulties with capturing and 
 iv 
 
conveying their inner experience and seemed to have a deficit of clear experiences, 
particularly thinking and feelings.  Our participants had few clear inner seeings, feelings, 
unsymbolized thinking, and almost no inner speaking.  One participant seemed distinctly 
different from the other participants in that he had inner seeing in 100% of his sampled 
moments that were complex and very detailed, though aspects of these inner seeings were 
not fully integrated.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Major depressive disorder (MDD) and Bipolar Disorder (BD) are debilitating 
conditions associated with diminished interpersonal relationships, impairment in 
occupational and academic functioning, and overall decreases in psychological well-
being.  MDD is the leading cause of disability in the United States for individuals aged 
15 to 44 (Young, Ryan, Weinberger, & Beck, 2008) and has been estimated to be one of 
the most common forms of mental disorder (Eaton, Kalaydjian, Scharfstein, Mezuk, & 
Ding, 2007).  Similarly, BD is frequently associated with substantial functional 
limitations.  For example, it is estimated that less than half of individuals with BD work 
full-time and of those who work full-time, their BD was associated with 65.5 lost 
workdays annually (Kessler et al., 2006; Suppes et al., 2001).  Both MDD and BD are 
associated with significant economic burden including with direct medical expenditures, 
suicide-related mortality, and workplace costs (Greenberg et al., 2003; Kessler et al., 
2006).  It was projected that salary-equivalent lost productivity per year associated with 
MDD and BD was over $15 billion (Kessler et al., 2006). 
 The prevalence rate of MDD ranges from 1 – 5% for men and 6 - 11% for women 
(Lehtinen & Joukamaa, 1994).  However, the incidence of depressive symptoms is 
significantly higher, ranging from 18 - 34% in women and 10 - 19% in men (Lehtinen & 
Joukamaa, 1994).  It has been recognized that the overall occurrence of MDD has 
increased from approximately 3% to 7% from 1991 to 2001 (Compton, Conway, Stinson, 
& Grant, 2006).  Although it is not clear precisely what has caused the increasing 
occurrence of MDD, factors such as increasing urbanization, modifications in family 
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structures, increased exposure to toxic substances, increased life expectancy, and 
increased access to mental health treatment have been identified as possible causes (Loue 
& Sajatovic, 2008). 
 BD is not as prevalent as MDD.  BD prevalence rates range from 0.4% to 1.6% 
(APA, 2000) and about 2.6% in the United States (APA, 2000; Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & 
Walters, 2005; Robins & Regier, 1992).  However, BD is often misdiagnosed as MDD 
and subsequently the prevalence rates for BD may actually be higher than previously 
stated (Angst et al., 2011).  
 The standard age of onset for MDD is mid-20s and for BD is 20-years old (APA, 
2000).  With both disorders, those individuals who experience a single episode of 
depression or mania are likely to experience repeated episodes throughout their lifespan 
(Coyne, Pepper, & Flynn, 1999).  In addition, the risk and severity of recurrent episodes 
increases with each subsequent episode and with early onset (Adams & Sutker, 2004; 
Solomon et al., 2000; Yatham, Kaurer-Sant’Anaa, Bond, Lam, & Torres, 2009).  It is 
estimated that 5 - 10% of individuals who have experienced a single episode of 
depression will go on to develop BD (APA, 2000).  Both MDD and BD are commonly 
associated with co-morbid substance-related disorders, anxiety, and personality disorders 
(APA, 2000; Brown, Suppes, Adinoff, & Thomas, 2001; Uecok, Karaveli, Dundakci, & 
Yazici, 1998).  
A significant concern regarding the presence of MDD and BD is the increased 
risk of suicide.  Individuals with MDD and BD often are preoccupied with thoughts of 
death, including suicidal ideation, and often engage in suicide attempts.  Overall, it is 
estimated that 15% of individuals diagnosed with MDD complete suicide and 10-15% of 
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individuals diagnosed with BD will commit suicide (APA, 2000; Novick, Swartz, & 
Frank, 2010).  Elderly individuals account for almost 16% of all suicides with firearms 
being the most common means (Xu, Kochanek, Murphy, & Tejada, 2010).  
Given MDD and BD’s complex clinical presentation and etiology, in addition to a 
current emphasis on awareness, recognition, and treatment of such disorders, it is 
imperative to have a clear understanding of the inner experiences of individuals with 
these disorders.  The present study will use the Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) 
method developed by Hurlburt (1990, 1993) to examine the inner experiences of three 
individuals with MDD and three individuals with BD.   
DES is an introspective, descriptive, and idiographic method aimed at exploring 
and describing inner experience.  DES is a bottom-up technique that involves faithfully 
describing a single experience and working up to portraying the inner experience of a 
single person based upon the conglomeration of multiple single experiences (Hurlburt & 
Akhter, 2006).  Participants are given a device that randomly emits a beep through an 
earphone. Participants are asked to choose a time during the day to turn on the beeper and 
carry it with them throughout their regular activities.  Once turned on, the beeper 
randomly emits a beep approximately every thirty minutes.  At the moment of each beep, 
participants are asked to “freeze” and remember or take notice of their inner experience at 
the last undisturbed moment before the beep sounded.  Inner experience refers to 
anything within a participant’s awareness, including but not limited to thoughts, feelings, 
sensations, images, etc.  Participants are asked to jot down notes about their inner 
experience in a small notebook, reset the beeper, and continue on with their daily 
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activities.  This procedure is typically repeated until the participant has received six 
beeps, which usually takes approximately three hours.  
Within 24 hours of collecting the moments of experience, an interview takes place 
between the investigator and the participant in which they discuss each moment of 
sampled inner experience.  The goal of this interview is to develop as faithful an 
apprehension of each sampled moment of inner experience as possible. DES is an 
iterative procedure (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006).  Most participants are not skilled 
observers of their inner experiences.  During the first day of sampling, participants 
usually are unprepared for the investigator’s direct and specific questioning about their 
moments of inner experiences.  Thus, DES researchers usually consider the first day of 
sampling a practice session and do not include the first day of sampled moments in data 
analyses (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).  Usually, participants engage in three to eight days 
of sampling yielding between 18 and 48 beeps. 
DES studies vary greatly in the types of participants sampled and participants’ 
experiences.  Some DES studies explore one participant’s inner experiences.  In these 
studies, the DES method is used for idiographic purposes, aimed to describe the unique 
characteristics of a unique individual (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006).  Other DES studies 
explore a collection of participants who have a feature in common, such as a psychiatric 
diagnosis (e.g., schizophrenia, depression, Asperger’s syndrome, etc.).  In such studies, 
the investigator first apprehends each participant’s experiences idiographically and then 
nomothetically examines if any salient characteristics emerge across the collection of 
participants as a whole (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006).  
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The present study used DES to explore the inner experience of a collection of 
participants with MDD and BD.  The purpose of this study was to observe and describe 
the inner experience of the sample of individuals and to examine if any salient 
characteristics or themes emerge across the participants diagnosed with MDD, the 
participants diagnosed with BD, or the collection of participants as a whole.  
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CHAPTER 2 
MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER 
Diagnostic Features  
According to the American Psychiatric Association (2000), a diagnosis of major 
depressive disorder (MDD) is warranted when a person experiences for at least 2-weeks 
depressed mood or a loss of interest or pleasure in most activities and exhibits evidence 
of four out of seven additional symptoms (e.g., lack of energy, feelings of worthlessness).  
The experience of these symptoms must be associated with clinically significant distress 
or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.  
One of the primary characteristics of MDD is depressed mood.  The depressed 
mood is often described as being persistently present and is characterized by sadness, 
distress, pessimism, emptiness, hopelessness, and discouragement.  For individuals with 
MDD, the depressed mood pervades most, if not all, aspects of one’s personal life and 
interferes with one’s social functioning.  Furthermore, the depressed mood can feel like 
an unalterable affective state (Maj & Sartorius, 1999) or may be described as numbness 
or a lack of feelings (APA, 2000).  Somatic symptoms, such as bodily aches or pains, are 
also commonly associated with the depressed mood.  In fact, such somatic symptoms can 
make it difficult for elderly individuals to be diagnosed with MDD as physicians are 
likely to attribute somatic symptoms to physical health issues rather than depression 
(Ruppel, Jenkins, Griffin, & Kizer, 2010).  Irritability, such as anger or exaggerated 
frustration, is also commonly associated with depressed mood (APA, 2000).  
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 MDD is also often characterized by cognitive and perceptual symptoms.  
Individuals with MDD may experience difficulty concentrating, memory impairment, 
slowed thinking, and in some severe cases, hallucinations (APA, 2000).  Feelings of 
worthlessness or guilt as well as thoughts of death or suicidal ideation are commonly 
experienced by individuals with MDD.  The persistent feelings of guilt experienced by 
individuals with MDD can include misinterpreting day to day events reinforcing one’s 
feelings of personal defects and inadequacies.  Suicidal ideation is also commonly 
experienced in the MDD population, although the severity, intensity, and lethality of the 
ideation vary substantially.  For example, one person may occasionally (e.g., a few times 
a month) experience thoughts of committing suicide, whereas another person may often 
(e.g., daily) experience thoughts of and may specify plans of how to commit suicide. 
 Behavioral changes are also observed in individuals with MDD.  For example, 
individuals with MDD may experience psychomotor agitation, such as the inability to sit 
still, or psychomotor retardation, such as a slowed speech or body movements (APA, 
2000).  Such psychomotor changes are generally severe enough to be noticed by others. 
Appetite and sleep disturbances are also common for individuals with MDD (APA, 
2000).  In terms of appetite, some individuals report a diminished appetite while others 
report an increase in appetite and may crave specific foods (APA, 2000).  Similarly, 
MDD can be associated with sleep disturbances such as insomnia.  The most common 
form of insomnia for individuals with MDD is middle insomnia which is characterized by 
waking up in the middle of the night and experiencing difficulties returning to sleep 
(APA, 2000).  Individuals with MDD can also experience reverse sleep disturbances 
where they experience hypersomnia, or prolonged sleep episodes.  
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 There are five subtypes of MDD listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-
IV (DSM-IV-TR, APA, 2000) including MDD with psychotic features, catatonic 
features, melancholic features, atypical features, and postpartum onset.  MDD with 
psychotic features is associated with the presence of delusions, psychomotor 
disturbances, vegetative symptoms, or hallucinations (APA, 2000).  The DSM-IV-TR 
distinguishes between mood-congruent psychotic features and mood-incongruent 
psychotic features (APA, 2000).  Mood-congruent psychotic features are consistent with 
the typical depressive themes including personal inadequacies, death, nihilism, and guilt.  
In contrast, mood-incongruent psychotic features may focus on non-depressive themes.  
It is estimated that approximately 14% of individuals with MDD experience psychotic 
features (Johnson, Horwarth, & Weissman, 1991; Maj & Sartorius, 1999).  Individuals 
with MDD who experience psychotic features are also more likely to experience an 
increase in weight loss, insomnia, psychomotor agitation, indecisiveness, and suicidality 
as compared to individuals with MDD who experience no psychotic features (Gaudiano, 
Young, Chelminski, & Zimmerman, 2008).  
It is controversial whether MDD with psychotic features represent a distinct 
disorder or if it is a manifestation of MDD in its most severe form (Maj, Pirozzi, & 
DiCaprio, 1990).  Forty and colleagues (2009) examined whether the severity of MDD is 
the sole cause of psychotic symptoms and found that individuals with predispositions to 
psychotic features are more likely to display psychotic features during severe episodes of 
depression.  In contrast, individuals without a history of psychosis may experience non-
psychotic depressive episodes which are at equal or greater severity to other individuals’ 
psychotic episodes.  Forty and colleagues (2009) concluded that there is individual 
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variation in the vulnerability to psychotic episodes during mood episodes and that the 
severity of the mood episode is not the single cause of the symptoms.  
 Another subtype of MDD includes catatonic features.  MDD with catatonic 
features is characterized by a group of symptoms of motor behavior disturbances such as 
motoric immobility, excessive motor activity, extreme negativism or mutism, 
peculiarities of voluntary movement, or echolalia or echopraxia (APA, 2000).  For 
example, individuals with MDD with catatonic features may experience rigid positioning 
of their body or may experience simple movements (e.g., getting out of a chair) as a 
painful act that may take hours to perform.  Catatonic features are mostly prevalent in 
schizophrenia but have been demonstrated in affective disorders such as MDD and 
Bipolar Disorder (Carroll, 2001).  In MDD, catatonic features are associated with 
increased severity of MDD symptoms, increased frequency of depressive episodes, more 
severe cognitive disturbances, and more severe deficits in daily functioning as compared 
to individuals with MDD without catatonic features (Starkstein, Petracca, Teson, & 
Chemerinski, 1996). 
 MDD with melancholic features refers to a subtype of depression in which there 
is a pronounced loss of interest or pleasure in usual activities or a lack of reactivity to 
pleasurable stimuli (APA, 2000).  In addition, to warrant a specifier of melancholic 
features, one must also experience three of the following: distinct quality of depressed 
mood, worsening of mood in the morning, early morning awakening, psychomotor 
retardation or agitation, significant weight loss or anorexia, and excessive or 
inappropriate guilt (APA, 2000).  Some have proposed that depression with melancholia 
has a distinct experiential quality different from non-melancholic individuals (Maj & 
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Sartorius, 1999).  Proponents of such a distinction have demonstrated that melancholia is 
related to unique neurobiological processes and latency of rapid eye movement sleep 
which non-melancholia depression is not (Maj & Sartorius, 1999).  Melancholia 
depression is also associated with deficits in memory and executive functioning (Withall, 
Harris, & Cummings, 2009; Michopoulos et al., 2008).  One study also found that 
melancholic depression is associated with an increase in cognitive rumination (Nelson & 
Mazure, 1985).  Despite the increased rates of depression in females as compared to men, 
more men than female tend to experience the clinical symptoms of melancholia (Khan et 
al., 2006).  Melancholic features have also found to be associated with younger age, an 
increase in severity of depressive symptoms, and a decrease in the duration of the 
depressive episode (Grunebaum, Galfalvy, Oquendo, Burke, & Mann, 2004; Khan et al., 
2006).  
 The subtype of atypical MDD is characterized by the presence of mood reactivity 
and two or more of the following: increased appetite or significant weight gain, 
hypersomnia, leaden paralysis (i.e., heavy feelings in arms or legs), and interpersonal 
rejection sensitivity not limited to episodes of mood disturbance (APA, 2000).  It is 
estimated that approximately 5% of individuals with MDD experience the 
aforementioned atypical features (Angst, Gamma, Sellaro, Zhang, & Merikangas, 2002).  
Atypical features of depression are more common in females and are associated with a 
younger age of onset (Pae, Haresh, Marks, Masand, & Patkar, 2009).  Furthermore, the 
course of atypical depression is usually more chronic and unrelenting as compared to 
non-atypical depression (Pae et al., 2009).  Individuals with this subtype of MDD are 
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twice as likely to have comorbid anxiety, mood, eating, and substance-related disorders 
(Pae et al., 2009).   
 The final subtype of MDD is postpartum onset which is characterized by the 
experience of depressive symptoms within 4 weeks after childbirth.  It has been estimated 
that between 8 and 20% of women after childbirth experience postpartum depression and 
approximately 34% of those women continue to experience depressive symptoms 1-year 
after childbirth (Uguz, Akman, Sahingoz, Kaya, & Kuccur, 2009).  Some characteristics 
of depression that are often exhibited in postpartum depression include motor retardation 
or agitation, difficulty concentrating, and fatigue (Krammerer et al., 2009). 
Given the aforementioned diagnostic criteria, the variety of presentations or 
experiences of MDD is immense (Dobson & Dozois, 2008).  For example, one person 
with MDD may experience depressed mood, fatigue, feelings of worthlessness, 
inappropriate guilt, and preoccupation with death, whereas another person may 
experience a completely different set of symptoms including depressed mood, significant 
weight loss, insomnia, psychomotor agitation, and difficulties concentration.  With the 
heterogeneity of symptoms, these two individuals have the same diagnosis, but their 
experiences may be vastly different.  Furthermore, two individuals could have the same 
“symptom” such as feelings of worthlessness, but their experiences can be markedly 
different.   One possible implication of the heterogeneity of the symptoms of MDD is that 
there may actually be a few distinct subtypes of depression included within the diagnostic 
criteria (Dobson & Dozois, 2008).  In addition, the heterogeneity of the symptoms of 
MDD may increase the difficulty in reaching agreement in diagnosis and may further 
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affect the research and conceptualization of the disorder and subsequently treatment 
(Dobson & Dozois, 2008).  
Prevalence and Course 
 The prevalence rates of MDD range from 1 – 5% for men and 6 – 11% for woman 
(Lehtinen & Joukamaa, 1994).  A meta-analysis of prevalence rates of mood disorders 
found large discrepancies in the prevalence of MDD ranging from 0.88 per 100 
individuals in Taipei to 29.6 per 100 individuals in Montreal (Waraich, Goldner, Somers, 
& Hsu, 2004).  Cross-culturally, studies conducted in Europe generally report 1-year 
prevalence rates 3 times higher than studies conducted outside of Europe (Waraich et al., 
2004).  In contrast, when studies conducted in Asia were pooled together, they exhibited 
1-year and lifetime prevalence rates 7 times lower as compared to studies conducted in 
non-Asian countries (Waraich et al., 2004).  Consistently across cultures, women were 
found to have prevalence rates of MDD 1.5 to 2 times higher than men (Waraich et al., 
2004).   
A survey of the prevalence of depression by ethnicity conducted between 1988 
and 1994 by the National Center for Health Statistics demonstrated that African-
American and Mexican-American individuals have higher lifetime prevalence rates of 
dysthymic disorder, whereas Euro-Americans individuals have higher lifetime prevalence 
rates of MDD (Riolo, Nguyen, Greden, & King, 2005).  Dysthymic disorder refers to a 
mood disorder similar to MDD with regards to the persistent presence of depressed 
mood, but the depressed mood is present for a longer duration (i.e., at least 2 years) with 
no more than moderate intensity (APA, 2000). Differences in the course of MDD were 
also noted for the three ethnicities.  Mexican-American and Euro-American individuals 
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exhibited significantly earlier onset of MDD as compared to African-Americans.  In 
terms of risk factors, individuals living in poverty had 1.5 times the prevalence of MDD; 
however, poverty was only significantly associated with the prevalence of MDD for 
Euro-American individuals.  Lack of education was demonstrated to be significantly 
associated with the prevalence of MDD for Mexican-American individuals.  
 One study examined the effect of global events, specifically the 2008 global 
economic downturn, on prevalence rates of MDD (Wang, Smailes, Sareen, Fick, 
Schmitz, & Patten, 2010).  It was found that prevalence rates for MDD increased from 
6.5% to 7.6% for a sample of Canadian workers.  Notably, significant increases in MDD 
were found for men who were married or in a common-law relationship.  
 Onset of MDD usually occurs in the mid-20s, although it may begin at any age 
(APA, 2000).  It has been shown that the age of onset of MDD is decreasing for 
individuals born more recently as compared with older cohorts (APA, 2000).  It is also 
more common for women than men to experience an early age of onset, recurrent course, 
and greater severity of MDD (Verhagen et al., 2008).  The course of MDD is variable.  
Some individuals have a single episode of depression, whereas others have multiple, 
frequent episodes (APA, 2000).  It is estimated that approximately 60% of individuals 
who experience a single episode will go on to experience additional episodes of 
depression (APA, 2000).  Furthermore, MDD may be preceded by dysthymic disorder in 
approximately 15 – 25% of clinical samples (APA, 2000).  Dysthymic disorder is similar 
to MDD as they share similar symptoms; however, dysthymic disorder differs from MDD 
in terms of severity, chronicity, and persistence.  Dysthymic disorder is characterized by 
the presence of depressive symptoms for more days than not for a period of 2-years 
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(APA, 2000).  However, it is noted that it is often difficult to differentiate MDD from 
dysthymic disorder as it can be challenging to retrospectively record the onset, duration, 
and persistence of the symptoms of depression. 
Comorbidity 
 Cormorbidity is common with MDD with approximately two-thirds of individuals 
with MDD having at least one additional axis I disorder (Bijl, van Zessen, & Ravelli, 
1997).  It has been shown that women with MDD exhibit more comorbid mental illness 
than men (Verhagen et al., 2008).  Furthermore, out-patient studies have shown that the 
specificity of cormorbid disorders seen with MDD is gender specific (Fava et al., 1996; 
Carter, Joyce, Mulder, Luty, & Sullivan, 1999).  For example, common comorbid 
disorders for women with MDD include simple phobias and bulima nervosa (Fava et al., 
1996; Carter et al., 1999).  Common comorbid disorders seen in men with MDD include 
substance abuse and dependence (Fava et al., 1996; Carter et al., 1999).  Verhagen and 
colleagues (2008) also found that women were more likely than men to have comorbid 
panic disorder, simple phobias, generalized anxiety disorder, and agoraphobia.  
Functional Limitations   
 To warrant a diagnosis of MDD, an individual’s depressive symptoms must be 
associated with clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning (APA, 2000).  The chronicity and severity of MDD 
is associated with a significant financial burden on individuals with depression, families 
and caregivers, and employers.  Current projections estimate that the economic burden 
associated with MDD will rank second among other mental illnesses and medical 
disorders by 2020 (Murray & Lopez, 1996).  While psychotherapy, pharmacotherapy, 
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and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) have been found to ameliorate depressive 
symptoms, only a small portion of individuals with MDD receive sufficient treatment 
(Wells et al., 1989). 
 Individuals with MDD often have significantly more functional impairment and 
require additional health care resources than individuals who are not depressed 
(Mechanic, Cleary, & Greenley, 1982; Shapiro et al., 1984; Simon, Von Korff, & 
Barlow, 1995).  Epidemiological studies have demonstrated that occupational 
impairments such as lost productivity and absenteeism occur frequently within the MDD 
population (Johnson, Weissman, & Klerman, 1992; Kessler & Frank, 1997).  Individuals 
with MDD average 2 - 4 disability day per month (Spitzer et al., 1995).  
In terms of the costs related to MDD, there are both direct and indirect medical 
costs.  Direct medical costs refer to costs directly related to the disorder itself (e.g., 
money spent on treatment).  Indirect costs include interference caused by MDD on 
productivity, absenteeism, and increased mortality.  One study estimated that the indirect 
costs associated with MDD is greater than indirect costs associated with other chronic 
conditions such as diabetes, back pain, and high blood pressure (O’Neill & Bertollo, 
1998).  It was estimated that the costs associated with diminished occupational 
productivity in the United States to be approximately $23.8 billion and the costs 
associated with depression-related suicide to be approximately $7.5 billion (Greenberg, 
Stiglin, Finkelstein, & Berndt, 1993).  
Another study compared health care costs for individuals with anxiety and 
depressive disorders to individuals without anxiety or depressive disorders (Simon et al., 
1995).  They found that individuals with anxiety or depression had statistically significant 
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higher 6-month health care costs as compared to individuals with no anxiety or 
depression.  Health care costs of MDD are also positively correlated with symptom 
severity (Wells et al., 1989; Hu & Rush, 1995). 
MDD is also associated with social or interpersonal functional impairments.  
Individuals with MDD often report moderate to severe impairment in their functioning in 
relationships, in social settings, at home, and at work (Kessler et al., 2003).  They also 
exhibit diminished frequency of sexual activity, interpersonal relationships, and 
participation in recreational activities (Coryell, Scheftner, Keller, Endicott, Maser, & 
Klerman, 1993).  They also tend to have never been married and have lower levels of 
education (Coryell et al., 1993).  The degree of functional impairment for individuals 
with MDD increases with the severity of depressive symptoms (Huang, Chung, Kroenke, 
& Spitzer, 2006).  
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CHAPTER 3 
 BIPOLAR DISORDER 
 
Diagnostic Features 
 The American Psychological Association (2000) separates BD into two distinct 
types: bipolar I disorder and bipolar II disorder.  
 Bipolar I Disorder 
 A diagnosis of bipolar I disorder is warranted when a person experiences one or 
more manic episodes (APA, 2000).  A manic episode is characterized by a period of time 
during which an abnormally and persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood is 
present for at least one week.  The mood may be present for a shorter duration than one 
week if hospitalization is required.  Three out of seven additional symptoms (e.g., 
inflated self-esteem or grandiosity, decreased need for sleep, flight of ideas, 
distractibility) must also be present.  However, at least four out of the seven additional 
symptoms must be present if the mood disturbance is irritable (not elevated or 
expansive).  To meet diagnostic criteria, criteria for a mixed episode, characterized by the 
presence of symptoms of both a manic episode and a major depressive episode, cannot be 
met.  A significant impairment in social or occupational functioning, hospitalization, or 
the presence of psychotic features must also be present to warrant a diagnosis. 
 One of the primary characteristics of bipolar I disorder is an elevated mood.  The 
mood is usually described as euphoric, good, cheerful or high (APA, 2000).  Unceasing 
enthusiasm for interpersonal, sexual, or occupational interactions is also commonly 
experienced (APA, 2000).  Emotional lability also frequently occurs with individuals 
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experiencing a manic episode (APA, 2000).  Overall, irritability is the most common 
mood during a manic episode (Adams & Sutker, 2004).  
Many individuals experiencing a manic episode will also present with an inflated 
self-esteem which may reach delusional proportions (APA, 2000).  Such individuals may 
give advice on matters about which they have no knowledge or experience or believe 
themselves to possess a particular talent or experience.  African Americans and Latinos 
may exhibit increased grandiosity and self-esteem in manic episodes more often than 
Caucasians (Perron, Fries, Kilbourne, Vaughn, & Bauer, 2010).  Grandiose delusions are 
also common with a manic episode (APA, 2000).  
 Behavioral changes are also observed in individuals experiencing a manic 
episode.  For example, one may experience a decreased need for sleep (APA, 2000).  In 
fact, approximately 81% of individuals experiencing a manic episode experience 
insomonia or a decreased need for sleep (Adams & Sutker, 2004).  Similarly, an increase 
in goal-directed activity also commonly occurs within a manic episode (APA, 2000).  For 
example, such individuals may suddenly take up multiple new hobbies.  Such behaviors 
may appear disorganized or bizarre in nature (e.g., beginning to write a book about 
something which they have no experience).  Individuals may also appear to be more 
social than usual, but do not adhere to typical standards of social engagement and may 
appear to be intrusive, domineering, and demanding in their social interactions (APA, 
2000).  Lastly, individuals experiencing a manic episode commonly display speech 
disturbances often characterized by pressured, loud, rapid, and difficult to interrupt 
speech (APA, 2000).  Speech disturbances exhibited can also appear theatrical or angry 
in nature depending on the nature of the mood episode (APA, 2000).  Approximately 75 
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to 100% of individuals experiencing a manic episode demonstrate speech disturbances 
(Adams & Sutker, 2004).  
 Cognitive disturbances are also commonly experienced with a manic episode. 
Individuals often complain racing thoughts and flight of ideas (APA, 2000).  Confusion, 
poor concentration, distractibility, and disorientation are also commonly experienced 
(APA, 2000).  Often, individuals report that they are unable to filter irrelevant thought 
processes regarding external stimuli from relevant thought processes. 
Neuropsychological testing has also evidenced cognitive deficiencies, including 
diminished processing speed, memory, verbal fluency, and executive functioning 
abilities, in individuals with bipolar I disorder (Xu, Lin, Rao, Dang, Ouyang, Guo, et al., 
2012).  
 Psychotic symptoms of delusions and hallucinations also can occur within a 
manic episode (APA, 2000).  Delusions have been reported by approximately 44 to 75% 
of individuals with a history of manic episodes (Adams & Sutker, 2004).  Hallucinations, 
mostly auditory, have been reported by approximately 14 to 40% of individuals with a 
history of manic episodes (Adams & Sutker, 2000).  
Bipolar II Disorder 
A diagnosis of bipolar II disorder is warranted when a person experiences one or 
more major depressive episodes and at least one hypomanic episode (APA, 2000).  As 
described previously, a major depressive episode is characterized by a two-week period 
in which at least five of the following symptoms are present and marked by a change in 
previous functioning: depressed mood, loss of interest or pleasure, sleep disturbance, 
psychomotor agitation or retardation, fatigue or loss of energy, feelings of worthlessness, 
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inappropriate guilt, diminished ability to think or concentrate, indecisiveness, recurrent 
thoughts of death, or suicidal ideation.  To meet criteria for a hypomanic episode, a 
person must experience a distinct period of elevated, expansive, or irritable mood lasting 
at least four days.  Three or more of the following symptoms must be simultaneously 
present with the mood disturbance: inflated self-esteem or grandiosity, decreased need for 
sleep, talkative or pressured speech, flight of ideas or racing thoughts, distractibility, 
increased goal-directed behavior or psychomotor agitation, and excessive involvement in 
pleasurable activities that have a potential for painful consequences.  Four of the 
aforementioned symptoms must be present if the mood disturbance is best characterized 
as irritable.  To meet criteria for a hypomanic episode, there must be collateral reports of 
changes in the person’s mood and behavior; however, the symptoms are not severe 
enough to cause marked impairment in social or occupational functioning or require 
hospitalization.  
 The mood disturbance characterized in a hypomanic episode is generally 
described as euphoric, unusually good, cheerful, or high (APA, 2000).  The mood may 
even have an infectious quality for those around the person experiencing the hypomanic 
episode; however, the change in mood is distinct from the person’s usual self.  The 
elevated mood is often accompanied with enthusiasm for interpersonal or occupational 
interactions.  Less frequently, the mood disturbance may be best characterized by 
irritability or may fluctuate between euphoria and irritability.  
 Behaviorally, individuals experiencing a hypomanic episode will likely have a 
decreased need for sleep and awake before the usual time with increased energy (APA, 
2000).  They will also speak somewhat louder and more rapidly than usual, but can be 
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interrupted unlike a person experiencing a manic episode.  Individuals experiencing a 
hypomanic episode may be very distractible, as demonstrated by frequent changes in 
speech or activity, due to responding to various irrelevant external stimuli.  Individuals 
may also have an increased interest in engaging interpersonally with others and there may 
be an increase in sexual activity.  Impulsive activities such as buying sprees, reckless 
driving, or foolish business investments, are also frequently observed in individuals 
experiencing a hypomanic episode.  The aforementioned behaviors generally mark a 
significant change in activities for the person experiencing the hypomanic episode; 
however, such behaviors do not result in the level of impairment that is characterized by a 
manic episode.  
Prevalence and Course 
 The prevalence of BD in community samples has varied from 0.4% to 1.6% 
(APA, 2000) and about 2.6% in the United States (APA, 2000; Kessler, et al., 2005; 
Robins & Regier, 1991;).  One study that surveyed 11 countries in Americas, Europe, and 
Asia found that lifetime prevalence for bipolar I disorder is 0.6% and for bipolar II 
disorder 0.4% (Merikangas, Jin, He, Kessler, Lee, Sampson, et al., 2011).  BD is often 
misdiagnosed as MDD and subsequently, the prevalence rates for BD may actually be 
higher than previously stated (Angst, Azorin, Bowden, Perugi, Vieta, Gamma, & Young, 
2011).  Approximately 10% - 15% of adolescents experiencing recurrent major 
depressive episodes will go on to develop BD (APA, 2000).  
 Unlike MDD, the female-to-male ratio for BD is less clear. Some studies have 
demonstrated a ratio of 1:1, while others have demonstrated a ratio as much as 2:1 
(Adams & Sutker, 2004).  Gender differences with regards to symptoms and course have 
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been demonstrated. For example, females with BD are more likely to experience a 
depressive onset, psychotic symptoms, and comorbid axis II disorders as compared to 
males (Nivoli, Pacchiarotti, Rosa, Popovic, Murru, Valenti, et al., 2011).  Females are 
also more likely to experience more major depressive episodes than manic episodes 
(APA, 2000).  Females have an increased risk of developing subsequent episodes in the 
immediate postpartum period and some females experience their first episode during the 
postpartum period (APA, 2000).  Males with BD are more likely to experience a manic 
onset, suffer from comorbid substance use disorders, and have more violent suicide 
attempts as compared to females (APA, 2000; Nivoli et al., 2011).  Males are also more 
likely to experience more manic episodes than major depressive episodes (APA, 2000).  
 There have been no reports of differential incidence of BD based on race and 
ethnicity (APA, 2000).  However, there has been some evidence to suggest that clinicians 
may have a tendency to over diagnose schizophrenia, instead of bipolar disorder, in some 
ethnic groups and in younger individuals (APA, 2000).  
 Individuals with a family history of BD are at a greater risk of developing the 
disorder themselves.  First-degree biological relatives of individuals with bipolar I 
disorder have elevated rates of bipolar I disorder (4% - 24%), bipolar II disorder (1% - 
5%), and major depressive disorder (4% - 24%; APA, 2000).  Individuals with a family 
history of mood disorders are more likely to have an earlier age at onset and have a 
poorer prognosis (APA, 2000).  
 The average age of onset for BD is approximately 20 years old with early onset 
often indicating poorer outcome (Adams & Sutker, 2004; APA, 2000; Yatham, Kaurer-
Sant’Anaa, Bond, Lam, & Torres, 2009).  Most first psychiatric hospital admissions for 
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BD occur between the ages 20 and 29 (Adams & Sutker, 2004).  BD is a recurrent 
disorder with more than 90% of individuals who have a single manic episode go on to 
have future episodes (APA, 2000).  For individuals with BD who do not take medication 
to manage their symptoms, it is estimated that, on average, four episodes (e.g., manic, 
hypomanic, or depressive) occur in 10 years (APA, 2000).  However, approximately 5% - 
15% of individuals with BD experience four or more mood episodes within a given year 
(APA, 2000).  This pattern is noted with the specifier with rapid cycling.  Generally, 
rapid-cycling is associated with a poorer prognosis (APA, 2000).  The interval between 
episodes often decreases as the individual ages (APA, 2000).  There is also some 
evidence that suggests changes in sleep-wake schedule may precipitate or exacerbate a 
manic, mixed, or hypomanic episode (APA, 2000).  Furthermore, the polarity of the first 
episode is of importance because depressive onset is associated with greater morbidity 
than manic onset (Yatham et al., 2009).  
Comorbidity 
 More than half of individuals with BD have at least one additional Axis I 
diagnosis (Altshuler, Suppes, Keck, Frye, Denicoff, et al., 2001; Goldberg, 2009).  The 
most frequent comorbid disorders with BD are substance abuse, anxiety, and personality 
disorders (Brown, Suppes, Adinoff, & Thomas, 2001; Goodwin & Hoven, 2002; Uecok, 
Karaveli, Dundakci, & Yazici, 1998).  Comorbidity with BD has been attributed to a 
poorer course over time, shorter relapse periods, an increased number of hospitalizations, 
poor adherence to treatment, and increased suicidality (APA, 2000; Dunayevich, Sax, 
Keck, McElroy, Sorter, McConville, et al., 2000; Frangou, 2002; & Vieta, Colom, 
Corbella, Martinex, Reinares, Bernabarre, et al., 2001).  
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Functional Limitations 
 To warrant a diagnosis of BD, an individual’s symptoms must be associated with 
clinically significant distress or impairment in social or occupational functioning, require 
hospitalization, or be characterized by psychotic features.  Often, individuals with BD 
experience problems with school truancy, school failure, occupational failure, divorce, or 
episodic antisocial behavior (APA, 2000).  Violent behavior, including physical violence 
towards children or partners, may occur during a severe manic episode or during episodes 
characterized by psychotic features (APA, 2000).  
 Individuals with BD generally report a limited support group including 
friendships, confiding relationships, and social contact (Hammen & Cohen, 2004).  They 
generally experience lower martial satisfaction and have a high risk of divorce 
(Levokovitz et al., 2000; Suppes et al., 2001).  The limited social support and social 
difficulties are relatively persistent across affective changes (Goldberg, Harrow, & 
Grossman, 1995). 
 Occupational limitations are also common with individuals with BD. Such 
individuals often experience impairment in obtaining employment and sustaining 
employment (Suppes et al., 2001).  It is estimated that less than half of individuals with 
bipolar disorder work full-time (Suppes et al., 2001).  Similar to social difficulties, 
impairment in occupational functioning does not seem to improve with remission or 
affective changes (Hammen & Cohen, 2004). 
 Another significant consequence of BD is mortality.  Approximately 60% of 
individuals with BD will attempt suicide and approximately 10-15% will be successful in 
their attempts (APA, 2000; Novick, Swartz, & Frank, 2010).  Suicidal ideation and 
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attempts are generally more common in the early stages of BD and commonly associated 
with depressive episodes (APA, 2010; Tondo, Isacsson, & Baldessarini, 2003).  
Individuals with BD are also at increased risk from dying from general medical 
conditions such as coronary heart disease (Sharma & Karkar, 1994), cerebrovascular 
disorders (Zheng, Macera, Croft, Giles, Davis, & Scott, 1997), and respiratory infections 
(Sharma & Marker, 1994).  Such findings may be attributed to individuals with BD 
experiencing more chronic stress due to their fluctuating mood episodes and their 
increased engagement in risky behaviors (Cassidy, Ritchie, & Carroll, 1998).  
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODS OF STUDYING THE EXPERIENCE OF MAJOR DEPRESSIVE 
DISORDER AND BIPOLAR DISORDER 
First-Person Accounts 
 Major Depressive Disorder 
There have been many memoirs or unstructured, personal accounts written that 
describe one’s experiences living with depression.  Such memoirs provide a detailed 
portrayal of one’s struggles living with depression.  There are many such memoirs 
available, including: Darkness Visible: A Memoir of Madness (Styron, 1990), Willow 
Weep for Me: A Black Women’s Journey Through Depression (Danquah, 1999), The 
Noonday Demon: At Atlas of Depression (Solomon, 2001), Unholy Ghost: Writers on 
Depression (Casey, 2001), My Depression: A Picture Book (Swados, 2005), Trouble in 
My Head: A Young Girl’s Fight with Depression (Monaque, 2007), Shoot the Damn Dog: 
A Memoir of Depression (Brampton, 2008), and A Man Derailed: An Autobiography on 
Depression (Holmes, 2009). 
There are also documentaries and films that capture the experiences of individuals 
with depression.  Recently, a documentary titled The Bridge (2006) was released which 
examined the lives of several people who committed suicide by jumping off of the 
Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, California in 2004.  The film highlighted each 
person’s difficulties living with depression and what may have contributed to their 
decision to commit suicide.  Another film, Prozac Nation (2001), was adapted from the 
autobiography Prozac Nation (Wurtzel, 1994) which described one woman’s struggle 
with depression. 
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Bipolar Disorder 
There have also been many personal accounts written that describe one’s 
experiences living with BD.  These include Detour: My Bipolar Road Trip in 4-D 
(Simon, 2002), An Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Moods and Madness (Jamison, 2005), 
Sugar and Salt: My Life with Bipolar Disorder (Hollan, 2007), Manic: A Memoir 
(Cheney, 2008), My Kind of Crazy: Living in a Bipolar World (Haynes, 2008), I’m Not 
Crazy Just Bipolar (Williamson, 2010).  
There are also documentaries and fictional movies that have portrayed the 
experiences of individuals BD.  For example, My Friend Paul (1999) provides a detailed 
account of having a friend with bipolar disorder. There also have been numerous fictional 
movies that highlight people’s difficulties in living with BD.  For example, Richard Gere 
portrayed a person’s difficulties in living with and getting treatment for BD in Mr. Jones 
(1993).  Another fictional movie about BD is Bulworth (1998) which provides insight 
into a person’s struggle to cope with mania.  
Strengths and Weaknesses of First Person Accounts 
While memoirs and films provide insights into the experiences of individuals with 
mood disorders, they are often exceedingly broad and subjective, presenting the author or 
producer’s focus or point of view.  For example, one book may center on family 
difficulties and how it relates to depression, whereas another may concentrate on the 
emotional experience of depression.  Such books and films may end up highlighting 
certain experiences while ignoring or distorting others. Such glimpses into one’s life with 
mood disorders are also influenced by the difficulties associated with retrospective recall 
of events and experiences.  So while these types of personal accounts may include 
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faithful aspects of the experience of having a mood disorder, it is impossible to tell which 
personal accounts or which aspects of personal accounts are faithful.   Thus personal 
accounts cannot provide an adequate basis for a confident understanding of the inner 
experience of those suffering from a mood disorder.    
Experience Sampling Methods 
The Experience Sampling Method (ESM) is a method of studying experience and 
was developed to understand the relationship of inner experience, behaviors, and 
situational variables within participants’ natural environments (Csikszentmihaly & 
Larson, 1987; Hormuth, 1986).  ESM uses signaling devices such as pagers, 
programmable wrist watches, or telephones to alert participants at quasi-random 
intervals.  In response to the signal, participants complete a questionnaire pertaining to 
their current experience (e.g., mood, affect, activities, etc).  The content of the 
questionnaire differs based on the investigator’s interests; however, most questionnaires 
include questions pertaining to the participant’s social context, location, time of the signal 
as well as his/her current affect and cognitions.  Overall, ESM aims to obtain an 
understanding of participants’ internal and external states at the moment of each signal. 
 ESM can be completed in two ways.  Traditionally, a paper-and-pencil technique 
is used in which participants complete a paper questionnaire at the moment of a signal or 
interval.  The paper-and-pencil method is cost efficient and can be administered to a large 
number of participants with minimal risk of participants’ losing or damaging laboratory 
equipment.  On the other hand, the paper-and-pencil method does not allow investigators 
to randomize presentation of items on the questionnaires, lacks the ability to extract 
compliance data, increases data management demands, and increases human error in data 
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entry.  More recently, ESM has replaced the paper questionnaires with computerized 
technologies, such as handheld electronic devices or Palm Pilots, on which participants 
complete their questionnaires.  Using electronic devices allows the time in which 
participants complete the questionnaire to be recorded and thus yields compliance data. 
Furthermore, computerized devices are advantageous as they allow for precisely 
controlled timing, randomization of item presentation, and reduce human error.  Using 
electronic devices also increases the likelihood of timely reporting (Barrett & Barrett, 
2001).  Disadvantages of electronic devices include possible programming complications, 
additional setup and maintenance, possible loss of data as a result of electronic 
malfunctions, and increased cost associated with purchasing the electronic devices 
(Stone, Kessler, & Haythornthwaite, 1991).  
 ESM has been used to investigate a multitude of inner experiences and how they 
relate to situational variables (Hormuth, 1986).  In terms of inner experiences, ESM has 
been used to explore participants’ mood, cognitions, and affects.  ESM has investigated 
gender differences (Graef, 1979), inner experiences of individuals with a psychiatric 
disorder (Kimhy, Delespaul, Corcoran, Ahn, Yale, & Malaspina, 2007; Delespaul, 1995), 
adolescents as they emerge through puberty (Savin-Williams & Jaquish, 1981), the 
affects of mothers’ with infants (Wells, 1988), clusters of emotions within families 
(Larson & Richards, 1994), and differences in positive and negative emotional 
experiences among culturally-different participants (Scollon, Diner, Oishi, & Biswas-
Diner, 2004) among others. 
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 Major Depressive Disorder 
 Several ESM studies have focused on the experience of depression.  For example, 
Peeters, Berkhof, Delespaul, Rottenberg, and Nicolson (2006) examined the pattern of 
negative and positive affect experienced by depressed and non-depressed individuals over 
the course of a day. Participants were asked to report the presence of 16 emotions (8 
positive emotions and 8 negative emotions) 10 times a day with 90-minutes as the 
average interval between ratings.  Results demonstrated that depressed individuals 
experienced significantly less positive affect and more negative affect than non-depressed 
participants.  Furthermore, they found that non-depressed individuals exhibited an 
increase in positive affect throughout the day beginning in the morning will low levels of 
positive affect and ending the afternoon and evening with high levels of positive affect.  
In contrast, depressed individuals exhibited a pronounced diurnal rhythm for negative 
affect which varied moment to moment substantially more than the healthy controls. 
 Another study compared retrospective and momentary reports of affect for 
depressed individuals and nonclinical controls (Ben-Zeev, Young, & Madsen, 2009).  
The study used ESM to obtain momentary reports of affect as participants were asked to 
complete the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Telligen, 1988) at each sampling moment.  After one week of randomly recording their 
affect approximately 8 times a day, participants were asked to retrospectively rate the 
degree to which they experienced negative and positive affect throughout the previous 
week.  Results found that both depressed and non-depressed participants exaggerated 
retrospective estimates of both positive and negative affect. However, the non-depressed 
group demonstrated a greater bias towards positive affect than the depressed group.  This 
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finding is consistent with the theory that non-depressed individuals experience a “rosy 
view” or “positive illusion” of their life (e.g., overly positive self-evaluation and 
unrealistic optimism) which has been theorized to foster psychological wellbeing 
(Mitchell, Thompson, Peterson, & Cronk, 1997).  Depressed individuals did not 
exaggerate positive affect more than negative affect suggesting that they do not display 
the same “rosy view” bias as demonstrated in non-depressed individuals. 
 Moberly and Watkins (2008) used ESM to examine the role of ruminative self-
focus for individuals reporting high and low levels of depressive symptoms.  Participants 
rated the degree to which they experienced sadness, anxiety, irritation, focus on feelings, 
and focus on problems using a 7-point rating scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) 8 
times over 7 days using a signal-contingent method.  Participants also completed scales 
that measured their depressive symptomatology and rumination response style.  Results 
demonstrated that ruminative self-focus was influenced by environmental context.  For 
example, ruminative self-focus increased as feelings or problems become more salient.  
They also found that the degree of self-focus tended to be highest in the morning and in 
the evening, which may be a function of the nature of activity during a typical day.  
These findings are also consistent with Peeters et al. (2006) which found that depressed 
individuals experience more negative affect in the morning as compared to the afternoon 
and evening.  Lastly, they found that ruminative self-focus was strongly associated with 
negative affect.  
Another study examined the relationship between emotion intensity, lability, and 
coping strategies and depressive symptoms in a sample of adolescents using ESM (Silk, 
Steinberg, & Morris, 2003).  Participants were instructed to rate the presence and 
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intensity of anxiety, sadness, and anger on a 5-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very 
much).  Participants were also asked to report recent events that occurred that were 
emotionally salient and any strategies that they used to regulate their negative emotions.  
They found that adolescents who were less likely to employ strategies to regulate their 
negative affect were experiencing more depressive symptoms than adolescents who used 
emotional regulation strategies.  In addition, the intensity of emotions experienced and 
increased lability were associated with elevated depressive symptoms and behavioral 
problems. 
Bipolar Disorder 
ESM has been used to examine emotional reactivity in individuals with BD.  
Myin-Germeys and colleagues (2003) investigated the emotional reactivity to daily 
hassles for participants with BD, MDD, and a control group.  Participants were cued ten 
times a day at unpredictable moments on six consecutive days. They found that in 
response to daily hassles, individuals with BD experienced a decrease in positive affect.  
In contrast, participants with MDD experienced an increase in negative affect and the 
control group experienced both an increase in negative affect and a decrease in positive 
affect.  Such results suggest mood disturbance impacts an individual’s emotional 
reactivity to daily stresses.  
Havermans and colleagues (2007, 2010) conducted two studies examining mood 
reactions of individuals with BD in order to better understand an individual’s propensity 
to experience a manic or depressive episode.  Using ESM, they monitored negative and 
positive mood states, and reactivity to daily hassles.  Results demonstrated that there was 
not a significant difference in negative or positive affect between individuals with BD 
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and a control group (Havermans et al., 2007; Havermans et al., 2010). However, 
participants with BD with subsyndromal depressive symptoms displayed particularly 
large negative affect in response to daily hassles and reported such daily hassles to be 
stressful (Havermans et al., 2007; Havermans et al., 2010).  Notably, they found that the 
participants with BD were more often alone and at home and spent less time working and 
more time in passive leisure activities as compared to a control group (Havermans et al., 
2007). 
ESM has also been used to understand the cognitive processes and coping styles 
of individuals with BD.  One study examined momentary self-esteem, emotion, and use 
of coping styles over a six day period (Bentall, Myin-Germeys, Smith, Knowles, Jones, 
Smith, et al., 2011).  Participants with BD displayed higher fluctuations in self-esteem, 
evidence of alcohol and substance abuse, and more dysfunctional coping styles including 
rumination and risk-taking as compared to a control group.  
Strengths and Weaknesses of ESM 
Overall, ESM provides many advantages in the study of individuals’ inner 
experience.  ESM reduces reliance on memory as participants report their current 
experience at the moment of the signal.  As Ben-Zeev, Young and Madsen (2009) 
demonstrated, depressed individuals are not accurate in their retrospective recall of 
negative and positive emotions.  ESM can be used in single case studies, yielding 
idiographic results, and also with a large number of individuals, yielding nomothetic 
results (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987).  ESM is an ecologically valid method 
allowing for real-life contextual analysis of behavior with repeated-measure designs.  
ESM can extract information about participants’ behavior, affect, and/or cognitions that 
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can be compared to situational variables (Hormuth, 1986).  Lastly, the questionnaires 
used in ESM procedures can vary to obtain as much information as desired about a 
participant’s internal and external experiences. 
ESM techniques also have limitations.  For example, Larson and 
Csikszentmihalyi (1983) expressed concerns about sample biases.  Potentially, 
participants who are willing to participate in studies such as ESM, which are time-
consuming and require divulging of personal information, may differ in important ways 
from participants who refuse to participate.  Furthermore, because of the lengthy nature 
of ESM, many participants may prematurely drop-out of the study.  
Another limitation of ESM includes the questionnaires that participants are asked 
to complete throughout their sampling.  The questionnaires that are used intend to be 
thorough in providing a detailed and accurate description of a person’s experience at a 
particular moment in time.  However, it is impossible to create an exhaustive list of 
questions that address all possible events or occurrence a participant may experience.  For 
example, an ESM study may ask depressed individuals to rate their emotional 
experiences; however, perhaps the uniqueness of a depressed person’s experience is not 
captured in the intensity or specificity of a specific emotional experience.  Perhaps the 
content or the structure of their experience may be of importance. In addition, it is 
possible that participants may misunderstand or misread questions and the procedure 
does not provide participants an opportunity to explain their answers or provide 
additional information.  The lack of dialogue between participant and investigator also 
does not allow the opportunity for iterative training or the clarification of meaning.   
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Think-Aloud (TA) and Articulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations (ATSS) 
 Another technique used to explore the characteristics of inner experiences is 
Think-Aloud (TA).  TA is used to primarily assess cognitions, what and how a person 
thinks, as he/she completes a prescribed task.  Although TA mostly assesses cognitions, it 
was originally developed to better understand the relationship between cognition, affect, 
and behavior (Davison, Vogel, & Coffman, 1997; Ericsson & Simon, 1984).  TA 
techniques have been used as early as the 1950s to study college students’ problem-
solving skills (Bloom & Broder, 1950) and to study the thought processes of average and 
superior chess players (de Groot, 1965).  
 TA studies typically explain to participants that most people have some sort of 
“internal monologue,” like an ongoing stream of thoughts that occur as they go about 
their daily activities. Participants are asked, as they complete an assigned task such as a 
math problem or a game of chess, to tune into their mental thoughts and verbally repeat 
them out loud, or “think-aloud.”  Participants’ thoughts are recorded and later transcribed 
and interpreted (Davison, Navarre, & Vogel, 1995). 
The Articulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations (ATSS) paradigm was created 
as an alternative to the Think-Aloud (TA) method (Davison, Robins & Johnson, 1983).  
Like TA, ATSS assumes people have an ongoing “internal dialogue” that can be naturally 
and easily attended to (Davison, Navarre, & Vogel, 1995).  Similarly, ATSS assesses 
participants’ inner thoughts as they verbalize their cognitions at the moment they occur.  
ATSS is a laboratory procedure in which participants listen to a hypothetical scenario via 
a video or audio tape player and are asked to imagine themselves in that situation.  Once 
the scenario has been played, participants are asked to articulate their ongoing thoughts as 
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they occur (Eckhardt, Barbour, & Davison, 1998).  Following the simulated situation, 
participants’ responses are coded for content and structure and further analyzed.  
 ATSS is advantageous in studying emotional experience because the selected 
scenarios can elicit a target emotion.  Surveying participants with similar or different 
scenarios and comparing the changes in think-aloud reports extracts qualitative data in 
terms of how cognitions change as a result of external influences.  ATSS has been used to 
investigate the thought patterns of participants with psychopathology.  
 Major Depressive Disorder 
 TA has also been used to examine the experiences of depressed individuals.  For 
example, Mayo and Tanaka-Matsumi (1996) compared problem solving abilities of 
dysphoric individuals and non-dysphoric individuals using the TA method.  Participants 
watched a video recording of an interpersonal problem depicting the loss of a 
relationship.  Participants were then asked to solve the problem while thinking aloud.  
Prior to the TA procedure, participants were asked to rate their perceived ability to 
problem solve.  Results demonstrated that the dysphoric group rated their problem 
solving abilities to be limited as compared to the non-dysphoric group. However, despite 
the low ratings of problem solving abilities, the dysphoric group demonstrated as many 
and as effective solutions to the interpersonal problem as compared to the non-dysphoric 
group.  However, a closer examination of their problem solving technique exposed that 
the dysphoric group were more likely than the non-dysphoric group to use an emotional 
problem solving approach (e.g., seeking emotional support or disengaging from the 
problem).  In contrast, the non-dysphoric group was more likely to engage in problem 
focused solutions which directly solved the problem.  
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 Barnhofer and colleagues (2002) examined depressed and non-depressed 
individuals recall of autobiographical memories.  Participants were presented with a cue 
word (positive words: happy, safe; negative words: sad, lonely) and were asked to 
verbalize thoughts aloud while remembering details of an autobiographical event for 2-
minutes.  Participants’ verbalized thoughts were recorded and later transcribed to be 
coded for the number of memories described and the specificity of each memory (i.e., a 
specific event, an extended even that occurred over a period of time, or categorical such 
as a series of repeated events).  Results demonstrated that depressed individuals produced 
less specific memories of an event, but recalled more categorical memories as compared 
to non-depressed individuals.  Such findings are consistent with the theory that depressed 
individuals engage in increased levels of rumination thus making their memory search 
generally less focused as compared to non-depressed individuals. 
White, Davison, Haaga, and White (1992) used the ATSS method to compare the 
depressed and non-depressed participants’ reaction to negative, neutral, and positive 
audiotaped simulated situations.  Depressed participants demonstrated substantially more 
negative cognitions in response to the negative situation as compared to the non-
depressed participants.  Such results suggest that depressed individuals’ cognitive style 
may be directly associated with situational variables. 
 Bipolar Disorder 
 We could not find any current TA or ATSS studies that examined the experiences 
of individuals with BD. 
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 Strengths and Weaknesses of TA and ATSS 
 Overall, Think-Aloud methods are advantageous in examining the experience of 
depressed individuals as it minimizes retrospective errors as participants are asked to 
report their ongoing thought processes as they occur or immediately thereafter (Davison, 
Navarre, & Vogel, 1995).  Also, TA and ATSS are relatively unstructured, allowing 
participants to report all cognitions in an open-ended manner rather than being limited to 
prescribed questions chosen by an investigator.  Lastly, TA and ATSS provide 
investigators with laboratory flexibility in that investigators can alter emotion or thought 
provoking scenarios to explore, describe, and compare thoughts from a variety of 
participants in an assortment of scenarios (Davison, Vogel, & Coffman, 1997). 
Despite its many advantages, TA and ATSS also have some disadvantages.  TA 
and ATSS are not ecologically valid; thus they present a picture of laboratory-induced 
mental processes that may or may not parallel mental process outside of the laboratories. 
Some investigators have argued for the need for caution given the potential for reactive 
interference between verbalizing thoughts and the actual thinking process.  During a TA 
session, participants are asked to verbalize their ongoing cognitions while completing a 
task.  Some critics of TA and ATSS question participants’ ability to complete the dual 
demands of paying attention to cognitions and simultaneously verbalizing them while not 
losing any important parts of the experience (Davison, Navarre, & Vogel, 1995).  Also, 
Klinger (1975) suggested that participants, while completing the Think-Aloud task, can 
only express a small portion of their cognitions since participants’ verbalization will 
interfere with the natural flow of experience.  It is also possible that cognitions that seem 
of relatively low frequency or low importance may not be reported at all or as often as 
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those that seem to be of high relevance (Davison, Navarre, & Vogel, 1995).  For 
example, if a participant is asked to report his experience while taking a math test, the 
participant may begin to think about what he is going to have for lunch; however, 
because this thought seems unrelated to the task at hand the participant may be reluctant 
to verbalize it. 
Fundamentally, TA assumes a person’s stream of consciousness consists only of 
words or experiences that can be easily summarized or conveyed via words and is 
presented in a constant stream of ongoing thoughts.  However, some introspective 
research does not support this language-dominant internal world but rather an internal 
world populated by mental images, unsymbolized thinking, inner speaking, inner hearing, 
sensory experiences, and much more (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).  Asking participants to 
report thoughts as they occur could result in participants converting these other rich 
experiences into verbal terms that may not provide a precise portrait of the nature or 
richness of inner experience as it occurs, particularly given the time constraints inherent 
in TA and ATSS procedures. 
Diary Methods 
Diary methods have also been used to investigate inner experience.  Diary 
methods refer to self-report instruments that are used repeatedly to examine experiences 
or behaviors; for example, participants may be asked to maintain a diary of their 
experiences over hours, days, weeks, and sometimes months (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 
2003).  Diary methods usually have two goals: to explore phenomena as it unfolds over 
time and to investigate particular phenomena (Bolger et al., 2003).  Diary strategies differ 
from personal diaries in that participants are instructed to record thoughts, emotions, or 
 40 
 
behaviors about a specific topic as it occurs within a specified time-frame rather than 
writing freely about anything.  Participants are made aware of the research target so that 
they record their experiences accordingly. 
 There are three types of diary schedules: interval-contingent, signal-contingent, 
and event-contingent (Bolger et al., 2003).  Interval-contingent methods require 
participants to report their experiences at predetermined intervals (e.g., every 5 hours, 
every day, etc).  Signal contingent relies upon signal devices to alert participants to 
record diary entries at fixed, random, or a combination of fixed and random intervals.  
Event-contingent diary methods require participants to record their experience each time 
an event occurs (e.g., every time they eat, each time they speak to their spouse, etc.).   
 Similar to ESM techniques, some diary studies use electronic devices for data 
collection. Electronic devices used with diary methods include palmtop computers or 
personal digital assistants (PDAs; Bolger et al., 2003).  Paper-and-pencil diaries are 
equipped with some obvious limitations including participants’ forgetfulness and 
compliance as well as participants feeling hesitant to be completely open and honest in 
their entries fearing that their diary may be viewed by others in their environment.  Some 
studies have found electronic diaries increase compliance as compared to paper-and-
pencil methods. 
 On the other hand, Green, Rafaeli, Bolger, Shrout, and Reis (2006) found that 
both the paper-and-pencil and computerized methods yielded a compliance rate of 
approximately 86 percent.  Despite the comparable compliance rate, they found that 
participants using the paper-and-pencil method were less likely than participants using 
the computerized method to complete all of the daily entries.  Green and colleagues 
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(2006) also investigated compliance rates of the paper-and-pencil method combined with 
increasing participants’ motivation and researcher-participant rapport.  Results found 
only 9.9% of paper-and-pencil entries were made outside of a five to fifteen minute 
interval. 
 Major Depressive Disorder 
 Several diary studies have examined the experience of depression.  Some diary 
studies have focused on behaviors or interpersonal interactions of individuals with 
depression.  For example, Hopka and Mullane (2008) used a daily diary method and 
behavioral coding system to examine whether depressed and non-depressed individuals 
differed with regards to their behaviors.  Their findings demonstrated that depressed 
participants engaged less frequently in social, physical, and educational activities as 
compared to non-depressed participants; however, they engaged more frequently in 
employment-related behaviors as compared to non-depressed individuals.  Such result 
suggests that depressed individuals’ environment and behavioral engagement is 
qualitatively different than non-depressed individuals. 
 Similarly, Wang and colleagues (2004) examined the degree to which depressive 
symptoms interfere with daily behaviors and functioning.  They used a diary method to 
examine the moment-in-time work performance among service workers who were 
depressed as compared to service workers who were not depressed.  Participants were 
provided with a pager and were asked to report on their current work performance at the 
random time points in which the pager alerted.  Participants were signaled to rate their 
work performance five times daily for seven days.  Findings demonstrated that depressed 
participants exhibited decrements in work performance for task focus and productivity as 
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compared to non-depressed participants.  Overall, the diminished work performance was 
estimated to be equal to approximately 2 absent days per month for the depressed 
participants. 
 Eberhart and Hammen (2010) examined the relationship between interpersonal 
style, stress and depressed mood.  Their sample consisted of female college students.  
Participants were instructed to complete a daily survey online for 14 consecutive days 
which consisted of an interpersonal style questionnaire, a romantic life events 
questionnaire which measured romantic stressors, questions pertaining to outside stress 
(i.e., school and work), and a measure of daily depressive symptoms.  Results 
demonstrated that romantic conflict stress mediated the relationship between 
interpersonal style and depressive symptoms suggesting a transactional model of 
interpersonal style and depression.  Results did not demonstrate support of a diathesis-
stress model of depression which understands depressive symptoms as being produced by 
interpersonal vulnerabilities that interact with conflict stressors. 
 Rook (2001) examined the relationship between interpersonal interactions on 
negative and positive mood for older adults (mean age 70).  Participants engaged in an 
interview to assess their background, health status, social network, life stress, and 
emotional health.  Participants were then asked to maintain a daily diary for 2 weeks 
which assessed mood and positive and negative social interactions.  For social 
interactions, the diary included a checklist of 14 possible positive exchanges and 6 
negative social exchanges; participants were asked to indicate whether each of the 
exchanges occurred.  Findings suggested that negative social exchanges were more 
influential on participants’ moods than were positive social exchanges.  For example, 
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negative exchanges further intensified negative mood and often diminished positive 
mood.  In contrast, positive exchanges did not counteract negative moods.  Furthermore, 
frequent negative exchanges were significantly related to increased depressed moods and 
reports of loneliness.  In contrast, positive exchanges were only significantly related to 
less loneliness. 
 Another study focused on the emotional experiences of individuals with 
depression.  Chepenik and colleagues (2006) examined the experience depressive 
disorders for elderly individuals as compared to non-depressed elderly individuals.  
Participants were asked to maintain a daily diary of their affective states for a two-week 
period.  Depressed participants exhibited significant day-to-day variability in their 
negative affect as compared to the non-depressed controls.  In addition, dysphoric days 
(i.e., days with negative affect ratings) occurred approximately 63% of the time for 
participants with Major Depressive Disorder, 50% of the time for participants with other 
depressive disorders, and only 7% of the time for non-depressed participants. Results also 
found that participants with MDD appeared to have blunted positive affect in response to 
positive events as compared with non-depressed participants. 
 Mor and colleagues (2010) examined the cognitive style of adolescents’ with 
depression.  Participants were asked to complete diary measures, including measures of 
their current thoughts, affect, and levels of stress, six times a day for three days.  Results 
showed that among the depressed and non-depressed participants, negative affect was 
universally related to both concurrent stress and self-focus.  However, the relationship 
between negative affect and self-focused cognition was significantly stronger for 
 44 
 
participants with a recent depressive mood disorder as compared to participants without 
an emotional disorder. 
 Another study examined the relationship among interpersonal interactions and 
emotional and cognitive symptoms of depression.  Hankin (2010) used the elaborated 
cognitive vulnerability-transactional stress model (Hankin & Abramson, 2001) to predict 
that individuals who exhibit high negative emotionality traits will likely create additional 
stressors in their environment and subsequently will be more likely to display cognitive 
vulnerabilities and interpret negative events in a depressed manner.  Participants were 
asked to maintain a daily diary for 35 consecutive days in which they rated their 
depressive symptoms and the objective stressors they were experiencing.  Results were 
supportive of the elaborated cognitive vulnerability-transactional stress model such that 
individuals with higher levels of trait negative emotionality as measured at baseline 
encountered significantly more objective stressors over time and interpreted those 
stressors in negative ways.  In other words, the dysfunctional interpretations and negative 
cognitive style interacted with the daily stressors which predicted the variability of 
depressive symptoms. 
 Bipolar Disorder 
 Diary studies have been frequently employed to investigate the behavior (e.g., 
sleep and activities) of individuals with BD (Gershon, Thompson, Eidelman, 
McGlinchey, Kaplan, & Harvey, 2012; Mullin, Harvey, & Hinshaw, 2011).  However, 
there have only been a few studies that have explored the inner experience of individuals 
with BD.  One study (Knowles, Tair, Jones, Highfield, Morriss, & Bentall, 2007) 
examined the self-esteem and presence of positive or negative affect of individuals with 
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BD in remission as compared to healthy controls and individuals with depression.  
Participants were asked to complete a diary twice a day for two weeks measuring self-
esteem and experienced positive and negative affect.  The participants with BD 
demonstrated stronger fluctuations in self-esteem and experienced affect as compared to 
the healthy controls and individuals with depression.  They also found that the individuals 
with BD evidenced pessimistic attributional style.  
 Gershon and colleagues (2012) also examined the presence of negative affect in 
relation to sleep.  Participants maintained a diary of their sleep and affect.  Results found 
the participants with BD experienced longer sleep onset latency and experienced higher 
negative affect as compared to the control group.  
 Two studies (Hofmann & Meyer, 2006; Jones, Tai, Evershed, Knowles, & 
Brentrall, 2006) examined the experienced of individuals identified as being at-risk for 
developing BD.  Jones and colleagues’ (2006) participants included children between the 
ages of 13 and 19 who had a parent who was diagnosed with BD.  Participants were 
asked to complete a 7-day recording of their sleep, activities, perceived self-esteem and 
experience of positive and negative affect.  Hofmann and Meyer’s (2006) participants 
included individuals who scored in the elevated range on the Hypomanic Personality 
Scale (2006) which indicated that they may be at risk for developing BD.  Participants 
completed a 28-day diary which involved some self-report measures which assessed for 
affect and manic symptoms.  Both studies found that the participants identified for being 
“at-risk” for BD demonstrated mood instability.  Such results suggest that mood 
instability may increase one’s vulnerability for BD.   
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 Strengths and Weaknesses of Diary Methods 
 Overall, diary methods are advantageous in that they reduce retrospective 
memory errors and allow for analysis of within-person differences as well as between-
person differences (Bolger et al., 2003).  For example, McAuliffe, DiFrancesico, and 
Reed (2007) instructed participants to maintain a daily diary of sexual behaviors for three 
months.  At the end of the three months, participants completed a retrospective survey 
estimating the frequency of sexual behaviors.  Fifty percent of participants under-
estimated their sexual practices and 17% over-estimated their sexual practices on the 
retrospective questionnaire (McAuliffe, DiFranceisco, & Reed, 2007).  Winkielman, 
Schwarz, and Belli (1998) suggest that differences among retrospective questionnaires, 
sampling procedures, and diary reports are due to participants’ interpretation of the 
questions.  Concurrent reports, such as diary methods and sampling procedures, provide a 
shorter reference period such as at the moment of a signal.  How often a participant 
reports experiencing negative, self-degrading thoughts in the past week, month, or even 
year would most likely be less accurate than the same participant’s report of how often 
he/she experienced self-degrading thoughts within one day or one hour. 
 Diary methods also have numerous disadvantages.  For example, diary methods 
often require detailed training sessions to ensure participants fully understand the diary 
protocols (Reis & Gabel, 2000).  Little is known about whether keeping a daily diary 
affects experiences that are reported (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003).  Some diary 
studies have documented negative mood elevation at the beginning of sampling, although 
the elevated mood is usually short-lived (Gleason, Bolger, & Shrout, 2001).  In studies of 
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MDD and BD, such changes in mood could be detrimental in the interpretation of 
research findings.   
 Diary methods also have similar limitations as ESM studies with regards to the 
questionnaire participants are asked to complete throughout their sampling.  As with 
ESM, the questionnaires are intended to be thorough in providing a detailed and accurate 
description of a person’s experience of something.  However, it is impossible to create an 
exhaustive list of questions that address all possible events or experiences.  In addition, it 
is possible that participants may misunderstand or misread questions and diary methods 
do not provide participants an opportunity to explain their answers or gain feedback with 
regards to their performance.  The lack of dialogue between participant and investigator 
also does not allow the opportunity for iterative training or the clarification of meaning.   
Descriptive Experience Sampling 
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) is an idiographic, exploratory method 
developed by Hurlburt (1990, 1993) to describe inner experience faithfully.  DES begins 
by attempting to apprehend single, randomly chosen moments of inner experience and 
then uses these individual moments of experience to build an idiographic profile of an 
individual’s inner experience.  DES aims to observe and describe pristine internal 
experience free of interference from the participant or the investigator (Hurlburt & 
Akhter, 2006).  DES rules out anything that is outside of the participant’s current 
awareness (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006) and thus participant’s explanations, interpretations, 
“unconscious” processes, and events occurring before or after the beep are avoided in 
DES.  
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 DES participants are given a device that randomly emits a beep through an 
earphone.  Participants are asked to choose a time during the day to turn on the beeper 
and carry it with them throughout their regular daily activities.  Once turned on, the 
beeper randomly will emit a beep. When the beep sounds, participants are asked to 
“freeze” and remember or take notice of their inner experience that was ongoing at the 
moment the beep sounded.  Inner experience refers to anything within a participant’s 
awareness, including but not limited to thoughts, feelings, sensations, images, etc.  
Participants are asked to jot down notes about their inner experience at that moment in a 
small notebook, reset the beeper, and continue on with their daily activities.  This 
procedure is typically repeated until the participant has received six beeps, which usually 
takes about three hours.  By nature, DES is an exploratory procedure; therefore, specific 
instructions as to what the participant will most likely experience are not given and it is 
entirely possible a participant will experience something no previous participant has 
experienced.  A detailed description of the instructions given to participants, including an 
annotated transcript of the instructions, can be found in Hurlburt and Heavey (2006). 
Within 24 hours of sampling, an expositional interview takes place between the 
investigator and the participant in which they discuss each moment of sampled inner 
experience.  The goal of the expositional interview is to develop as clear and precise an 
apprehension of each sampled moment of inner experience as possible.  During the 
interview the investigator strives to remain non-leading in his/her questioning.  In order 
to remain unbiased and non-leading, the participant and investigator must bracket their 
presuppositions with regard to the nature of inner experience (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).  
In addition, the investigator must also carefully evaluate the participant’s use of 
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“subjunctifiers,” or descriptions of inner experiences that are verbally asserted using 
subjunctive, non-declarative statements (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).  
DES is an iterative procedure (Hurlburt, 2009; Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006).  Most 
participants are not skilled observers of their inner experiences.  During the first day of 
sampling they usually are unprepared for the investigator’s direct and specific 
questioning about their moments of inner experiences.  Thus, DES practitioners usually 
consider the first day of sampling a practice session and do not include the first day of 
sampled moments in data analyses (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).  Usually, participants 
engage in three to eight days of sampling, yielding between 18 and 48 moments of 
experience. 
DES studies vary greatly in the types of participants sampled and participants’ 
reported experiences. Some DES studies explore one participant’s inner experiences.  In 
these studies, the DES method is used for idiographic purposes, aimed to describe the 
unique characteristics of a unique individual (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006).  Other DES 
studies explore a collection of participants who have a feature in common, such as a 
psychiatric diagnosis (e.g., schizophrenia, depression, Asperger’s syndrome, etc.) or an 
external characteristic (e.g., speed of talking).  In such studies, the investigator first 
apprehends participants’ experiences idiographically and then nomothetically examines if 
any salient characteristics emerge across the collection of participants as a whole 
(Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006).  Such nomothetic analyses of inner experiences begin at the 
bottom – faithfully describing a single experience of a single participant.  Idiographic 
DES studies have been used to develop a codebook for frequently occurring 
characteristics of experience (Hurlburt & Heavey, 1999). 
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DES has been used to explore inner experiences of individuals with psychiatric 
diagnoses in common.  For example, Hurlburt, Happe, and Frith (1994) explored the 
inner experience of three participants diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome.  They found 
the Aspergers participants’ inner experiences were either nonexistent or exclusively 
characterized by images with rarely any other feature of inner experience.  In addition, 
these participants showed no interest or curiosity about the differences between their own 
experiences and experiences of other participants, something that is uncommon with the 
DES participants (Hurlburt, Happe, & Frith, 1994).  
DES has also been used to explore experiences of participants diagnosed with 
schizophrenia (Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987; Hurlburt, 1990).  Such studies have 
demonstrated that participants diagnosed with schizophrenia tend to experience “goofed-
up” images and hyper-clear emotional experiences.  These studies have suggested 
perhaps individuals with schizophrenia experience distortions or hallucinations on a 
smaller scale everyday in their conscious experience (Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987a).  
Participants’ with anxiety (Hebert & Hurlburt, 1993) and depression (Hurlburt, 1993) 
have also participated in DES studies.  Results indicate participants with increased 
anxiety often engage in self and other-directed criticism (Hebert & Hurlburt, 1993). 
Participants with depression tend to experience more unsymbolized thinking as compared 
to participants without depression (Hurlburt, 1993).  
DES has also explored the relationship between inner experiences and external 
characteristics.  Hurlburt, Koch, and Heavey (2002) evaluated the connection between 
inner experience and the rate of participants’ speaking measured in words per minute.  
They found the collection of participants with high-speech-rates experienced three-times 
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more multiple awarenesses (25.9% as compared with 7.1%) and experienced higher 
frequency of just engaging in an activity with no ongoing inner experience, a 
phenomenon called “just doing,” as compared to the comparison group.  
High inter-rater reliability has been demonstrated for the DES method such that 
DES investigators agree upon the categorization of experiences using a codebook 
developed by Hurlburt and Heavey (1999; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).  Results yielded 
interobserver agreement of 98% for the 11 low frequency characteristics of inner 
experience and 91.3% for the five high frequency characteristics.  The characteristic with 
the lowest reliability was sensory awareness. 
DES is well suited to exploring inner experience in that it captures pristine inner 
experiences; it is exploratory and idiographic in nature; and it does not make assumptions 
about the characteristics of inner experience such as assuming inner experience is always 
present or consists of one pattern for all participants.  DES reduces reliance on 
participants’ memory by having the participant take notes about the experience 
immediately after it occurs and by scheduling the follow-up expositional interview within 
24-hours of the collection of beeps.  DES is ecologically valid, allowing for a depiction 
of inner experience in participants’ natural environments.  
Major Depressive Disorder 
 There have been several DES studies on depression.  Hurlburt (1993) examined 
the experience of four participants who were depressed or dysphoric.  Participants were 
sampled during times of dysphoric mood and times of euthymic mood.  The collected 
moments of experience were examined for similarities of experience individually and as a 
sample.  Overall, depressed mood was associated with an increase in unsymbolized 
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thought, the experience of thinking without the content of the thinking being represented 
in words, images, or other symbols (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2008; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002; 
Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).  It was also noted that participants had a more difficult time 
observing and articulating the characteristics of their experience when in a depressed 
mood.  
 Another study explored the characteristics of inner experience for depressed and 
non-depressed participants using DES (Perlotto, 2001).  The moments of experience were 
coded for prominent characteristics of inner experience.  Results found that depressed 
participants experienced feelings, sensory awareness, and unsymbolized thinking most 
frequently, whereas non-depressed participants experienced feelings, inner seeing (e.g., 
images), and sensory awareness most frequently.  Notably, depressed participants 
experienced more negative feelings than positive feelings as compared to non-depressed 
participants.  Depressed participants also had more multiple experiences in each sampled 
moments as compared to the non-depressed group. Similar to Hurlburt (1993), these 
findings were restricted by a small sample size of three depressed and five non-depressed 
participants.  
 Cavenagh (2003) explored the relationship between cognitive style and 
depression with DES for two participants who were determined to be at-risk for 
depression compared to four participants who were determined to not be at-risk for 
depression.  The two participants at-risk for depression exhibited substantial differences 
in their inner experience as compared to the four participants who were determined to not 
be at-risk for depression.  The two at-risk for depression participants’ inner experiences 
exhibited evidence of a negative cognitive triad, whereas the remaining participants did 
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not.  The two at-risk for depression participants also experienced the greatest frequency 
of negative valence in their sampled moments of experiences (61% and 39%) and were 
described to have a more depressed feel to their experiences as determined by the clinical 
impressions of the researchers conducting the expositional interviews.  Consistent with 
Perlotto (2001), the at-risk for depression participants in Cavenagh’s (2003) study 
infrequently experienced inner seeing, or images, and more often experienced sensory 
awareness as compared to the non-depressed participants.  Overall, Cavenagh (2003) 
determined that the results did not show patterns consistent with the current theories of 
depression. 
 Gunter (2007) also examined the inner experience of individuals with depression 
using DES and found results consistent with Perlotto (2001) such that depressed 
participants exhibited more negative experiences than positive experiences as compared 
to the non-depressed participants.  Furthermore, depressed participants exhibited more 
negative physical sensations than non-depressed participants and such physical sensations 
were often associated with an affective experience.  
 DES has also been used to explore the inner experiences of three depressed 
participants over the first 10 weeks of antidepressant medication (Lefforge, 2007).  
Results were supportive of the aforementioned findings that participants more frequently 
experienced negative emotions compared to positive emotions.  Substantial individual 
differences in inner experience were also noted among the participants. Participants also 
displayed a high degree of comorbidity and a variety of patterns of changes in symptoms 
across the 10 weeks.  
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 Bipolar Disorder 
 DES has been used to explore the inner experience of those with BD.  Hurlburt 
(1993) sampled with four participants who had various affective disorders ranging from 
hypomanic to normal dysphoric and mildly depressed to deeply depressed.  The 
participant who experienced hypomania experienced inner seeing in 95% of his sampled 
moments.  The majority of those inner seeing were recreations of scenes he had seen 
earlier in reality.  The inner seeings were characterized by clarity, color, rich visual 
details, movement within the inner seeing, and the center of the inner seeing being clear 
with the periphery gradually degrading.  However, the inner seeings seemed to alter in 
relation to the participant’s mood altering.  For example, during his period of fatigue, his 
inner experience was dominated by inner seeing with abrupt edges, lacking motion, and 
with visual details indeterminate.  This participant also seemed to struggle to distinguish 
how his emotional experiences were present to him despite being able to differentiate 
between emotions.  The participants who experienced depression evidenced more 
unsymbolized inner experience.  He also reported few incidents of inner seeing, inner 
speaking, and feelings.  He also seemed to have a harder time observing and 
communicating the characteristics of his inner experience as the severity of his 
depression increased.  
 Limitations to DES 
 There are limitations of DES that are worth noting.  Like most qualitative 
methods, data collection in the DES method is time-consuming, requiring a substantial 
commitment of the investigator’s and participant’s time.  For example, participants are 
asked to come in for an initial meeting with the researchers during which they are given a 
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brief description of the DES procedure as well as instructions regarding using the beeper 
and collecting sampled moments of experience.  This first meeting generally lasts 
between a half hour and an hour.  Participants are then asked to collect six moments of 
experience during a time of their choosing.  This takes approximately another three 
hours. After the collection of the beeps, participants return for an hour long expositional 
interview about their experiences at each moment of the beep.  After the completion of 
this process, the researchers write a brief description of each moment of experience.  This 
process usually is repeated four to eight times.  The time consuming nature of DES limits 
the number of participants that can be used for each study.  The time-consuming nature of 
DES may also result in sampling bias in that participants who volunteer to participate in 
such a time consuming research study may be qualitatively different than other potential 
participants. 
Another potential limitation to DES research is the lack of situational control. 
Participants are asked to collect sampled moments of their experience during any time of 
their choosing.  Some participants collect their moments of experience while in class 
while other participants may collect their moments of experience while working and so 
forth.  Some participants may only collect their moments of experience in particular times 
or activities resulting in a non-typical representation of their inner experience.  For 
example, a person’s inner experience while doing homework may be different than if 
he/she is socializing with friends.  Gathering moments of experience only while doing 
homework may not lead to an accurate portrayal of that person’s experience.  The 
situational variability also makes comparison between two participants difficult because 
of the variability in their environment when they collected their sampled moments.  
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Furthermore, the situational variability may account for some of the differences in 
experience observed between groups.  For example, perhaps the typical situation in which 
a depressed person samples (e.g., alone in their house) may be qualitatively different than 
a non-depressed person (e.g., out with friends).  Additional research is needed to further 
understand the effects of situational variability on inner experience. 
Another limitation of DES is its lack of ability to monitor whether participants 
actually report on their experience at the moment of the beep.  Some ESM and diary 
methods utilized technologies that record the time in which participants report their 
experiences.  This allows researchers to monitor how compliant participants are with 
regards to the task.  DES participants are told that they can choose to not discuss any 
particular sampled moment with the researchers. Such sampled moments may include 
moments participants may feel uncomfortable or be embarrassed to discuss with the 
researchers or moments in which participants were not able to attend to their inner 
experience.  However, participants rarely present with sampled moments they do not 
wish to discuss.  This may demonstrate that such moments are infrequent or participants 
may be choosing not to observe such moments and subsequently replace them with other 
moments of experience or avoid participating in events that they do not want to discuss 
with the researchers. 
Perhaps most importantly, DES is a method that appears to require high levels of 
skill to be performed with fidelity.  It is difficult to train these skills and challenging to 
determine the level of skill of specific investigators.  Furthermore, neither the participant 
nor the investigator appear to be in a good position to independently assess their level of 
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skill at performing DES or the adequacy of their performance in any particular 
investigation.  This is a complex issue that defies a simple solution.   
The Present Study 
 The present study used the Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) method to 
explore the inner experience of three individuals with MDD and three individuals BD.  
Participants were recruited from the Las Vegas, Nevada area.  Volunteers who self-
reported a diagnosis of MDD or BD were assessed for the presence of those disorders 
using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I disorders (SCID-I; First, 
Gibbon, Spitzer, & Williams, 1997) and the Center for Epidemiological Studies – 
Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1997).  Participants who met the criteria for MDD or 
BD were invited to participate in Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES).  
Participants wore a random signal generator (beeper) while engaging in their 
typical daily activities.  When signaled by the beeper, participants were asked to observe 
their inner experiences.  Participants were asked to engage in approximately eight days of 
sampling spread out over several weeks.  After each day of sampling, participants were 
interviewed by the researcher and faculty supervisors to obtain an understanding of the 
participants’ inner experiences at each sampled moment.  
After each interview, the interviewers composed a summary of the participants’ 
sampled moments of experience.  The primary investigator and interviewers engaged in a 
collaborative editing process in order to develop a written summary of the participants’ 
sampled moments that attempts to capture the essence of the their inner experience.  
These written summaries were used to create an individual profile of each participant’s 
inner experience.  The investigator also reviewed the sampled moments of the group of 
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participants as a whole to determine if any of commonalities exist in the inner experience 
of the participants. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Participants included individuals from the Las Vegas area with a diagnosis of 
MDD or BD.  Participants were recruited through flyers describing the present study and 
through support groups such as the National Alliance for Mental Illness (NAMI) and 
Mojave Mental Health.  Three volunteers who met criteria for MDD and three volunteers 
who met criteria for BD were invited to participate in the present study.  They were 
compensated $10 an hour for their participation with a bonus of $20 for completing the 
entire study.  
Materials 
 The informed consent form provided participants with a description of the study 
including expected risks and benefits of participation.  It also included contact 
information for the primary investigator and the office for the protection of research 
participants. 
 The demographic questionnaire included questions concerning a participant’s 
name, address, phone number(s), email address, age, ethnicity, sex, marital status, 
education level, and employment.  The demographic questionnaire also asked participants 
to indicate when they were first diagnosed with MDD or BD and to list any past and 
current treatments they have received (e.g., psychotherapy, pharmacological treatment).  
 The Center for Epidemiological Studies – Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 
1977) is a self-report measure in which participants rated the frequency in which they 
have experienced 20 symptoms of depression (e.g., depressed mood, appetite changes) 
 60 
 
during the past week.  Adequate internal consistency and test-retest reliability has been 
demonstrated for the CES-D (Radloff, 1977).  The CES-D provides scores ranging from 
0 to 60, with higher scores signifying higher levels of depression.  There is not a specific 
cut off score indicating the presence or absence of depression.  However, an arbitrary cut 
off score of 16 has been used and discriminated adequately between depressive patients 
and non-depressive patients (Radloff, 1977).  
 The Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1992) asked 
respondents to indicate the extent to which they are distressed by a broad range of 
psychological symptoms.  Participants rated the symptoms on a five-point scale ranging 
from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). The SCL-90-R provides nine primary symptom 
dimensions (Somatization, Obsessive-Compulsive, Interpersonal Sensitivity, Depression, 
Anxiety, Hostility, Phobic Anxiety, Paranoid Ideation, and Psychoticism), a general 
overview of psychological distress (Global Severity Index), a measure of intensity of the 
symptoms (Positive Symptom Distress Index), and an overall number of reported 
symptoms (Positive Symptom Total).  High reliability has been demonstrated with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.96 for the Global Severity Index (Schmitz, Hartkamp, Kiuse, 
Franke, Reister, & Tress, 2000).  
 The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I disorders (SCID-I; First, 
Gibbon, Spitzer, & Williams, 1997) is a semi-structured interview used to make 
psychiatric diagnoses.  The SCID-I includes ten modules which relate to DSM-IV 
diagnoses.  The mood disorders module will be used in the present study.  The mood 
disorders module comprehensively assesses for the presence of major depressive episode, 
manic episode, hypomanic episode, dysthymic disorder, mood disorder due to a general 
 61 
 
medical condition, and substance-induced mood disorder.  The administration time for 
the mood disorders module is approximately 30 to 60 minutes.  
A portable, pocket-sized beeper created by Hurlburt (2007) was used to randomly 
beep participants and alert them to pay attention to their current inner experience.  The 
beeper is a small rectangular box and is equipped with an on/off/volume dial.  When 
activated, the pocket-sized beeper randomly emits a 700-Hz tone through an ear-piece in 
intervals ranging from 0 to 60 minutes with a mean of 30 minutes.  The volume is 
adjustable, thus allowing alteration for personal preference and background noise levels.  
A pocket-sized, 3 X 5 inch notebook was given to participants to record notes 
about their inner experience when the beep sounds.  
Procedure 
 The primary investigator posted flyers advertising this study in the great Las 
Vegas community and recruited participants from support groups such as the National 
Alliance for Mental Illness (NAMI) and Mojave Mental Health.  Individuals who were 
interested in the study were asked to contact the primary investigator by telephone.  All 
volunteers who self-reported a diagnosis of MDD or BD and contacted the primary 
investigator were invited to participate in a one-hour appointment to determine eligibility.  
The one-hour eligibility appointment with the primary investigator took place in the 
Experience Sampling Lab at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV).  All 
appointments were conducted individually.  
 During this appointment, the study was explained to participants.  Any questions 
were answered and participants were asked to provide informed consent.  To assess 
whether participants met criteria for MDD or BD, they were administered the mood 
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disorders module of the SCID-I (First et al., 1997).  They were also asked to complete the 
demographic questionnaire, CES-D, and SCL-90.  
 Participants who met diagnostic criteria for MDD or BD on the SCID-I were 
invited to participate in Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES). Participants who did 
not meet criteria were compensated for their time and were not invited to participate in 
any further aspects of the study.  
After consenting to participate in DES, including videotaping or audiotaping of 
the interviews, the participant was given a beeper, an earphone and a 3 X 5 notebook.  
The investigator demonstrated how to work the beeper including how to turn it on and 
off, how to adjust the volume, how to plug in and wear the earphone, and how to reset the 
beeper once it had beeped.  The participant was instructed to turn on the beeper during a 
time of his/her choosing and to then continue on with his/her daily activities.  The 
investigator told the participant that once the beeper is turned on, it would emit a beep 
sometime within an hour.  At the onset of the beep, the participant was asked to recall 
what was occurring in his/her inner experience.  The participant was instructed to jot 
down notes about his/her ongoing inner experience right at the moment the beep began in 
the 3 X 5 notebook.  It was explained that the purpose of these notes was to help him/her 
recall the details of his/her experience at the moment of the beep during a later interview.  
The participant was asked to stop and reset the beeper after each beep and continue this 
process until a total of six beeps were emitted.  In explaining the procedures, the 
investigator was careful not to give specific, detailed instructions about what to pay 
attention to at the moment of the beep other than whatever is ongoing in awareness; these 
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details are left unclear because the investigator did not know what the participant will 
experience at the moment of the beep.  
The investigator also explained to the participant the nature of the co-investigator 
relationship of DES.  The investigator explained that participation involved wearing the 
beeper approximately 8 days and returning to the lab after each day of sampling for an 
expositional interview.  The purpose of these expositional interviews was to faithfully 
apprehend and then describe the participant’s inner experience at each moment.  During 
the expositional interview, the participant was asked to be open and honest and his/her 
inner experience and was given the right, at any time, to refuse discussion of sensitive 
material that may have been captured by the beep.  Participants were allowed to terminate 
their participation in the study at any time and were compensated for their participation.   
Prior to the completion of this first appointment, a second appointment was 
scheduled for an one-hour long expositional interview.  The second appointment was 
scheduled to take place within 24 hours of the collection of beeps.  
During the second appointment, a team of DES researchers, including Dr. Chris 
Heavey, Dr. Russell Hurlburt, and myself interviewed the participant about his/her 
collected samples until both the interviewers and the participant believed they had as 
clear an apprehension as possible of the participant’s inner experience at each beep.  The 
interviews were videotaped. 
The collection of sampled beeps followed by an expositional interview was 
repeated approximately 8 times or until we believed we had a good sense of the nature of 
the participant’s inner experience.  The first day of sampling was considered training and 
therefore samples from the first day were not used in analyses.  After each day of 
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sampling, the interviewers prepared a written summary of each sampled moments of the 
participant’s experiences.  
Analysis of Data 
 After each expositional interview, the primary investigator and faculty advisors 
completed a written description of each moment discussed during the interview.  The 
purpose of the written descriptions was to provide an accurate description of what was 
ongoing in experience at the moment of the beep.  The written descriptions were 
reviewed and revised by the three researchers (Dr. Heavey, Dr. Hurlburt, and me) present 
during the interview for the purpose of having the written description be as representative 
as possible of the inner experience present at each sampled moment.  At times, we 
disagreed regarding the degree to which the description accurately matched the 
participant’s inner experience.  When a disagreement occurred, we would review the 
video recording of the interview and would change the written description as needed to 
match the participant’s report.  
 After completing sampling with each participant, we conducted an idiographic 
analysis of the inner experience of each participant by reviewing each participant’s 
samples of experience.  Participant’s moments of experience were examined to determine 
the features of that individual’s inner experience, including salient characteristics and any 
phenomenon of interest.  Throughout this process, we reviewed each sampled moment 
and sometimes went back and watched the video recordings of the interviews to clarify 
aspects of the participant’s inner experience.   
Finally, we reviewed the sampled moments of the group of participants as a whole 
to determine if any features of inner experience occur commonly across participants.  Dr. 
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Heavey, Dr. Hurlburt, and I engaged in a lengthy reviewing process of the idiographic 
descriptions of each participant’s inner experiences outlined below in each participant’s 
chapter and the features of inner experience that occurred across the participants 
discussed in the final across-participant chapter. 
The following chapters include idiographic profiles of each participant’s inner 
experience.  The first three participants discussed below met criteria for MDD.  The order 
that they are listed corresponds to the degree to which they endorsed depressive 
symptoms on the CES-D (Radloff, 1977) with the first participant having endorsed the 
fewest depressive symptoms and the final participant having endorsed the most 
depressive symptoms.  The final three participants met criteria for BP.  The order that 
they are listed also corresponds to the degree to which they endorsed depressive 
symptoms on the CES-D (Radloff, 1977).  The final across-participant chapter provides a 
review of participants as a whole and discusses features of inner experience that occurred 
commonly across participants.  
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CHAPTER 6 
IDIOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF DEVON’S EXPERIENCES 
 Devon is a 26-year old bi-racial male who sampled with us from March to May 
2012. Devon met criteria for major depressive disorder as measured by the SCID-I (First, 
Gibbon, Spitzer, & Williams, 1997).  Devon received a CES-D (Radloff, 1977) score of 
33, suggesting a clinically significant level of depressive symptoms.  He received a 
Global Severity Index score of 2.29 on the SCL-90-R (Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973; 
Derogatis, 1994), suggesting the presence of psychological difficulties.  Devon was not 
receiving any treatment for depression at the time of sampling.  
 Devon sampled on eight separate occasions, collecting a total of 38 sampled 
moments. Five of those sampled moments occurred during the first sampling day, which 
is generally considered a training day and subsequently will not be discussed.  After 
discarding the samples from the first day of sampling, we were left with 33 moments of 
experience.  The following sections provide a description of the salient phenomena that 
emerged across Devon’s samples.  
Inner Seeing 
 Devon experienced inner seeing in all 33 (100%) of his sampled moments.  All of 
Devon’s inner seeings were highly detailed and complex.  The following sample provides 
an example of the extreme complexity of Devon’s inner seeing.  The detail and 
complexity of this sample is typical of Devon’s inner seeings.  
Sample 5.3: At the moment of the beep, Devon was innerly seeing himself from a 
3rd person perspective looking at himself from slightly above his actual self and 
to the right. The seen-Devon was making an exaggerated hungry/sick/stomach-
 67 
 
ache expression.  He was also innerly seeing his stomach.  His stomach seemed to 
be like an x-ray and Devon saw several other organs.  He saw approximately four 
blue/green/black organs and his stomach.  His stomach was pinched together 
indicating that it was very empty and was slimy on the inside.  The seen stomach 
and the other organs were not accurate portrayals of actual organs - for example, 
the other organs probably did not correspond to actual bodily organs, and the 
stomach was not the shape actual stomachs have.  Devon was also innerly seeing 
symptoms of his stomach.  For example, when he thought of his stomach as being 
acidy, he was innerly seeing liquid, green mistiness that suffused his entire inner 
seeing (that is, was not merely seeing the stomach as acidy).  When he thought of 
gassy, he saw a yellow bubbliness that included the bloop, bloop, bloop sound of 
bubbles popping, but the bloop, bloop, bloop sounds were not coordinated with 
the seen bubbles (there were more bubbles than bloops).  This inner seeing 
changed to match whatever stomach symptom he was experiencing including 
gassy, acidy, growly, and empty.  Devon was also feeing his stomach feel empty, 
gassy, growly, and acidy.  Devon was also feeling physical sensations he 
associated with feeling tired/fatigued.  His eyes felt heavy; he had a slight 
headache between his eyes; his throat felt dry; and he had heart-burn. These 
physical sensations were amplified as compared to previous beeps.  
In this sample, Devon was seeing himself and his stomach in substantial detail.  His inner 
seeing morphed to match the stomach symptom he experienced.  This is an example of 
the typical creative, rich, and detailed nature of all of Devon’s inner seeings.  The degree 
of richness and complexity observed in Devon’s inner seeings are not typical of other 
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individuals who experience a high frequency of inner seeing.  All of the examples of 
inner seeing provided in this section will continue to demonstrate the extreme detail and 
complexity in Devon’s inner seeings.  
Preoccupation with Facial Expressions and Eyes 
In seventeen (51%) of Devon’s inner seeing, he was focused on facial expressions 
and/or eyes.  In twelve of these samples, Devon was focused on innerly seeing his own 
facial expression or eyes.  The following provides an example of his preoccupation with 
his own facial expressions.  
Sample 3.5: Devon was fixing the blinker’s light on his girlfriend’s car.  He was 
reaching his hand down the car’s engine.  At the moment of the beep, Devon was 
seeing two things which were both present but were not physically present 
together.  First, he was innerly seeing himself trying to fit his hand in the car’s 
engine.  He was seeing this from a 3
rd
 person perspective; he could see the 
driver’s side of the car (a silver/gray BMW) and himself trying to reach his hand 
in the car’s engine.  He was making an exaggerated face because his arm was 
stuck.  Devon said everything he was innerly seeing was the same as how it 
looked in reality except for the exaggerated look on his face and the fact that his 
hand really was not stuck in the engine.  Second, he was innerly seeing the back 
of his head and the words, “I hope I know what I’m doing” typed in white letters 
on the center of the back of his head.  The letters were located somewhere 
between his hair and his skull.  He was actually feeling a tickle sensation where 
the words were on the back of his head.  
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In this sample, Devon was innerly seeing himself and the focus of him seeing himself 
seemed to be on the exaggerated look on his face which seemed related to his arm being 
stuck.  This was a distortion from reality in that his hand was actually not stuck and 
Devon did not think he was actually making the exaggerated facial expression.  
 Devon also had five sampled moments that involved him being preoccupied with 
someone else’s facial expression or eyes.  The following provides an example of him 
being concentrated on someone else’s facial expression.  
Sample 3.4: Devon was wondering if Michael Jackson [while he was alive] still 
got allergies [despite his nose surgeries].  Devon was innerly seeing a background 
image of Michael Jackson’s face.  Michael Jackson was older in the image and 
had straight hair and lighter skin.  This background Michael Jackson face was 
much larger than real size, about floor to ceiling size.  At times, Devon was 
zooming-in on Michael Jackson’s nose. In the front of the background, on the 
right side, Devon saw another Michael Jackson. This was a younger Michael 
Jackson in which he had curly hair.  He was striking a dancing pose.  He was 2-
dimensional (i.e., flat), appeared to be floating and was moving slightly.  On the 
left side were the words, “Does Michael Jackson still get allergies?” These words 
were in paragraph form looking like a news column.  It was as if it was a full 
news column of words, but the only words present were, Does Michael Jackson 
still get allergies?  The letters were white and in Times New Roman font.  The 
column of words was also moving but not in the same floating-nature as the 
Michael Jackson picture. 
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 Devon also had one sample that involved him both being preoccupied by his own 
and someone else’s facial features. 
Sample 3.1: At the moment of the beep, Devon was innerly seeing Bruno Mars 
and himself (seen-Devon) sitting next to each other in some arena.  Bruno Mars 
was on the left and was about to play the guitar.  Actual-Devon was hearing 
Bruno was playing bits of his hit songs, skipping back and forth between each 
one.  Seen-Devon had an impatient expression on his face.  Seen-Devon was 
innerly saying, “Do I really look like that fool?” Actual-Devon was innerly 
hearing Seen-Devon innerly say these words and he was thinking them, but the 
hearing and the thinking of them were not in sync, Actual-Devon was also 
changing his visual focus, moving back and forth between Seen-Devon and Bruno 
Mars, seeing close-ups of each one’s face to try to compare how much they look 
alike. 
In this sample, Devon was focused on both his and Bruno Mars’ appearances. Similar to 
in other sampled moments, the Seen-Devon’s facial expression was exaggerated to 
demonstrate an impatient expression.  
 Multiple Inner Seeing 
 Ten (30%) of Devon’s samples contained more than one inner seeing.  Four of 
those multiple inner seeing samples involved him seeing the same event from two 
different perspectives, as if Devon had two cameras placed in different locations but 
aimed on the same event. The following sample provides an example of this 
phenomenon.  
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Sample 5.2: Devon was sitting in his car staring at a clear plastic bag he got from 
the police when he had been arrested for a traffic violation.  The plastic bag had 
contained his possessions following his arrest.  At the moment of the beep, Devon 
was innerly seeing himself from two different perspectives.  He was seeing 
himself from the third-person perspective from the back/left getting handcuffed 
by a police officer.  Devon saw the officer putting the handcuffs on his wrists.  He 
could also see the police car in front of him.  Devon was also seeing himself from 
the third-person perspective from the front.  He saw himself making a silly face as 
if indicating to passersby that he didn’t know what the police were doing.  The 
Seen-Devon was wearing a green shirt and blue sweats.  Devon was also feeling a 
sense of relief which he experienced as a soothing massage of cool, clean air 
across his chest moving from left to right.  [Devon’s relief was related to the fact 
that he had been arrested for not having proof of insurance while he was driving; 
but he now had his proof of insurance in his car in the bag that had contained his 
possessions while he was in jail, the same bag he was staring at in this moment.]  
Devon was also feeling physical sensations he associated with feeling 
tired/fatigued.  His eyes felt heavy; he had a slight headache between his eyes; his 
throat felt dry; and he had heart-burn. These sensations were not as salient as they 
were in the first beep.  It was as if the feelings were the same as in previous beeps, 
but the “volume had been turned down” on them.  
In this sample, Devon had two separate inner seeing which were both aimed at a single 
event, his being arrested.  He was seeing himself both from the front and from the 
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back/left, as if there were two cameras aimed at him while he was being arrested and he 
was innerly seeing the feed of those cameras simultaneously.   
Two of Devon’s multiple inner seeing samples involved three or more inner 
seeings.  The following provides an example of one of those samples.  
Sample 8.4: At the moment of the beep, Devon was feeling anxious/worried about 
his car, which was broken down and had been parked in front of Smith’s for 
several days.  He had two related and one separate inner seeings.  First, he was 
seeing his car sitting out front of Smith’s.  He was seeing his car from the 
perspective of being close to the dent on his fender and was seeing Smith’s 
beyond the car.  He was also seeing a birds-eye perspective of his car sitting out 
front of Smith’s.  His car was closer to the back of the parking lot than to the 
front, and was the only car in the parking lot.  In front of Smith’s were 10-15 
employees wearing red shirts and black pants.  The employees had no facial 
features and looked cartoonish in that they all had the exact same body except the 
females had breasts.  The male employees had men-hair that was exactly the same 
as the other men and the female employees had female-hair that was exactly the 
same as the other females.  Devon was also seeing an image of himself sitting on 
the bus (a replica of what he was actually doing).  He was seeing it from the 
perspective of in front of him to the right.  
In this sample, Devon was innerly seeing many inner seeing simultaneously. Two of 
those inner seeing involved seeing his car parked in front a Smith’s grocery store from 
two different perspectives.  He was also seeing an unrelated image of himself sitting on 
the bus, which was what he was actually doing at the moment of the beep. 
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 Distorted Physical Shape and Size and Exaggerated Inner Seeing 
 Fifteen (45%) of Devon’s inner seeings included some distortions in physical size 
or shape.  Similarly, five (15%) of his inner seeings included some aspect that was 
exaggerated (e.g., exaggerating the look of distress on his face), for a total of 20 
physically distorted and/or exaggerated samples.  Devon distorted and exaggerated a 
myraid of objects within his inner seeing including but not limited to facial expressions, 
backgrounds, and perceptual properties. Devon frequently distorted and/or exaggerated 
his or someone’s facial expression, size, or eyes. In six (18%) samples that involved 
physical distortions and in four (12%) samples that involved exaggerations, the object 
that was distorted/exaggerated was the innerly Seen-Devon himself. In six (18%) samples 
that involved physical distortions and in one (3%) sample that involved exaggerations, 
the object that was distorted/exaggerated was another person.  In three (9%) samples that 
involved physical distortions, the object that was distorted was an object (e.g., a traffic 
light).  
 The majority of Devon’s samples that involved some distortion of size or shape or 
exaggeration of a person involved a distortion/exaggeration of the person’s head or facial 
expression.  A few of these distortions and exaggerations made the person look cartoon-
like and denoted some emotional significance.  For example, in Sample 8.4 described 
previously under the Multiple Inner Seeings subsection, Devon was innerly seeing 
employees of Smith’s standing out front of the store.  The employees did not have facial 
features and looked cartoon-like with all of the employees having the same body and 
either female hair or male hair.  The following sample provides another example of 
creative physical distortions of facial expressions. 
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Sample 8.3: Devon was waiting for the bus at a bus stop.  At the moment of the 
beep, he was innerly seeing himself sitting, hunched over, and looking to his right 
(when the bus would actually come from the left of him).  He was seeing himself 
from the perspective of someone directly to his right. In his inner seeing, his head 
was distortedly larger than it should be (approximately twice as large as it is in 
reality).  The hunch in his back was also larger than it was in reality, although not 
as enlarged as his head. Devon’s face looked like gravity was pulling it down; it 
felt heavy and it looked like he did in his inner seeing and concerned about 
avoiding the dirt on the stop and whether he was sweating through his gray shirt 
and thinking, I hope I don’t look like that.  There were no words or other 
experiential aspects of these concerns/thinkings; it was not clear if this was one 
overarching concern with several aspects or more experientially distinct.  They 
seemed to be more cognitive than emotional though we could not be confident 
about that.  He was also physically feeling uncomfortable because of the position 
he was in.  
In this sample, Devon was innerly seeing himself.  However, his image of himself was 
distortedly larger than it should be.  He also had an exaggerated hunched back and his 
face looked like it was being pulled down by gravity.  Devon was not merely seeing 
himself; rather he was seeing a cartoon-like, negatively exaggerated version of himself.  
The following provides an example of an inner seeing that contains physical 
distortions of someone other than Devon.  This sample also provides an example of 
distorted perceptual properties and background. 
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Sample 2.4: At the moment of the beep, Devon was innerly seeing Dr. Hurlburt, 
Dr. Heavey, and Nellie sitting like they do during the interviews.  He was seeing 
this from a first-person perspective, as if he was in the process of being 
interviewed by them.  Devon was innerly seeing Dr. Hurlburt and Dr. Heavey 
looking disappointed that Devon had collected his beeps while driving and Nellie 
looking “happy-go-lucky.”  There was more emphasis placed on seeing Dr. 
Hurlburt and Dr. Heavey as compared to seeing Nellie. Dr. Hurlburt looked 
cartoon-like with his head in a squared shape.  Dr. Hurlburt was wearing khaki 
pants and a plaid shirt.  Dr. Heavey looked more similar to how he looks in reality 
(not cartoon-like) and was wearing a button down shirt and dress slacks.  Devon 
did not know what Nellie was wearing as she was not central in his inner seeing.  
Devon was also seeing parts of the interview room (e.g., the camera and the 
walls), but it did not seem to scale, rather everything seemed smashed together.  
He also saw Dr. Hurlburt closer in proximity to him than Dr. Heavey and Dr. 
Heavey closer in proximity to him than Nellie. [In reality, Dr. Hurlburt is closer to 
him during the interviews and Dr. Heavey and Nellie are an equal distance from 
him.]  The images of Dr. Hurlburt, Dr. Heavey, and Nellie seemed to be coming 
towards him, whereas the surrounding room came and went in his inner seeing.  
The words, “Sorry guys, wasted your beeps” were also present; however, this was 
less salient in his experience.  
In this sample, Devon was innerly seeing a distorted, cartoon-like representation of Dr. 
Hurlburt. Similarly, he altered the geometric properties of the room making things seem 
closer to him and smashed together.  There was also movement to his images.  
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Many of Devon’s physical distortions and exaggerations were of his or someone 
else’s facial expression or eyes.  
Sample 6.1: Devon had just finished working out where he had heard a song that 
had a saxophone playing.  Devon was now sitting in his car.  At the moment of 
the beep, Devon was innerly hearing the song with the saxophone.  He was also 
innerly seeing a man playing a saxophone.  The man was wearing a blazer that 
looked tie-dye with red/blue/yellow colors.  The suit had big black cuffs.  The 
man was also wearing pleated pants.  Devon was not seeing the man’s eyes.  In 
place of his eyes were black regions. Devon understood himself to be creating an 
image of a “cool” saxophone player, but when he recalls saxophone players of his 
acquaintance (including his father and other well-known players), their eyes do 
not look cool—they look bulging or intense.  Devon omitted seeing the eyes, 
perhaps as a result of them not generally looking cool.  The man was playing the 
saxophone in a dim night club with lights behind him.  This inner seeing was a 
still-frame.  Devon was also innerly seeing himself sitting thinking about the 
song. The seen-Devon had a bored look on his face and was sitting in his car.  
That is, he was innerly seeing exactly what he was doing in real life—an exterior 
perspective on himself, so to speak—except that his seen expression was more 
bored than his actual expression probably was, and that the front of the car was 
missing (that is, the perspective was from outside the windshield, but the 
windshield itself was not seen, even though the rest of the car (door, back seat, 
etc.) was seen.  [The actual-Devon was not feeling bored, although the seen-
Devon was seen to be bored.]  Devon also saw the ear piece used for this 
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experiment on his ear.  Devon could see from his mouth up (he could not see his 
chin or neck) but could see his shoulders even though physically this would be 
impossible.  
In this sample, Devon has distorted the saxophone player’s eyes and he has 
exaggerated/changed the expression on the Seen-Devon’s face.  The perceptual properties 
of Devon’s head and shoulders were distorted as well as the features of his car.  
Devon also had other samples in which he distorted inanimate objects.  In the 
following sample, Devon was innerly seeing a perceptually distorted traffic light. 
Sample 2.3: Devon was driving.  At the moment of the beep, he was innerly 
seeing a red traffic light.  He was seeing the light very close to himself, perhaps a 
foot or so away, and off to his right side and about a foot or so above him.  The 
light looked to be very large (~8 feet or more tall and 5 or 6 feet across).  The red 
light was the largest, about 5 feet in diameter, with the yellow light several inches 
smaller and the green light several inches smaller again.  Devon himself did not 
use feet or inches in his descriptions; in fact, even when feet and inches were 
suggested to him, he did not assent.  The red light was “this far”, spreading out his 
arms; he said, “I could sleep in it” several times.  The red light was lit, whereas 
the yellow and green lights were not.  The covers around each light and the steel 
of the traffic light were green.  He could also see part of the pole the traffic light 
was attached too and a blue sky behind the traffic light.  He could also barely see 
a hint of a concrete bridge behind the traffic light.  The red light was what he was 
looking for so he could stop driving and write notes about the previous beep, 
which occurred only a few moments earlier.  
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In this sample, Devon was innerly seeing a red light.  However, the perceptual properties 
of the red light were distorted such that the red light was much bigger than in reality and 
larger than the yellow light, and the yellow light was larger than the green light.  
 Elaborate and Incongruous Backgrounds 
 In approximately 13% of Devon’s samples, his inner seeing contained a 
background was elaborate or was incongruous to the central focus of his inner seeing.  
For example, in Sample 2.3 discussed previously, Devon was innerly seeing a red traffic 
light.  However, in the background of his inner seeing, Devon was seeing a blue sky and 
a hint of a concrete bridge behind the traffic light.  In this sample, Devon was focused on 
the red light, in fact, in reality he was trying to find a red light.  Yet, he also saw a 
concrete bridge and a detailed version of the sky.  The background in this inner seeing 
appeared elaborate.  The following sample provides another example of an elaborate and 
incongruous background in an inner seeing sample. 
Sample 2.5: Devon was in the process of getting out of his car.  At the moment of 
the beep, he was innerly seeing Russell Peters, a stand-up comedian, doing a 
stand-up routine.  He could see Russell Peters holding a microphone and nodding 
his head in an exaggerated manner.  Devon saw a spotlight on Russell Peters and 
could see his shadow behind him.  Devon also saw some of the audience in front 
of Russell Peters.  Devon saw a rectangular edge/border around what he was 
seeing, similar to a screen that goes around a YouTube clip.  He was seeing the 
screen towards his lower right side.  The surround to the screen changed: 
sometimes there was nothing present and sometimes there was a computer around 
it.  At the time of the beep, Devon was not seeing beyond the screen. Devon could 
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also hear the comedian as well as the audience react to the comedian’s act. Devon 
believes what he was innerly seeing was the same or very close to what he had 
actually seen on YouTube.  
In this sample, Devon was innerly watching Russell Peters do a stand-up routine.  He also 
saw an elaborate background/border which was similar to a screen that goes around a 
YouTube clip. This border also kept changing.  In this sample as well as others, it seems 
as if the central aspect of Devon’s inner seeing may be separated and not always 
coordinated with the background/border of the inner seeing.  The incongruity between 
Devon’s background/border from the central aspect of his inner seeing suggests that the 
foreground of central aspect of his inner seeing is constructed by one process while the 
background/border is constructed by another.     
 Seeing of Self  
In 16 (48%) of Devon’s samples, he was innerly seeing an image of himself.  In 
13 (39%) samples, Devon was innerly seeing himself doing what he was actually doing 
in reality.  However, the number of samples that involved him innerly seeing himself 
doing what he was doing may be much higher than 39%.  During the last interview, 
Devon stated that he always sees himself doing what he is doing but that he did not 
describe seeing himself at each moment of experience because he took it for granted that 
seeing himself would be expected and therefore not noteworthy in the same way that he 
did not think it was important to specify that he was speaking English.  
One example of him seeing himself doing what he was doing was Sample 8.4 
discussed under the Multiple Inner Seeing subsection.  In this sample, Devon was innerly 
seeing his car parked outside of a Smiths grocery store with employees of the store 
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standing out front.  In addition to the inner seeing related to him seeing his car, Devon 
was also seeing an image of himself sitting on the bus and this inner seeing was a replica 
of what he was actually doing.  He was seeing it from the perspective of in front of him to 
the right.  Sample 6.4 provides another example of this phenomenon. 
Sample 6.4: Devon was resting on a couch.  At the moment of the beep, he was 
innerly seeing exactly what he was doing in real life - sitting on the couch.  He 
saw himself from the upper, right perspective.  His inner seeing appeared to be an 
accurate portrait of what he was actually doing.  Devon could only see himself.  
He was not seeing the couch he was sitting on.  Devon was also to a lesser extent 
feeling the air conditioning as it blew cool air across his chest.  This sensation was 
felt by the real Devon, not the seen-Devon. 
As was mentioned previously, some of his inner seeings of himself were 
physically distorted or exaggerated in some aspect, such as negatively enhancing aspects 
of Devon’s facial expression.  Sample 3.5, previously discussed under the subsection 
Preoccupation with Facial Expression and Eyes, provides an example of this 
phenomenon.  In this sample, Devon was fixing his girlfriend’s car.  At the moment of 
the beep, he was innerly seeing himself fixing the car the same as how it likely looked in 
reality except for an exaggerated look on his face suggesting that his arm was stuck in the 
car’s engine and the fact that his hand really was not stuck.  His exaggerated facial 
expression and imagining his arm being stuck in the car could be perceived as him having 
some negative self impression or concern regarding how people perceive him.  For 
example, he was making himself look worse than he did in reality.  He was also 
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experiencing a thought at the moment of the beep of, “I hope I know what I’m doing.” 
Envisioning his arm being stuck in the car’s engine may represent his self-doubt.  
 In seven additional samples, Devon seemed to be experiencing concern about how 
others would perceive him.  For example, in Sample 8.3 discussed previously under the 
subsection Distorted Physical Shape and Size and Exaggerated Inner Seeing, Devon was 
experiencing concern about how he appeared to other people.  He was innerly seeing 
himself waiting for the bus.  However, he distorted and exaggerated the physical shape 
and size of himself (e.g., hunched back, face pulled down by gravity) making himself 
look worse than he actually does. He was also thinking at the moment of the beep that he 
hoped that he did not look like his inner seeing of himself.  
 Another example of Devon’s preoccupation with how he looked to others was in 
Sample 5.2 which was described previously under Multiple Inner Seeings subsection.  In 
this sample, Devon was innerly seeing himself being handcuffed by a police officer from 
two different perspectives.  In one of his inner seeings, he was seeing himself make a 
silly face as if indicating to anyone seeing him be handcuffed that he did not know what 
the police were doing.  Devon’s inner seeing of himself may have conveyed a notion of 
being concerned about what others would think of him.  There were also several 
instances when Devon was seeing himself and was worried that he might be sweating 
through his shirt, including beep 6.5 discussed below in the Inner Seeing of Words 
section. 
Inner Seeing of Words  
Devon had seven (21%) inner seeings that involved innerly seeing words.  The 
following provides an example of this phenomenon.  
 82 
 
Sample 4.2: Devon was looking at himself in the mirror and fixing his hair line.  
At the moment of the beep, Devon was comparing his hair line to Drake’s, a 
musician, hair line. Devon was innerly seeing himself from the chest up with a 
front profile.  He was also seeing Drake behind him with his hands up as if 
pointing to his hair line.  The image of Drake was flat, not 3-dimensional, 
whereas the Seen-Devon was 3-dimensional.  While the Seen-Devon was in front 
of drake, the Seen-Devon was not blocking the view of Drake.  Behind Seen-
Devon and Drake was a black background with waves of various colors moving 
in beat with Drake’s song, “They Know.”  Devon was also innerly hearing the 
song, “They Know.”  Devon was mostly hearing the beat of “They Know” with 
occasionally the words “they know, they know, they know.”  Devon was also 
seeing many phrases of words in white, typed lettering.  He was also reading and 
innerly speaking these words.  The words, “If my hair line ever recedes, he should 
donate me some of his hair line” were present at the moment of the beep.  Devon 
also was seeing flashes of Drake interviewing people who were seeking hair-line 
donations.  
In this sample, Devon was seeing many phrases of words.  Most prominent among the 
words he was seeing were the words, “ If my hair line ever recedes, he should donate me 
some of his hair line.”  In addition to seeing these words, Devon was reading and innerly 
speaking them at the same time that he was seeing them. The following provides another 
example of Devon innerly seeing words.  
 Sample 2.2: Devon was driving to the store.  At the moment of the beep, he was 
innerly saying, “driving” in a low voice with dramatic emphasis.  He believes he 
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was innerly saying “driving” as opposed to innerly hearing “driving”; however, he 
said that it was difficult to make that distinction because he believes he was both 
saying and hearing it. Simultaneously, he was innerly seeing “driving” in white 
letters written similar to the words in Tales From The Crypt.  The letters appeared 
one at a time in sync with his pronunciation of the letters in his innerly saying 
“driving.”  Once the letters were all present, the letters in the word moved up and 
down independently.  He was seeing the word “driving” in front of his as part of 
what he was actually seeing (e.g., the road, cars). His innerly seeing “driving” 
appeared like subtitles, towards the bottom left of his visual field but in larger 
letters than what is typically used in subtitles.  The word “driving” appeared near 
the windshield in proximity to him. 
In this sample, Devon was innerly seeing the word “driving.” The letters in the word 
appeared one at a time then they moved up and down independently once all the letters 
were present. The letters appeared in sync with him innerly speaking them. In this 
sample, his inner seeing of a word was imposed onto what he was actually seeing.  
 Devon also had some samples that involved innerly seeing words with unusual 
characteristics. 
Sample 6.5: Devon was taking a walk.  At the moment of the beep, he was innerly 
saying to himself, “man it’s hot”  He was also innerly seeing himself walking 
although the seen walking was not in sync with the actual walking.  The seen-
Devon’s face was sweaty with sweat squirting horizontally off his face in a 
clearly exaggerated manner, but this didn’t strike Devon as exaggerated in his 
seeing.  The Seen-Devon’s face also had an exaggerated way-too-hot expression.  
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Behind the Seen-Devon were big, tall trees with “man it’s hot” written across the 
canopy of the trees.  The words were in block white letters and were backwards 
and upside down.  Devon felt the heat to be coming from the words or at least the 
direction of the letters.  Devon was also thinking/feeling concerned about whether 
he was sweating through his shirt – that the dark sweat could be seen in his chest 
and armpits – and if he was, it would be embarrassing.  This concern was at least 
partially a feeling. 
In this sample, Devon was innerly seeing the words “man it’s hot” and these words were 
written across a canopy of trees, backwards, and upside down.  His inner seeing of the 
words was very detailed and complex.  Devon was experiencing the heat as radiating 
down from the words, “man it’s hot.”  This sample also provides an example of another 
incident in which Devon was concerned about what he looked like to other people and 
involved exaggerations of the seen-Devon’s facial features.  
 Incomplete or Uncoordinated Inner Seeing 
 Devon had ten (30%) sampled moments that involved inner seeing that in some 
way seemed compromised or incomplete.  For example, he had inner seeings that were 
dissolved, blurry, incompletely articulated, or foggy.  Several of these samples have been 
discussed previously.  Namely, Sample 6.1 was discussed in the Distorted Physical Shape 
and Exaggerated Inner Seeing subsection.  In this sample, Devon was innerly seeing 
himself sitting in his car.  However, Devon could see from his mouth up (could not see 
his chin or neck) but could see his shoulders even though physically this would be 
impossible.  This sample seemed in some way incompletely articulated.  
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Devon also had two samples that involved him seeing aspects of his inner seeing 
in 2-dimension and other aspects of his inner seeing in 3-dimension.  One of these 
samples, Sample 4.2, was discussed previously in the Inner Seeing of Words subsection.  
In this sampled moment, Devon was innerly seeing a flat, not-3-dimensional image of 
Drake, a musician.  Simultaneously, he was innerly seeing a 3-dimensional version of 
himself.  This sample also seemed in some way incompletely articulated in that his two 
inner seeing were not consistently seen in the same dimension.  Sample 3.4 also involved 
inconsistent dimensional inner seeing.  This sample was discussed in the Preoccupation 
with Facial Expressions and Eyes subsection.  In this sample, Devon was innerly seeing 
two images of Michael Jackson one of which was 2-dimensional and the other was 3-
dimensional.  The two images were uncoordinated or one of which may have been 
incomplete such that a few seconds later both images could have been 3-dimensional.  
The following provides another example of a sample that involved inner seeing 
that seemed incompletely articulated. .  
Sample 5.1: At the moment of the beep, Devon was thinking about studying, 
which involved partially or entirely innerly seeing a book tilted away from him.  
The book was an unknown, hardback book.  It was five or six inches thick and 
had a vintage brown leather cover.  The book had white pages and a ribbon 
sticking out of the middle of the book marking a page.  Devon’s inner seeing was 
foggy/see-through/intangible.  The book fluctuated between being foggy/see-
through/intangible to being solid-looking.  The word “study” was also somehow 
present.  It was not written or spoken; Devon felt the word in some way he could 
not specify, but he seemed confident that the word “study” itself was somehow 
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present—that is, it was not merely the idea of study that was present.  Devon was 
also feeling a physical sensation associated with a sense of urgency to study.  His 
heart was racing and his legs were moving or squirmy.  Devon was also feeling 
physical sensations he associated with feeling tired/fatigued.  His eyes felt heavy; 
he had a slight headache between his eyes; his throat felt dry; and he had 
heartburn.  
In this sample, Devon’s inner seeing fluctuated between being foggy/see-
through/intangible to being solid-looking.  This inner seeing could have been 
incompletely articulated for various reasons.  For one, it may be that a few seconds after 
the beep the entire aspect of his inner seeing would be more clearly articulated such that 
the moment of the beep caught the inner seeing in the process of forming or coming 
together.  Alternatively, it is possible that the inner seeing was incompletely articulated 
intentionally in the same way that when we talk we sometimes abbreviate language to 
articulate what we want without fully forming the words/phrases. The following is 
another example of an inner seeing that seemed transparent. 
Sample 4.3: Devon was driving.  At the moment of the beep, he was innerly 
seeing his girlfriend in the sky.  She was transparent and see-through.  He was 
seeing her from the chest up and she had her arms crossed across her chest.  She 
also had an angry/pouty face.  Her hair was moving in the wind.  He was also 
thinking, the weather is just like my girl’s mood, it keeps changing.  He was 
unsure if this thought was present in words.  He was also physically feeling hot 
and cold which he described as uncomfortable.  His hands/feet felt cold and his 
chest/neck felt hot.  He also was irritated regarding his physical discomfort.  He 
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described his irritation as itching on his neck, genital area, and areas in which his 
clothes were tight on his body.  He also was fidgety, which may have been part of 
the irritation.  
In this sample, his inner seeing was transparent and see-through.  There could be several 
reasons why his inner seeing was incompletely articulated.  First, his inner seeing being 
incompletely articulated could be intentional.  For example, it could be his girlfriend 
being transparent could be related to the inner seeing of her being imposed on the sky and 
his real world.  It could also be a creative or artistic aspect of his inner experience.  
Second, the incompleteness of his inner seeing could be related to how his inner seeings 
are constructed.  Similar to what was discussed in the Elaborate and Incongruous 
Background section, it could be indicative that aspects of his inner seeings are being 
constructed by separate processes and those processes do not always coordinate 
congruently.  
Divided Self 
 Devon had two (6%) samples that involved experiencing two origins or locations 
of experience.  In these samples, Devon was innerly seeing himself.  Devon’s inner 
experience consisted of his experience of something (e.g., innerly seeing himself) and an 
experience that seemed to originate at his inner seeing of himself (e.g., the seen-Devon 
felt a sensation).  These experiences are more than him just innerly seeing himself; rather 
they involve the seen-Devon having experiences of his own.  
Sample 4.4: Devon was pushing his car because it does not go into reverse and he 
needed to get out of a parking space.  At the moment of the beep, he was innerly 
seeing three things.  First, he was innerly seeing himself pushing his car up a hill 
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(in reality, Devon was not pushing his car up a hill).  He was also seeing the seen-
Devon’s legs shake as he tried to push the car (in reality, Devon’s legs were not 
shaking).  He also saw the words, “You are not worthy” in big, solid, strong, 
weathered white letters.  He emphasized that these seen words were known to be 
very strong and that they meant he is only a watered-down version of his pop 
(father).  The second thing he was innerly seeing was his father pushing a large 
car from the end of the vehicle.  (He wasn’t sure if it was the front or the back 
end.) Devon was seeing his father from the perspective of a young boy watching 
his father push the car.  He could see trees in the background and he knew what 
he was seeing was in Philadelphia.  His father was seen to be easily pushing the 
car (in distinct contrast to the difficulty Seen-Devon was having).  The third thing 
Devon saw was from the perspective of the seen-Devon’s (from the first inner 
seeing) thoughts.  The Seen-Devon was innerly seeing Devon’s father standing 
with his arms crossed on a hill.  He also saw the words “You are not worthy” with 
this inner seeing.  The words were not big, solid, strong, and weathered like in the 
first inner seeing.  They were white letters but did not have any depth or mass to 
them. 
In this sample, Devon’s experiences contained two origins of experience: Actual-Devon 
and the Seen-Devon.  Actual-Devon was innerly seeing two things and the Seen-Devon 
was innerly seeing something as well.  We call this phenomenon divided self.  This 
sample also provides another example of Devon innerly seeing words and those words 
having unusual characteristics (i.e., strong, weathered). The following is the other sample 
Devon had that involved a divided self experience.  
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Sample 3.2: Devon was washing the dishes.  At the moment of the beep, he was 
innerly seeing himself sitting in a chair in a room that was dimly lit.  He was 
seeing himself from an upper right angle.  His forehead and eyes were distorted to 
look larger than they actually are.  His mouth/chin looked slightly smaller than 
normal.  His inner seeing was slightly shaking in a similar manner of watching 
something filmed by a nervous/shaking cameraman.  Devon was also innerly 
singing along to the Bruno Mars song, The Lazy Song.  He innerly heard the 
actual song sung by Bruno Mars as well as himself singing the same song in a 
monotone voice and Seen-Devon singing the song in a somewhat less monotone, 
more on key voice.  The three versions of the song he was hearing were in sync 
with each other.  
This sample is less clearly an example of divided self.  However, it is possible that there 
are also two origins of experience: Actual-Devon and Seen-Devon.  Devon was singing 
along to the song as was Seen-Devon.  
Preoccupation of Bodily Functions 
Seven (21%) of Devon’s samples involved some focus on bodily functions (e.g., sweat). 
Five of the seven samples focused on his bodily functions, whereas, two of the seven 
samples were focused on someone else’s bodily functions.  We have already discussed 
three of these samples.  Samples 6.5 discussed under the Inner Seeing of Words 
subsection and Sample 8.3 described in the Distorted Physical Shape and Size and 
Exaggerated Inner Seeing subsection involved a concern over the presence of sweat.  
Sample 5.3 also described in the Inner Seeing section involved Devon innerly seeing his 
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stomach and experiencing symptoms of a stomach ache.  The following sample provides 
another example of Devon’s preoccupation with bodily functions. 
Sample 2.1: Devon said that he has been having problems with allergies and had 
just sneezed before the beep.  At the moment of the beep, he was innerly seeing 
himself in the middle of sneezing.  He saw himself in third person as if he was 
standing towards the right side of himself.  He could see his arms stretched out, 
his face in a “sneeze” face, and wet sneeze particles flying through the air.  He 
could also see a downtown neighborhood behind him. He believes this 
neighborhood is a street by his house.  Devon’s inner seeing was in high 
definition, it appeared clearer and more vibrant than what he typically sees. Also 
in his experience, but less salient, was a physical sensation of having to/preparing 
to sneeze. 
In this sample, Devon was innerly seeing himself sneeze and with wet sneeze particles 
flying through the air.  Consistent with what was discussed previously, Devon’s inner 
seeing seemed to involve a component of being concerned about what he looks like to 
others.   
Experience of Music 
 Two (6%) of Devon’s 33 samples involved the experience of music.  These 
experiences are more than just hearing or listening to music; rather he was experiencing 
the music visually and auditorily.   
Sample 2.6: At the moment of the beep, Devon was innerly hearing an 
orchestrated song. He was also innerly seeing a foggy black color that had some 
movements to it (like ambient wave).  When the melody played, Devon innerly 
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saw write/gray spots appear on the black background.  He described the spots as 
being similar to when you touch a plasma TV screen and one’s finger leaves an 
indentation and changes the color of the background briefly.  The white/gray 
spots would appear, spread out/grow (similar to ripples in a body of water when 
something drops into the water), and disappear.  The white/gray spots appeared in 
sync with the melody.  They did not appear in a linear fashion, but seemed to be 
on a path.  Devon didn’t know what that path was.  Devon was also gesturing his 
finger in sync with the melody of the music.  He was experiencing the physical 
movement of his finger and was also experiencing a finger moving in the same 
pace/manner in his mind.  Devon’s inner seeing appeared to be vintage or fuzzy.  
He described this as him not using his inner eyes as much than he was paying 
attention more to what he was hearing than what he was seeing.  
In this sample Devon was innerly hearing an orchestrated song and was innerly seeing 
something unique and synchronized with the music.  
Sample 7.1: Devon was playing a song he was remembering on the piano.  At the 
moment of the beep, Devon was innerly seeing/hearing the song he was 
remembering.  He saw the song as a transparent green space, like a green window.  
The green was a shade slightly lighter than the color of grass.  In front of the 
green space, Devon saw two palm trees one on either side.  Behind the green 
space, Devon saw evergreen trees which were the same shade as the green space 
making them unclear.  There were dots a darker shade of green popping up on the 
green space in sync with pitches/notes of the song as they were played by the 
xylophone.  These dots appeared right to left as the song progressed and 
 92 
 
corresponded to hearing the xylophone notes/sounds. The dots appeared from 
right to left on the green space.  Devon was also innerly hearing the song.  The 
song had a vocal to it, but Devon was more focused on the melody.  He was 
playing the piano to match the song. He was also feeling physical weakness in his 
fingers, specifically his right hand pinky and 4
th
 finger.  He was also feeling 
frustrated which he felt manifest in his chest and forearms.  He was also feeling 
physically hot; he was unsure if that was related to feeling frustrated.  [In the 
retelling, it seemed strange to him that there would be palm trees and evergreen 
trees, but that strangeness was not part of the experience at the moment of the 
beep.] 
In this sample, Devon was playing a song on the piano, innerly hearing that song, and 
innerly seeing that song.  His experience of the song was visual, detailed, and complex.  
In both samples. Devon’s experience of the music went beyond just hearing or listening 
to it.  Rather, his experience of music was manifested visually in a very detailed and 
complex manner. 
Sensory Awareness 
 Sensory awareness occurred often in Devon’s samples.  Devon’s sensory 
awarenesses encompassed a variety of sensory modalities.  None of Devon’s sensory 
awareness experiences appeared to be the salient feature of his experience; rather they all 
seemed to be less salient then inner seeing facets.  In fact, many of them were embedded 
within his inner seeing.  The following is an example of one of Devon’s sensory 
awareness experiences. 
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Sample 8.5: At the moment of the beep, Devon was feeling anxious/excited about 
his upcoming insurance exam.  He was experiencing anxiousness/excitedness 
physically in his chest.  He was also innerly seeing himself sitting at a desk taking 
the exam.  He saw himself from a right, profile perspective.  The Seen-Devon had 
his right hand on the computer mouse and his left hand resting on the table.  The 
Seen-Devon was wearing a black shirt and dark blue jeans.  The Seen-Devon had 
a slight smile on his face.  Devon was also smelling the air conditioning in the 
testing room and experiencing the pleasant temperature of the testing room.  The 
Seen-Devon may have felt nervous, although it was unclear if feeling nervous was 
a part of the Seen-Devon’s experience or if Devon knew that the Seen-Devon was 
nervous.  Devon was also seeing another image of himself sitting on a bus (a 
replica of what he was actually doing).  The Seen-Devon-2 was looking out the 
window of the bus.  The Seen-Devon-2 was like Devon was in reality, except his 
head did not look like it was attached to his neck, but to his shoulders instead.   
In this sample, Devon was drawn to the smell of the air conditioning and the feel of the 
pleasant temperature of the testing room.  This aspect of his experience was purely 
sensory in that he was engrossed in the sensory aspects and was not aware of the any 
meaning or interpretation regarding the sensory experience. 
 Many other samples discussed previously had involved sensory awarenesses. The 
following are a few examples: Sample 2.1 discussed under the subsection Preoccupation 
with Bodily Functions contained a sensory focus on his seen-self making a sneeze face 
and flying sneeze particles, sample 4.2 discussed under the subsection of Inner Seeing of 
Words contained a sensory focus on his seen-self and Drake’s hair line, and Sample 6.5 
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discussed under the subsection of Inner Seeing of Words involved a sensory focus of 
sweat on his seen-self and feeling heat.  
Feelings 
 Devon had one (3%) sampled moment that involved a feeling.  He had several 
other sampled moments that involved experiences that may or may not have represented 
feelings. These experiences were difficult to understand for a few reasons.  First, they 
were usually less salient in his experience as compared to his inner seeing.  Second, they 
were frequently associated with multiple bodily sensations which were seemingly 
disconnected and experienced as separate strands of experience.  In those samples, it was 
unclear if Devon was experiencing an emotional experience or rather if it was an 
experience of physical sensations that he may have labeled with an emotional word.  
 The sampled moment that clearly involved an emotional experience was Sample 
8.5 discussed in the Sensory Awareness section.  In this sampled moment, Devon was 
feeling anxious/excited about his upcoming insurance exam.  He experienced the 
anxiousness/excitedness physically in his chest.  In this sample, Devon was also innerly 
seeing himself.  The Seen-Devon also may have had an emotional experience of 
nervousness.  
 The following is example of a sampled moment that involved a complex 
experience which may or may not have involved a feeling.  
Sample 6.3: Devon was looking for a pen.  At the moment of the beep, he was 
feeling frustrated/annoyed/upset which he described as an “are you serious?” 
feeling.  Part but not all of his feeling of frustration involved feeling itchy all over 
his body, especially on his face and head and hot.  He described the itch feeling as 
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if spikes were coming out of his body and scratching his skin from the inside.  
Devon also felt hot all over his body, especially in his lower back.  Devon also 
felt sweat building at his temples and armpits. Devon was innerly seeing himself 
look for a pen.  His inner seeing was exactly of what he was doing in real life.  He 
was seeing himself from the upper, right perspective.  Devon saw his whole body.  
He also occasionally saw his face close up, but that was not present at the moment 
of the beep.  
In this sample, Devon may have felt frustrated/annoyed/upset which was associated with 
complex and hyper clear bodily sensations (e.g., itchy as if spike were coming out of his 
body).  His experience did not involve a singular bodily sensation, rather it involved 
multiple, seemingly disconnected bodily sensations.  This particular sample is typical of 
Devon’s samples which suggest the presence of a possible emotional experience.  This 
sample may have involved an emotional experience associated with multiple, hyper-clear 
bodily sensations, or it may have involved multiple, hyper-clear bodily sensations that he 
labeled as “frustrated/annoyed/upset.” It also possible that this may be an entirely distinct 
phenomenon of experience.  
Inner Speaking and Inner Hearing 
 Five (15%) of Devon’s samples contained inner speaking.  Four of the inner 
speaking samples involved both the experience of innerly speaking and innerly seeing of 
the same words. Dave experienced inner hearing in six (18%) of his samples.  Five of the 
six inner hearing samples involved innerly hearing music.   
 Many of Devon’s samples that involved inner speaking have been discussed 
previously. For example, sample 2.2 discussed in the Inner Seeing of Words subsection 
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involved innerly saying “driving” in a low voice with dramatic emphasis.  He was also 
seeing the word “driving” written in white letters in a font similar to the words in Tales 
From The Crypt.  
Devon had two samples that included both inner speaking and inner hearing.  One 
of these samples, Sample 3.1, was discussed in the Preoccupation with Facial 
Expressions and Eyes subsection.  In this sample, Devon was innerly seeing himself.  The 
Seen-Devon was innerly saying, “Do I really look like that fool?”  The Actual-Devon 
was both experiencing the Seen-Devon innerly speaking and was simultaneously innerly 
hearing the Seen-Devon.  
Another sample that involved both inner speaking and inner hearing was sample 
3.2.  This sample was described in the Divided Self subsection.  In this sample, Devon 
was innerly seeing himself. He was also innerly singing along to Bruno Mars song, The 
Lazy Song.  He was also innerly hearing three things: the actual song sung by Bruno 
Mars, himself singing the same song in a monotone voice, and the seen-Devon singing 
the song in a somewhat less monotone, more on key voice.  All versions of the song were 
in sync with each other.  
 Many of Devon’s samples that involved inner hearing have been described 
previously. For example, Samples 2.6 and 7.1 were described in the Experience of Music 
subsection.  In Sample 2.6, Devon was innerly hearing an orchestrated song and in 
Sample 7.1, Devon was innerly hearing a song he remembered on the piano.  
Worded Thinking  
 Devon had three (9%) samples that involved the experience of worded thinking. 
Worded thinking involves thinking in particular distinct words without having those 
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words being experienced as spoken, heard or seen (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).  One 
example of this phenomenon was Sample 5.1 discussed in the Incomplete or 
Uncoordinated Inner Seeing subsection.  In this sample, Devon somehow experienced the 
word “study” as being present. However, it was neither written nor spoken.  Devon felt 
the word in some way he could not specify, but he was confident that the word was 
somehow present. 
Discussion 
 Devon was a motivated participant who displayed an unusually high degree of 
consistency in his sampled moments across sampling days.  Devon’s inner experience 
involved very rich, complex, and detailed inner seeings.  The degree of richness and 
complexity observed in Devon’s inner seeings was not typical of other individuals who 
have participated in DES sampling.  Devon’s experience of inner seeing was also distinct 
from most people’s inner seeing in that it often involved the presence of two or more 
images at a given moment.  At times, the multiple inner seeing involved seeing the same 
event from different perspectives; other times the multiple inner seeings were of 
seemingly unrelated events.  Devon’s inner seeing also often involved frequent 
distortions and exaggerations of facial features and perceptual properties and contained 
unnecessarily elaborate detailed backgrounds and borders.  The majority of Devon’s 
samples that involved some distortion or exaggeration of a person and made that person 
look cartoon-like or unusual in some way. Finally, Devon’s inner seeing often 
incorporated seeing words which sometimes involved unusual characteristics such as 
being strong or emitting heat. Despite the complexity of his inner seeing, Devon was 
convincing and consistent in his accounts of his inner seeings.  
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 Devon also often, and perhaps always, was innerly seeing himself.  Sometimes he 
was monitoring himself, seeing him do whatever he was actually doing in reality.  Other 
times, he was innerly seeing a distorted, cartoon-like version of himself.  Lastly, his inner 
seeing of himself sometimes involved a preoccupation with how he looked to others.  
Such inner seeing usually involved distortions or exaggerations making himself look 
worse than he actually does. Towards the end of his sampling, Devon mentioned that he 
always was innerly seeing himself and stated that he sometimes did not describe that 
inner seeing because he did not realize that it was important or that it was secondary to 
the other things he was experiencing during those sampled moments.  
 Devon also had a couple of samples during which he seemed to have two, 
separate, distinct origins of experience, a phenomenon called divided self.  In these 
samples, Devon was innerly seeing himself and both Devon and the Seen-Devon were 
having distinct inner experiences.  This is a rare phenomenon of experience.  
 Other noteworthy characteristics of Devon’s experience include him frequently 
focusing on bodily functions and sometimes experiencing music visually.  His experience 
of music was also more detailed than just listening to or paying attention to music.  Both 
Devon’s experience of bodily functions and music were rich and complex.  For example, 
his attention to bodily functions sometimes evolved and changed to match what he was 
physically feeling.  They also seemed visually exaggerated and more detailed, almost as 
if they were in high definition. Similarly, Devon’s experience of music went beyond just 
hearing or listening to it.  Rather, it was manifested visually in a very detailed and 
involved manner.  Finally, Devon experienced sensory awareness often, typically with 
them being embedded in his inner seeing.  Devon had one sampled moment that clearly 
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involved a feeling. He had other sampled moments that were suggestive of a feeling; 
however, they were problematic in that the experience mostly involved multiple and 
seemingly disconnected complex bodily sensations which may or may not have been 
related to a feeling. 
 Throughout all of his samples, regardless of the phenomenon of inner experience, 
Devon displayed highly complex and detailed inner experiences.  The only phenomenon 
of inner experience that seemed similar to most DES participants (i.e., less complex and 
detailed) was his experience of sensory awareness.  However, while his sensory 
awareness seemed like most DES participants’ sensory awareness, he also simultaneously 
experienced inner seeing during those sampled moments that were complex and detailed, 
which, as noted, isnot at all like the majority of DES participants.  The significance of 
Devon’s vivid inner seeing and rich inner experience is unclear. Such detailed and rich 
inner experiences may be advantageous to Devon.  For example, one may speculate that 
his ability to visually and auditorily experience music may enhance his ability to make 
music (e.g., play the piano, produce music).  Conversely, such detailed and rich inner 
experience may be a distraction at times, perhaps using up mental resources that could be 
applied productively to other aspects of functioning. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 IDIOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF ROBIN’S EXPERIENCE 
 Robin is a 50-year old Caucasian female who sampled with us from June to July 
2012. Robin met criteria for major depressive disorder as measured by the SCID-I (First, 
Gibbon, Spitzer, & Williams, 1997).  She received a CES-D (Radloff, 1977) of 36, 
suggesting a clinically significant level of depressive symptoms.  She received a Global 
Severity Index score of 2.67 on the SCL-90-R (Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973; 
Derogatis, 1994), suggesting the presence of psychological difficulties.  Robin was taking 
the following medications at the time of sampling: Xanax .30mg, Lisinpril 20mg, 
Neurontin 600mg, Imuran 50mg, Plaquenil 400mg, Nexium 40mg, Cymbalta 60mg, and 
Vesicare 5mg.  
 Robin sampled on eight separate occasions, collecting a total of 42 sampled 
moments.  Six of these sampled moments occurred during the first day of sampling, 
which is generally considered a training day and subsequently will not be discussed.  
After discarding the samples from the first day of sampling, we were left with 36 
moments of experience.  
Overview of Robin’s Sampling 
Robin had considerable difficulty in capturing and conveying her inner 
experience.  She often had difficulty identifying the moment of the beep.  For example, 
she sometimes described a sequence of events that occurred across five to ten seconds 
and she struggled to identify when specifically the beep occurred within that span of 
time.  She also often described her behaviors rather than experience at the moment of the 
beep.  Both of these are common for participants on the first day of sampling; however, 
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most participants improve over subsequent interview days. Robin did not improve.  In 
fact, we had less confidence in Robin’s ability to apprehend her inner experience as 
sampling continued.  
Concomitantly, Robin seemed highly suggestible in the interviews as evidenced 
by what seemed to be her changing her reports about her experience or agreeing to the 
presence of things only after it was asked about by the interviewers.  For example, during 
one of the interviews, Robin was describing a sampled moment in which she was 
thinking about moving to Florida. After an interviewer asked how that thought was 
present to her and gave some possible ideas including her innerly seeing a map of 
Florida, Robin stated that she was in fact innerly seeing a map of Florida.  It is possible 
that Robin was in fact innerly seeing a map of Florida at the moment of the beep and 
coincidently one of the interviewers used that as an example.  Conversely, this could be 
an example of Robin’s suggestibility. 
She also used more subjunctifications when discussing her experience than other 
participants.  Subjunctifications include tentative and unsure language (e.g., “maybe”, 
“sort of”) and changes in bodily language (e.g., gestures that indicate being uncertain).  
Subjectionifications can indicate that the participant is having difficult describing her 
experience or that her experience not fully being understood by the interviewers.  Robin 
seemed to use subjunctifications the most when discussing emotional experiences. 
In contrast, Robin had some instances of inner seeing where the interviewers felt 
confident that Robin was honestly and accurately describing her pristine experience.  In 
these samples, she seemed to be less suggestible and used less subjunctifications.   
 102 
 
Robin’s difficulties in capturing moments of experience did not appear to derive 
from her lack of motivation as she continued to work hard to pinpoint the moment of the 
beep and report on her inner experience as completely as possible.  Robin’s lack of inner 
experience and/or her difficulty apprehending it make it impossible to be confident about 
the salient characteristics of her inner experience, to the extent she has any.  Overall, 
there are reasons to accept Robin’s descriptions as being faithful to her experience, and 
there are reasons to be skeptical, and we were unable definitively to sort that out.  The 
following provides a description of Robin’s sampling and experience in light of our 
skepticism of her inner experience.   
Minimal Inner Experience and Just Doing 
 Perhaps not surprisingly based on the discussion above, the most common feature 
of Robin’s inner experience appeared to be little or nothing present at the moment of the 
beep.   Thirteen samples (36%) of Robin’s moments involved nothing or very little in her 
inner experience.  Three of these samples involved nothing in Robin’s experience.  Seven 
of these samples involved a hint of some experience but were mostly blank or unclear 
experiences.  Three of these samples involved Robin being absorbed in watching 
television with nothing else in her experience.  The following two samples provide 
examples of moments in which Robin’s inner experience was blank. 
Sample 2.5: Robin was on her way to put money on her laundry card.  At the 
moment of the beep there was nothing in her experience. 
Sample 3.2: Robin was on the computer.  At the moment of the beep, there was 
nothing in her experience.  She described the nothingness as staring into space 
and a foggy sensation, but as best we could determine there was nothing in her 
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experience; that is, there was no experiential presence of fogginess or anything 
else. 
Here are two examples of the seven samples that seemed to be mostly blank but 
may have involved a hint of experience present 
Sample 7.4: At the moment of the beep, Robin was putting the big plate in the 
dishwasher.  It was unclear if there was nothing in Robin’s experience and she 
was putting the dish in the dishwasher as if on autopilot, or if she was 
attending/paying attention/actively putting the dish in the dishwasher.  We could 
not be confident about what if anything was in her experience. 
 Robin had several samples similar to this in which it was difficult to discern to 
what degree something was in Robin’s direct experience at the moment of the beep.   
Sample 8.4: Robin was cleaning the coffee maker.  At the moment of the beep, 
she may have been experiencing some jumbled thoughts about making coffee 
every day and the coffee not getting drunk.  She was not confident that these 
thoughts were present at the moment of the beep.  Cleaning the coffee maker did 
not seem to be in her experience. 
In this sample, Robin was not clear as to what was in her experience.  There may have 
been hints of jumbled thoughts about making coffee but Robin did not think they were 
present at the moment of the beep.   Both of these samples come from late in Robin’s 
sampling, days 7 and 8, respectively.   Most participants are able to confidently 
apprehend what is in their experience at the moment of the beep well before their seventh 
day of sampling, even if there is nothing in experience.   
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The following provides an example of a moment in which Robin was absorbed in 
watching television.  Robin had three samples that involved her being carried away with 
what she was watching on TV.   
Sample 4.2: Robin was watching the Big Bang Theory on TV.  At the moment of 
the beep, she was being carried along by the show.  She was not paying attention 
to anything in particular.   
In this section, we’ve discussed three related types of experience: little to nothing 
present in her experience, moments in which there may be a hint of inner experience, and 
moments when she was watching television with no particular experience.  In all of these 
experiences, Robin’s inner experience was mostly blank.  Robin had a very high 
frequency of these moments of experience; in fact, they were her most frequently 
occurring phenomenon.  It is possible that Robin does not have much occurring in her 
inner experience, which is reflected in the high frequency of these mostly blank 
moments.  This theory would also be consistent with her difficulties at capturing her 
inner experience as was discussed at the opening of this chapter.  Robin sometimes had 
more coherent inner experiences, which will be discussed below.  These coherent inner 
experiences, however, occurred less frequently than her blank or mostly blank moments 
of inner experience.   
Feelings 
 In seven (19%) of Robin’s samples, it seemed as if she experienced a feeling.  
Three additional samples may have also included a feeling, although it was unclear if a 
feeling was present at the moment of the beep.  In total, 28% of Robin’s samples may 
have involved a feeling.  In terms of valence, Robin experienced more negative emotions 
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(seven samples) than positive emotions (three samples).  Six of Robin’s emotional 
experiences were accompanied by bodily sensations.  However, Robin appeared to have 
more difficulty than most participants in describing her bodily sensations.  The following 
is an example of a sample that included a feeling associated with bodily sensations.   
Sample 2.2: At the moment of the beep, Robin was nervous, which she 
experienced as a football-sized area of tenseness/discomfort in her stomach area 
and a shaky feeling throughout her body.  Although she said her nervousness was 
about having to give blood, this was not in her experience at the moment of the 
beep.  She was playing solitaire on her computer, but this also was not in her 
experience at the moment of the beep. 
This sample was unusual for Robin in that she clearly described her experience of the 
bodily sensation.  The following sample provides another example of a feeling associated 
with a bodily sensation.  In this sample, Robin had difficulties describing her experience 
of the bodily sensation. 
Sample 6.3: Robin had been speaking with her husband about her friend Mary 
switching her phone service to T Mobile, which cut Mary’s cell phone bill in half.  
At the moment of the beep, Robin was feeling excited for Mary.  This feeling 
seemed to be located throughout her body and was associated with a physical 
sensation that Robin could not describe.  “Lightness” was the word we could find 
to most closely describe the physical sensation, but Robin was resistant to using 
that term to describe her sensation. 
In this sample, Robin was confident that she was experiencing excitement physically 
throughout her body; however, she was unable to articulate that experience of excitement.  
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This sample is more typical of Robin’s samples that involve feelings and is consistent 
with Robin’s general difficulties in describing her experiences. 
 The following sample provides another example of Robin’s difficulties in 
describing an emotional experience. 
Sample 7.2: Robin had been watching TV and had been watching her cats, Ms.  
Muffet and Opal, fight.  At the moment of the beep, she was watching to make 
sure Ms.  Muffet did not pick on Opal too badly.  As best we could determine 
Robin was paying attention to the cats and was worried.  This worry seemed to be 
experienced throughout her body, but did not involve any physical sensations or 
specific localization.  This experience was more of a feeling than a thought, 
although that was not entirely clear in the interview.  Robin began talking about 
this experience as if it were a thought, but asserted that it was more of a feeling 
after the interview asked if it was a feeling.  Robin was also hearing the TV as 
background noise.  She was not paying attention to the content of what was being 
said.   
In this sample, Robin had begun talking about her experience of worrying as a thought.  
However, after an interviewer asked if it was a feeling, she began discussing the 
experience as if it was a feeling.  At the conclusion of the discussion of this beep, the 
interviewers were left wondering if worrying was in her experience at the moment of the 
beep and if it was, did it seem cognitive in nature, emotional, both, or something 
completely different.   
 Overall, feelings were Robin’s most commonly occurring phenomenon of 
experience besides her high frequency of blank or mostly blank moments of inner 
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experience.  While she had a few incidents of feelings that seemed consistent with other 
DES participants in clarity, the majority of her experience of feelings seemed less precise 
and convincing than those described by other participants.  Her frequent use of 
subjunctifications and her difficulty articulating her bodily sensations are consistent with 
the notion that Robin often has minimally developed inner experience.  It is also possible 
that there is something unique about Robin’s inner experience that made it difficult for 
her to verbalize it in an interview.   
Unsymbolized Thinking  
 Robin had eight samples (22%) that involved unsymbolized thinking.  Three of 
these samples involved Robin experiencing the unsymbolized thought as being physically 
located somewhere in her head.  The following provides a few examples of Robin’s 
unsymbolized thinking. 
Sample 2.4: At the moment of the beep, Robin was wondering why her doctor 
wants to call/knowing there was something wrong/thinking doctors don’t call if 
there is nothing wrong.  This was a cognitive/thinking experience rather than a 
feeling, and it was multifaceted with multiple aspects or themes. 
Sample 3.3:  Robin was talking on the phone.  At the moment of the beep, Robin 
was telling her friend about the fact that she (Robin) had given up her relationship 
with her brothers because they did not support her.   Robin was experientially 
controlling/driving the words she was saying.  A notion of, “If you know you’re 
right, why do you care what other people think?” was also present to Robin.  This 
notion was an experienced thought, but was not experienced in words or images.   
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Robin seemed confident that this experience was located in the back of her head.  
She was also experiencing comfortableness throughout her entire body.    
Sample 4.5:  Robin was about to tell her husband that she had lost ½ lb.  At the 
moment of the beep, she was thinking about having come home from the doctor’s 
office and that she lost ½ lb.  This thought was not experienced in words or 
images.   
In each of these samples, Robin was experiencing a coherent thought that was not 
represented in any experiential details (e.g., words, images).  Sample 3.3 is an example of 
an unsymbolized thought that Robin experienced as being physically located at the back 
of her head.  Despite at times having difficulties describing her experience, Robin was 
convincingly confident that these experiences were not represented experientially.  Her 
confidence in the lack of experiential details present during these sampled moments is in 
direct contrast to other sampled moments in which she appeared suggestible and easily 
led as was discussed at the opening of this chapter.   
Happening of Speech 
 Robin had three samples (8%) that involved her saying something out loud that 
was not experienced by her.  Rather, it was like the words were just rolling out of her 
instead of being created by her.  This phenomenon is called the happening of speech.  All 
three samples also involved her simultaneously experiencing unsymbolized thinking that 
was different from what she was simultaneously speaking out loud.  In each of these 
samples, her experience was focused on what she was thinking not what she was 
speaking out loud.  The following is an example of the phenomenon. 
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Sample 5.2: Robin was in her house talking to a neighbor from her window.  At 
the moment of the beep, Robin was talking out loud to her neighbor asking, How 
is your back doing? Robin was not confident that those were the exact words 
present, but was sure that she was asking him about his back.  Robin experienced 
her speaking as if the words were just rolling out of her, that she was not carefully 
attending to the specific words she was speaking.  At the same time, she was 
thinking of suggestions for his back/how she could help him feel better.  It was 
unclear if Robin was thinking of specific suggestions for his back such as, don’t 
lay down but sit up more, or if she was thinking generally about suggestions for 
his back.  This thinking was not experienced in words or images, but Robin 
experienced it as being located physically in her head.  Experientially, Robin’s 
thinking about suggestions for his back was more central in her experience than 
was talking out loud (perhaps 60%, 40% respectively).   
In this sample, Robin was thinking about what her neighbor could do for his back.  Robin 
had difficulties narrowing down the specific details of her thoughts.  Experientially, 
thinking globally of suggestions for how she could help someone verses thinking of 
specific suggestions for someone is very different.  However, Robin could not specify 
which of those, both, or neither were in her experience at the moment of the beep.  This 
thought seemed to be unsymbolized and was experienced as being physically located in 
her head.  She was also simultaneously speaking out loud to her neighbor; however, what 
she was saying out loud was not in her experience.  The following is another example of 
the happening of speech phenomenon. 
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Sample 4.4: Robin was in the bathroom peeing and yelling at her husband to get 
into the shower.  At the moment of the beep, she was thinking that he didn’t 
shower the day before and he should get into the shower.  This thought was not 
experienced in words or images.  This thought was related to what she was yelling 
out to her husband, but was not specifically what she was yelling.  Although they 
were occurring at the moment of the beep, Robin’s peeing and yelling out loud 
were not in her experience. 
In this sample, Robin was experiencing an unsymbolized thought about how her husband 
had not showered the day before.  At the same time, she was speaking out loud.  
However, what she was speaking out loud was different than what she was thinking and 
was not directly in experience.  She experienced it as if the words were just occurring at 
the moment of the beep.   
Inner Seeing 
 Seven (19%) of Robin’s samples involved inner seeing.  Three of Robin’s 
samples involved her innerly seeing words, which is generally a rare experience.  Two of 
her samples involved seeing something she had seen previously.  For one of her inner 
seeing experiences, Robin experienced her inner seeing as if it was physically located in 
her head, a similar phenomenon to what was discussed previously under unsymbolized 
thinking.  The following sample provides an example of one of Robin’s inner seeing 
samples. 
Sample 4.1: Robin was making spaghetti sauce.  At the moment of the beep, she 
was innerly seeing the word “OREGANO” written on a list of the spices she 
needed to add to the sauce.  Oregano was the only word she could read on the list, 
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but she could see that there were other spice names below it.  OREGANO was 
written in black, computer-printed bold upper-case letters near the top of a white, 
rectangular (taller than wider) piece of paper.  The word OREGANO was 
approximately twice as large as the other spices listed below it. 
Robin had two other samples that involved innerly seeing words, both of which 
involved lists of things for her to do.  The following provides another example of one of 
Robin’s inner seeing samples.  In this sample, Robin was seeing something she had seen 
previously.   
Sample 6.2: Robin had been watching the Big Bang Theory on TV; it showed a 
ball-pit play area like they used to have at McDonalds.  Robin had also just 
finished speaking to her husband.  At the moment of the beep, she was innerly 
seeing a square, tan/black, drained ball pit from the perspective of standing near 
the rim of the pit looking down at it.  The ball pit had an inch of urine on the floor 
of the ball pit, three or four diapers, and a few syringes with orange tops.  There 
may have been something else in the left corner of the ball pit, but it was unclear 
as Robin was not seeing that area clearly.  Robin was also feeling grossed 
out/repulsed.  This feeling seemed mental and had no physical location or 
sensations associated with it.  Robin’s inner seeing was a recreation of a drained 
ball pit she saw on the news.  However, in Robin’s experience, she was not seeing 
the TV/news displaying the pit; rather she was seeing the pit as if she were 
standing at the rim of it.   
 Finally, Robin had one sample that involved an inner seeing that seemed to be 
physically located in her head.   
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Sample 3.5: At the moment of the beep, Robin was feeling relief/glad that Mary is 
going to be okay.  This feeling was experienced physically in her body as 
comfortableness.  She was also innerly seeing an airplane ticket.  The airplane 
ticket was rectangular, black and white, with squared edges.  Information was 
written on the ticket, but Robin could not see the specifics.  The airline ticket she 
was seeing was located in the front of her head, around her forehead.  She was 
seeing it as if she were looking from the back of her head.  Robin had been 
thinking that Mary was getting a ticket to fly home from Florida rather than 
having to take the bus, which had been very traumatic on her way to Florida.   
In this sample, Robin was innerly seeing an airplane ticket.  Some of the details, such as 
the information written on the ticket, were not clear to Robin.  Her inner seeing was 
located in the front of her head.  This is consistent with Robin experiencing some 
unsymbolized thoughts as being physically located in her head.   
 Overall, Robin experienced inner seeing in approximately 20% of her sampled 
moments.  Slightly less than half of her inner seeing samples involved innerly seeing 
words, a relatively rare phenomenon.  Robin also had a few inner seeing samples that 
involved recreating something she had seen before.  Lastly, Robin had one inner seeing 
sample which she experienced as being physically located in her head.  Robin’s inner 
seeing samples seemed to be her clearest moments of inner experience.   
Discussion 
 Robin was a motivated participant who seemed to feel that she was doing a good 
job of capturing and conveying her inner experience.  However, we had some concerns 
regarding Robin’s ability to capture and convey her experience.  Robin often appeared to 
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have considerable difficulty in identifying what was ongoing in her experience at the 
onset of the beep.  Her reports of experience often involved a sequence of events and she 
struggled to identify at what point in the sequence of events the beep sounded.  It was 
also our observation that Robin seemed highly suggestible throughout her interviews as it 
appeared she changed her reports of her experience or agreed to the presence of things 
only after it was asked about by the interviewers.  Robin did not seem to improve across 
sampling days in her ability to capture and convey her experience.  She also did not 
become more believable with regards to the accuracy of her reports.  In fact, we 
developed less confidence in Robin’s ability to apprehend her inner experience as 
sampling continued. 
 Robin experienced many samples that were mostly blank.  She had several 
samples in which there was nothing in her experience or slight hints of experience.  She 
also had some samples that involved her being carried away with a television program 
she was watching without anything else in her experience.  Robin experienced a few 
incidents of feelings (28%), unsymbolized thinking (22%), and inner seeing (19%).  
However, many of these samples seemed to contain various subjunctifications which led 
us to be cautious not to assume that Robin’s description accurately conveyed her inner 
experience.  In addition, many of these samples contained inconsistencies that resulted in 
us questioning aspects of her report.    
Robin occasionally had samples in which she was both innerly thinking 
something and speaking out loud.  In these samples, what Robin was innerly thinking, 
usually in the form of unsymbolized thinking, was different than what she was saying out 
loud.  Furthermore, her experience of speaking out loud was automatic as if she were 
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speaking on auto pilot.  In comparison to other DES participants, Robin had below-
average frequencies of sensory awareness (5%) and inner speaking (0%).   
Although there is no way to know for sure, her difficulties in capturing her 
experience may be related to her having less in experience to access at a given time than 
most people.  Robin had some incidents of inner experience that seemed clearly 
apprehended, particularly her experiences of inner seeing.  This suggests that Robin can 
have clear inner experience and was capable of describing those experiences in an 
interview.  This also suggests that Robin’s difficulties in describing her experience in 
other sampled moments was a result of her not having much to report about or having 
unclear inner experiences rather than language difficulties or other procedural issues.  It 
is also possible that she needed further practice at refining her skills.  Lastly, it is possible 
that Robin’s inner experience and her ability to capture her inner experience were 
impacted by the various medications she takes daily or some other factor.    
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CHAPTER 8 
IDIOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF ANDREA’S EXPERIENCES 
 Andrea is a 23-year old Hispanic female who sampled with us from December 
2011 to March 2012.  Andrea met criteria for major depressive disorder as measured by 
the SCID-I (First, Gibbon, Spitzer, & Williams, 1997).  Andrea received a CES-D 
(Radloff, 1977) score of 54, suggesting a clinically significant presence of depressive 
symptoms.  She received a Global Severity Index score of 3.06 on the SCL-90-R 
(Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973; Derogatis, 1994), suggesting the presence of 
significant psychological difficulties.  Andrea was not receiving any treatment for 
depression at the time of sampling.   
 Andrea sampled on four separate occasions, collecting a total of 24 sampled 
moments.  Six of these moments occurred during the first day of sampling, which is 
generally considered a training day and subsequently will not be discussed.  After 
discarding the samples from the first day of sampling, we were left with 18 moments of 
experience.   
 All participants were invited to participate in eight sampling days.  Andrea ended 
her participation with this study prematurely after completing four sampling days.  She 
indicated that she could not participate in further sampling because she did not have time 
in her schedule, but we don’t know whether her premature termination might have been 
related to the relative unclarity of her experience or something else related to her 
sampling.  Andrea also told us that she did not wear the ear piece that is attached to the 
beeper on sampling days one, two, and three.  It is our experience that wearing the ear 
piece assists participants to identify the precise onset of the beep and thus makes it easier 
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for them to apprehend their ongoing inner experience.  It is unclear if her not wearing the 
ear piece affected her ability to capture her experience at the moment of the beep.   
We identified the following salient characteristics of Andrea’s inner experience, 
though they should be interpreted tentatively as no confident conclusions could be drawn 
about Andrea’s inner experience. 
Sensory Awareness 
 The most common feature of Andrea’s inner experience was sensory awareness, 
which occurred in 7 (39%) of her samples.  Six of the seven sensory awarenesses were 
bodily (e.g., a tingle or pain).  The following is an example of Andrea’s sensory 
awareness: 
Sample: 4.6: Andrea was taking a shower.  At the moment of the beep, she was 
paying attention to the feeling of soap between her fingers on both hands.  She 
was also paying attention to the feeling of warm water hitting her upper back.  
Lastly, she was feeling refreshed which had a relief component to it.  We were 
unable to determine whether feeling refreshed was an emotion or a physical 
sensation or both a feeling and a sensation.    
In this sample, Andrea was paying particular attention to a specific, bodily sensory aspect 
(pain and soap/water/relief, respectively).  Her sensory experience was differentiated 
such that she was simultaneously able to pay attention to the sensory aspect of soap 
between her fingers on both hands as well as the feeling of the warm water hitting her 
upper back.  Both seemed to be equally in her experience at the moment of the beep.   
 In another incident of sensory awareness, Andrea was texting on her phone.  In 
her experience were the physical sensations of texting.  Her experience did not include 
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any aspects of the meaning of what she was texting even when we would expect that 
content to be in her experience.  In this sample, she was experiencing two sensory 
awarenesses: the feeling of her thumbs moving and the feeling of the buttons of the 
phone on her fingertips.   
Sample 2.5: Andrea was answering a text message.  At the moment of the beep, 
she was feeling the muscles of her thumbs moving (as the thumbs were moving 
on the phone to create a text message).  She was also feeling the buttons of the 
phone on her fingertips.  The content of the text message or the person it was 
intended for was not in her experience at the moment of the beep. 
Andrea had three additional samples that contained two sensory awarenesses.  One of 
these samples was discussed previously, Sample 4.6.  Three of these samples involved 
more than one differentiated bodily sensory awareness.  The other sample contained a 
visual sensory awareness and an auditory sensory awareness.  The following provides 
two examples, each of which involved two sensory awarenesses.   
Sample 3.3: Andrea was being poked with a needle in her third finger of her left 
hand by another student as part of practicing how to draw blood.  At the moment 
of the beep, she felt pain in her middle finger [the one in which she was poked].  
The pain was felt equally throughout her entire middle finger [note: Andrea was 
poked on the top, side end of her finger] and internally, not on the surface of her 
finger.  That is, the pain was not felt where the poke had occurred – in fact, she 
had no experienced sensation of the direct poke.  Instead, the pain was 
experienced throughout her finger.  Andrea also felt a tingling sensation from the 
bottom of her middle finger to her elbow.  The tingling sensation was strongest 
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near her finger and lessened in intensity toward her elbow.  The tingling sensation 
was experienced internally, not on the surface of the arm.  Andrea was also 
feeling scared.  There were no bodily sensations associated with her feeling 
scared.  Less saliently in her experience, Andrea could see the other student’s 
hand on her finger and she could see the needle poking into her finger. 
Sample 4.3: Andrea was cutting an apple.  At the moment of the beep, she was 
focused on the sound made as the knife cut through the apple and also on the juice 
droplets spraying out of the apple as she cut it. 
In both of these samples, Andrea was drawn to sensory qualities (i.e., bodily, auditory, 
and visual sensations).  The multiple sensory awarenesses seemed to be equally present to 
her at the moment of these beeps.  For example, pain internally on her middle finger is 
different than a tingling sensation from the bottom of her middle finger to her elbow, but 
yet both were present to her at the moment of the beep.  The first example is also notable 
in that her experience of pain extended beyond the actual physical sensation.  She was 
poked on the top, side end of her finger, yet her experience of the pain was throughout 
her entire middle finger and internally.  In fact, she experienced no pain where the poke 
occurred.   
Overall, sensory awareness was Andrea’s most frequent form of experience 
across samples.  In fact, she experienced sensory awareness even when verbal awareness 
might have been expected.  For example, when texting someone, Andrea’s inner 
experience involved the sensory aspect of texting, whereas most would assume her 
experience would be on the content of the message that she was texting.  Andrea also 
displayed highly differentiated sensory awareness.  For example, in Sample 2.5 described 
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previously, she was simultaneously experiencing the movements of her muscles and the 
feel of the keys.  Finally, Andrea’s sensory awareness sometimes extended beyond the 
actual physical sense.  For example, she was feeling pain from a needle poke not where 
she was actually being poked by a needle.   
Feelings 
 The next most prominent aspect of Andrea’s inner experience was feelings.   Six 
(33%) of Andrea’s 18 samples involved a feeling.  In addition, one (6%) sample involved 
a thought/feeling.  In total, 39% of Andrea’s samples involved some aspect of an 
emotional experience.   
In terms of valence, Andrea experienced four negative feelings and two positive 
feelings.  Three of Andrea’s feelings did not involve bodily sensations, and three did 
involve bodily sensations.  Both of Andrea’s positive feelings were associated with 
bodily sensations.  The following sample provides an example of one of Andrea’s feeling 
that did not involve any bodily sensations: 
Sample 3.2: Andrea was poking a fellow student’s finger in order to draw blood.  
At the moment of the beep, she felt nervous and hurried which she experienced as 
two distinct and separate, yet equally salient, feelings.  The nervous feeling was 
mental, meaning it had no other experiential characteristics.  Feeling hurried 
involved somehow knowing that there were a few things that she needed to 
complete quickly after poking the person’s finger.  The specific things that she 
needed to complete (e.g., throw away the needle, wipe blood) were not present to 
her at the moment of the beep, rather at the moment of the beep, she knew that 
there were things that she needed to do quickly. 
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In the samples that involved feelings associated with bodily sensations, it was 
unclear if her experience was of an emotional experience associated with bodily 
sensations, or if her experience was of bodily sensations that she labeled as an emotion. 
Sample 2.6: Andrea was hugging her son and was feeling happy.  She 
experienced the feeling of happiness as a very cold feeling (although not ice cold) 
deep in her upper chest [she originally called this feeling “blood flow,” but that 
was a presupposition about the underlying physiology, not a description of 
experience].  She also was feeling heat on her cheek from where her son’s cheek 
touched her cheek.   
It was unclear during the interview if Andrea’s experience was focused on the very cold 
feeling deep in her upper chest, which she labeled as happiness.  It is also possible she 
was feeling happy which manifested itself as a very cold feeling deep in her upper chest.  
It was difficult for the interviewers to discern whether the feeling of happiness was 
clearly apprehended.   
The following sample provides another example of the possibility of integration 
or separation of feelings and bodily sensations. 
Sample 4.1: Andrea was driving and another car had almost hit her car.  At the 
moment of the beep, Andrea was feeling scared and feeling her heart racing.  
Feeling scared and her heart racing seemed to go together somehow but it was 
difficult for us to determine whether she understood the heart racing as being part 
of the emotion or whether that question made sense to her.   
It is possible that feeling scared and feeling her heart race were two separate and 
simultaneously occurring experiences.  It is also possible that Andrea was feeling scared 
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which was associated with her heart racing.  Lastly, it could be possible that Andrea was 
experiencing her heart racing and labeled that bodily sensation as her feeling scared.   
 Andrea had one sample in which she experienced a thought/feeling.  This 
experience included both an emotional and cognitive/thinking process.  The emotional 
and cognitive processes were intertwined to such a degree that they could not be 
separated into two distinct, separate experiences.  Rather, the experience was both 
emotional and cognitive. 
Sample 2.3: Andrea was doing a homework problem which asked her to find an 
example of a normal value.  At the moment of the beep, she was thinking/feeling 
that the problem was difficult/frustrating.  She could not disentangle the thinking 
from the feeling – it seemed to be one experience that could be called a thinking 
experience or could be called a feeling.  She experienced the thought/feeling in 
her head and it was not accompanied by any sensation.  After the beep, she 
noticed a sensation of pressure in her head that she reported was related to the 
frustration, but that was not part of her experience at the moment of the beep. 
 Overall, Andrea experienced feelings in 39% of her samples.  Her experience of 
feelings varied and included both positively and negatively valenced feelings, some 
feelings being associated with bodily sensations, some feelings not associated with bodily 
sensations, and one incident of a feeling intertwined with a cognitive experience.  
Sometimes with Andrea’s experience the interviewers were not confident about whether 
a feeling was present at the moment of the beep and if it was present, how Andrea 
experienced it.  For example, it was unclear what the relationship was between Andrea’s 
feelings and associated bodily sensations.  It was difficult to discern if her experience was 
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of an emotional experience associated with a bodily sensation or perhaps a bodily 
sensation that she labeled as an emotion (e.g., my heart is racing therefore I must be 
scared).   
Inner Speaking and Inner Hearing 
 Inner speaking was present in 1 (6%) of Andrea’s samples.  Inner hearing was 
present in 2 (12%) of Andrea’s samples.   
Sample 3.5: Andrea was speaking with a fellow student, Shatoya.  At the moment 
of the beep, she was telling Shatoya: “Squeeze the finger to where it turns red, 
kind of purplish, so you have a lot of blood when you poke it.” Simultaneously, 
Andrea was innerly saying to herself, “The finger has to turn reddish or purplish 
for blood to gather up.” Andrea was focused on what she was innerly saying more 
than what she was saying out-loud.  She was innerly saying it to herself in her 
own voice, as if the words were somehow supplied to her.   
In this sample, Andrea’s experience was on her inner speaking rather than what she was 
saying out-loud to her classmate.  At this moment, Andrea was simultaneously speaking 
two distinctly different sentences, one aloud and one innerly, but understood herself to be 
the agent of neither.   The aloud words were happening, coming out of her, without her 
attending to them.   She was attending to the inner words, but it was not merely that she 
was recalling what she had read earlier; it was as if what she had read earlier was being 
played back through her own inner speaking.   
 The following two samples involved inner hearing.   
Sample 4.4: At the moment of the beep, Andrea was innerly hearing “oh gosh” 
said in an irritated tone in her own voice.  She understood that “oh gosh” 
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represented one thought: “I don’t really have any knowledge of the candidates 
running; I need to do my research.” However, this thought was not directly or 
explicitly present at the moment of the beep.  Andrea was of the impression that 
she had explicitly thought the complete thought some seconds before the beep, 
and that the “oh gosh” remained from that prior thinking. 
Sample 4.5: Andrea was reading on the Internet that people with thyroid problems 
have to take pills for the rest of their lives.  At the moment of the beep, she was 
somehow thinking that she might have to take pills for the rest of her life.  She 
was innerly hearing, “I might have to take pills the rest of my life.” This was said 
really quickly, perhaps twice the normal rate, in her own voice.  She was also 
feeling frustrated, dead-end like.  This frustration did not involve any physical 
sensations or location.  Reading was not in her experience at the moment of the 
beep. 
In these two samples, Andrea was experiencing inner hearing.  In Sample 4.5, there was 
some ambiguity in her experience such that she initially said that no words were present, 
but later stated that she was innerly hearing the statement.  The ambiguity may represent 
a lake of clarity in her inner experience.  It may also represent the difficulty in 
verbalizing one’s inner experience, especially an inner experience which many people do 
not anticipate.   In both of these examples, Andrea was clear that the experience was not 
inner speaking; she did not experience herself as innerly saying or producing the words.  
Rather, her experience was of innerly hearing the words.  In the first sample, what she 
heard was said in an irritated tone.  In the second sample, what she heard was said really, 
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quickly perhaps twice the normal rate.  In both samples, what she heard was in her own 
voice. 
Unsymbolized Thinking 
 Andrea had one experience (6%) that involved thinking a clear and specific 
thought without the content being represented in words, images, or other symbols.   
Sample 3.6: Andrea was cleaning and was looking for something.  She could not 
remember specifically what she was looking for, although she thought that she 
was looking for tubes to collect blood.  At the moment of the beep, Andrea was 
wondering where they [which she thinks was the tubes] were.  It was difficult to 
determine how she experienced the wondering; at one point she described it as a 
sense of herself being lost, but she also said that her experience was more aimed 
at the missing tubes than at herself as lost.  She was also physically experiencing 
herself opening a cabinet.  She remembers that her hands were on the handles of 
the cabinet, but she was unsure what aspect of opening the cabinet was directly in 
her experience. 
While Andrea had difficulty determining how she experienced the wondering and the 
specific content of the wondering (e.g., her being lost or the tubes being lost), she was 
consistent that her wondering was experienced without words or other symbols present.  
We have counted this as an instance of unsymbolized thinking, but it is not as clear or 
specific as is unsymbolized thinking typically.  Specifically, it is somewhat unusual for 
the target (in this sample, what she was looking for) of an unsymbolized thought to be 
ambiguous.   
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Inner Seeing 
 Andrea had one experience (6%) that involved inner seeing, seeing something that 
is known to be not actually present.   
Sample 2.4: At the moment of the beep, Andrea was feeling tired and was 
thinking maybe she should take a nap.  Her thought that maybe she should take a 
nap involved (and may have been entirely) innerly seeing a round/oval, 
gray/white rock sleeping with a pastel purple blanket over it.  She was seeing the 
rock from a side perspective with its head to the right.  The rock had two dots for 
eyes and a line for a smile.  She did not see anything around the rock [Andrea 
identified the rock as the one from a Zoloft depression commercial, but believed 
that the rock and blanket that she was innerly seeing was altered from what she 
saw on the commercial].  Her tired feeling was mostly or entirely in her eye lids 
feeling heavy.   
In this sample, Andrea was experiencing inner seeing and less saliently in her experience, 
feeling tired which was associated with her eye lids feeling heavy.  Andrea’s inner seeing 
also may have involved a sensory awareness with regards to her attending to the sensory 
qualities of the rock she was innerly seeing.  Her description of the rock (i.e., round/oval, 
gray/white rock with a pastel purple blanket) and her high frequency of sensory 
awarenesses led the interviewers to consider her as being drawn to the visual qualities of 
what she was innerly seeing.     
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Just Doing and Nothing in Experience 
 Andrea had two samples (11%) in which she was “just doing,” she was just 
engaged in some activity with no awareness of it (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).  She also 
had one sample (6%) in which there was nothing or very little in experience.   
Sample 2.1: Andrea was driving and had to make a left turn to get to where she 
was going.  At the moment of the beep, she may have been thinking that she 
needed to turn left or she may have been simply proceeding without any thought 
present.  If a thought was present, it was dim and without words or images. 
In this sample, Andrea’s experience was mostly of the task that she was doing.  There 
also may have been a dim, unsymbolized thought present at the moment of the beep, but 
it was difficult to discern.   
Sample 3.4: Andrea was outside walking back to her class.  At the moment of the 
beep, Andrea was visually seeing the building where her class was located.  The 
building she was seeing was, or at least may have been, dimly in her experience. 
Discussion 
 Andrea participated in four days of sampling rather than the eight days of 
sampling intended for this study.  The aforementioned salient characteristics of 
experience emerged across the four days of sampling; however, it is uncertain if these 
salient characteristics would have continued to be present in additional sampling days.  
Andrea’s descriptions of her inner experience were sometimes unclear.  Her description 
of sensory awarenesses seemed to be mostly clear; however, her description of other 
experiences seemed less clearly apprehended.  It is possible that her inner experiences 
were clear, but she struggled to verbalize her inner experiences.  It is also possible that 
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her experience of phenomenon besides sensory awareness were less clear, resulting in 
difficulties apprehending those experiences.  While she somewhat improved in her ability 
to capture and describe her experiences over the four days of sampling, it is difficult to 
determine if she would have continued to improve in her skill to apprehend and describe 
her experiences if she continued sampling.  Also, Andrea disclosed to us that she did not 
use the ear piece on the beeper to hear the beeps.  Rather, the beeps came out of the 
speaker.  Not using the ear piece on the beeper could have hindered Andrea’s ability to 
identify the precise moment of the beep and subsequently made it more difficult for her 
to capture her experience occurring the brief moment before the beep alerted.  In sum, 
there are no confident conclusions that can be drawn about Andrea’s inner experiences.  
The salient characteristics identified and the following discussion of Andrea’s inner 
experiences should be taken as tentative profile of Andrea’s experience.   
 Andrea’s most frequently occurring phenomenon of experience was sensory 
awareness (39%).   Her description of her sensory awarenesses were clearer than her 
description of other experiences.  Andrea’s sensory awarenesses were atypical in a few 
ways.  She experienced sensory awareness even when verbal awareness might have been 
expected.  She also had some sampled moments in which she was experiencing more 
than one sensory awareness, and those awarenesses were very differentiated and equally 
salient in her experience.  Finally, Andrea had one sampled moment that involved a 
sensory awareness that extended beyond the actual physical sense. That sample involved 
her being poked by a needle but she felt pain in other areas of the finger being poked, but 
not at the actual site where the needle penetrated her skin.  
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 Andrea also had a few sampled moments that involved feelings (39%) and inner 
hearing (11%).  She had below-average frequencies of inner speaking (6%), 
unsymbolized thinking (6%), and inner seeing (6%).  Andrea’s experience of these 
phenomenon seemed to be less clearly apprehended as compared to her experience of 
sensory awareness.   
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CHAPTER 9 
IDIOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF TYLER’S EXPERIENCES 
 Tyler is a 56-year old, Caucasian, male who sampled with us from June to July 
2012.  Tyler met criteria for bipolar disorder as measured by the SCID-I (First et al., 
1997).  Tyler received a CES-D (Radloff, 1977) score of 18, suggesting the presence of 
some depressive symptoms.  He received a Global Severity Index Score of 1.5 on the 
SCL-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973; Derogatis, 1994), suggesting 
the presence of psychological difficulties.  Tyler does not work because he is on mental 
disability.  Tyler was receiving psychological treatment for his bipolar disorder at the 
time of sampling which included meeting regularly with a psychologist and a 
psychiatrist.  Tyler was taking the following medications at the time of sampling: 
Lexapro (10 mg), Lithium (300 mg), Seroquel (600 mg), and Hydrocodone (10 mg).   
 Tyler sampled on six separate occasions, collecting a total of 36 sampled 
moments.  Tyler was unable to complete the intended eight days of sampling because he 
moved away from the area.   Six of Tyler’s samples occurred during the first day of 
sampling and will subsequently not be discussed.  After discarding the sampled from the 
first day of sampling, we were left with 30 moments of experience.   
 Overall, Tyler’s inner experience was consistent in that he experienced sensory 
awarenesses in the over 80% of his sampled moments.  He also seemed to experienced a 
high frequency of thoughts, however his thoughts were problematic in that they were 
often unclear, vague, and perhaps more affective or sensory in nature.  Tyler also had a 
difficult time apprehending whether the thought was present precisely at the moment of 
the beep.  In contrast, his experiences of sensory awareness were clearly apprehended.  
 130 
 
The following provides a description of the salient characteristics of Tyler’s inner 
experience. 
Sensory Awareness 
 Sensory awareness occurred in 25 (83%) of Tyler’s 30 samples.  Tyler 
experienced visual sensory awarenesses the most often (in 23 sampled moments).  He 
also had two sampled moments with tactile sensory awarenesses, one sampled moment 
with olfactory sensory awareness, and one sampled moment with auditory sensory 
awareness.  Tyler had two additional samples that seemed to involve perceptual 
awareness, although in these sampled moments, it was difficult to rule out the presence of 
a sensory awareness.  If we include these samples, Tyler may have experienced sensory 
awareness in 90% of his sampled moments. 
 Tyler’s visual sensory awarenesses varied greatly.  Sometimes he was focused on 
aspects of objects in his environment (e.g., dirt on the sidewalk) and other times he 
focused on characteristics of people around him (e.g., noticing the coloring of a man’s 
hair).  The following sample provides an example of one of Tyler’s visual sensory 
awarenesses. 
Sample 3.1: Tyler was at the dog park.  He was reaching into a box to get a plastic 
bag for dog waste.  At the moment of the beep, he was visually absorbed in the 
shiny, brown cleanness of the bag.   
In this sample, Tyler was absorbed in the visual qualities (i.e., shiny, brown cleanness) of 
the plastic bag.  This experience was purely sensory in that he was engrossed in the 
sensory aspects and was not aware of any meaning or interpretation regarding the object. 
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 In 5 of Tyler’s 23 visual sensory awarenesses, Tyler was absorbed in the coloring of 
objects. 
Sample 6.1: Tyler was drinking ruby red juice.  At the moment of the beep, he 
was noticing the white color of the ice cubes in contrast to the red/pink color of 
the juice.  He may have been thinking, do I need to put more ice cubes in my 
drink.  He was not sure if this thought was present to him at the moment of the 
beep. 
In this sample, Tyler was drawn to the color contrast of the red/pink color of his juice to 
the white color of the ice cubes.   
 Tyler had two samples which involved a tactile sensory awareness.  The 
following is an example of one of Tyler’s tactile sensory awarenesses. 
Sample 2.2: Tyler was running his tongue along the botTylers of his teeth.  A split 
second before the moment of the beep, his teeth were feeling his tongue; now, at 
the moment of the beep, he was no longer feeling his teeth (his tongue had arrived 
at the place where he is missing 3 teeth).  Somehow, in a way that was not 
entirely clear, he was aware of the absence of the sensation, or the absence of the 
teeth as if physical gritty/roughness somehow remained but at the moment of the 
beep as a just-passed sensation.   
In this sample, Tyler had been feeling the physical gritty/roughness of his teeth.  At the 
moment of the beep, he was somehow aware of the absence of that sensation.   
 Tyler had one sample which involved an olfactory sensory awareness.  In this 
sample, Tyler was absorbed in smelling a good smell coming from the kitchen, which 
was the smell of soup cooking.   
 132 
 
Sample 3.6: At the moment of the beep, Tyler was purposefully sniffing the good 
smell coming from the kitchen.  He may have been wondering what the smell 
was, trying to figure out what was cooking, but he was unsure if the wondering 
occurred before or after the moment of the beep. 
 Tyler also had one auditory sensory awareness which involved him paying 
attention to the sound of paper being cut by a box cutter. 
Sample 6.2: Tyler was ripping paper with a box cutter.  At the moment of the 
beep, he was noticing the sound of the paper being cut by the box cutter.  He was 
also seeing the paper cut by the knife; we understood this seeing as being 
somewhat less salient than the sound.  He was not paying attention to the doing of 
the cutting, which seemed on autopilot.  There was some discussion of the fact 
that the sound meant that the cutting was clean, that this was the sound that he 
expected/wanted to hear, but it was not clear whether this was or was not in his 
experience at the moment of the beep. 
 Tyler also had five sensory awareness samples in which Tyler was purposefully 
creating a sensory experience to be aware of, which we call the doing of sensory 
awareness.  In these samples, Tyler was not just noticing some sensory aspect; instead he 
was purposefully creating a sensory experience (e.g., purposefully smelling something) to 
be aware of (e.g., noticing the qualities of the smell).  One example of Tyler’s doing of 
sensory awareness has been discussed previously.  In Sample 3.6, Tyler was sniffing the 
good smell coming from the kitchen and at the moment of the beep, he was noticing the 
smell.  In this sample, Tyler was actively sniffing the smell in order to pay attention to 
 133 
 
the qualities of the smell.  The following sample is another example of Tyler doing of 
sensory awareness. 
Sample 3.5: Tyler was wiggling his toes in his socks.  At the moment of the beep, 
he was visually paying attention to his toes moving his socks.  He may have also 
been wondering why he was wearing black socks, but he was unsure if that 
wondering occurred before or after the moment of the beep. 
In this sample, Tyler was wiggling his toes in his socks purposefully to create the sensory 
experience (i.e., visually seeing his toes moving his socks) that he was noticing at the 
moment of the beep.   
 Overall, sensory awareness was very salient in Tyler’s inner experience, occurring 
in the large majority of his sampled moments.  While Tyler experienced sensory 
awareness of all senses, he most frequently experienced visual sensory awareness.  Tyler 
also sometimes purposefully created the sensory experiences on which he was focused.   
Unsymbolized Thinking  
Two (6%) of Tyler’s samples involved unsymbolized thinking.  Both these 
unsymbolized thoughts were related to a sensory awareness he was also experiencing at 
the moment of the beep.  The following sample provides an example of one of Tyler’s 
unsymbolized thinking experiences.   
Sample 2.4: Tyler was on a bus and a seemingly homeless man came onto the bus 
and sat next to Tyler.  At the moment of the beep, Tyler was noticing the man’s 
wild, gray hair.  He was also innerly thinking, this guy is old/the gray hair is 
old/his hair is gray..  This thought was not experienced in words or images.  Tyler 
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first noticed the hair and then experienced the thought, but both were present in 
experience at the moment of the beep.   
In this sample, Tyler’s thought, “this guy is old/the gray hair is old/his hair is gray”  is 
unsymbolized as it was not experienced symbolically (i.e., words, images).  This thought 
was also related to Tyler’s sensory awareness of noticing the man’s wild, gray hair.  The 
following provides another example of Tyler experiencing an unsymbolized thought. 
Sample 5.5: Tyler was looking at a plant in his house.  At the moment of the beep, 
Tyler was noticing how the plant’s leaves looked burnt on the bottom.  He was 
also thinking something like, “How come I didn’t see it before/how did this 
happen?” This thinking was not experienced in words or images. 
In this sample, Tyler’s thought, “How come I didn’t see it before/how did this happen?” 
is another example of unsymbolized thinking.  The thought was not experienced in words 
or images, but Tyler was confident that the idea was present at the moment of the beep.  
In this sample, Tyler’s unsymbolized thought was related to his sensory awareness of the 
plant looking burnt on the bottom.   
Hints of Thoughts 
 An additional 14 (47%) of Tyler’s samples involved what he described as a 
thought.  In some of these sampled moments, it seemed like there were hints of thoughts 
present.  Other times, it seemed like there were thoughts that were close to but not exactly 
present at the onset of the beep.  Other times, it was difficult to discern if what he was 
describing was a thinking (cognitive) experience or some experience that was possibly 
more sensory or affective in nature.  If the thoughts were present at the moment of the 
beep, they seemed to be low in saliency in comparison to other aspects of his experience 
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and to be not fully formed.  Several of those examples were presented previously 
(Samples 3.5, 3.6, and 6.1).   The following sample is another example of a sample in 
which we were unclear regarding the presence of a thought at the moment of the beep. 
Sample 4.4: At the moment of the beep, Tyler was looking at the basket-weave 
bark on a date palm tree.  He may have also been thinking that all the bark doesn’t 
look good on a date palm tree/the tree would look better without the bark.  But, it 
is unclear if he was thinking that at the moment of the beep.   
In this sample, it was unclear if the thought about the bark not looking good on the 
palm/tree was present at the moment of the beep.  The following provides another 
example of this phenomenon. 
Sample 5.3: At the moment of the beep, Tyler was noticing the moustache hair 
above his son’s lip.  There may have been a hint of a thought about the fact that 
he is starting to grow a moustache or the fact that he will need to shave soon, but 
we could not be sure. 
This sample is similar to Sample 4.4 in that it was difficult to discern whether the thought 
about his son growing a moustache was present at the moment of the beep.  If it was 
present at the moment of the beep, it was less salient than Tyler’s sensory awareness of 
his son’s moustache hair and was generally vague or not fully formed.   
 Tyler also had sampled moments in which it was difficult to discern if his 
experience was a thinking experience or whether it was more sensory or affective in 
nature. 
Sample 2.5: Tyler was having an argument with his 13-year old son.  At the 
moment of the beep, Tyler was thinking, why does this boy care about adult 
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affairs/matters? This thought was not experienced in words or images.  This 
thinking may have included or otherwise reflected some degree of consternation 
or frustration with why his son was worried about adult things, but we could not 
be sure.   
What Tyler called “thinking” in Sample 2.5 did not seem to be the same type of 
experience that Tyler called “thinking” in a Sample 2.4 when he was thinking, this guy is 
old/the gray hair is old/his hair is gray (discussed previously under the Unsymbolized 
Thinking section).  We could not be confident how the two experiences were different.  It 
seemed that Sample 2.4 was at least possibly more sensory than cognitive, and Sample 
2.5 seemed at least possible more affective than cognitive.  Whether there was anything 
cognitive in either is not known; whether there was any experienced emotion in either is 
also not known.    
 Overall, Tyler experienced distinct, unsymbolized thoughts or hints of thoughts in 
approximately 50% of his samples.  His thoughts were usually pertaining to his sensory 
awareness experience at the moment of the beep.  Tyler had several samples that 
involved vague hints of thinking processes when it was difficult to discern whether or not 
they were present at the moment of the beep.   
Preoccupation with Eyes 
 Tyler had three (10%) samples in which he was focused on eyes.  Two of these 
samples were focused on dogs’ eyes and one sample was focused on a woman’s eyes.  
This is a rare phenomenon and appeared to have significance for Tyler.   
Sample 2.3: Tyler was taking his dog for a walk and saw a woman walking 
towards him walking two Pit Bulls.  At the moment of the beep, Tyler was 
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looking at the two Pit Bulls’ heads and was focused in on their eyes.  He was 
slightly more focused on the dog on the left.  Tyler was looking at the Pit Bulls’ 
heads to determine if they were aggressive dogs, though it was not clear if this 
was directly experienced beyond seeing their eyes and heads. 
In this sample, Tyler was focused on the Pit Bull’s eyes.  Focusing on their eyes may 
have been the way that Tyler was trying to discern if the dogs were aggressive.  In the 
following sample, Tyler was focused on the coloring of a woman’s eyes. 
Sample 3.3: At the moment of the beep, Tyler was paying attention to the very 
black on very whiteness of a woman’s eyes.  It was a stark contrast of striking 
blackness and whiteness that had captured his attention.  He may have also been 
recognizing her eyes or wondering if they were really black, but he was unsure if 
the thinking occurred before or after the moment of the beep.  His description of 
seeing the woman’s eyes was very compelling, whereas the discussion of the 
possible thinking was much less so. 
Tyler was focused on the woman’s eyes, specifically the contrast between the blackness 
and whiteness of her eyes.   
Inner Seeing 
 Tyler reported inner seeing in one (3%) of his samples.  Despite not experiencing 
inner seeing often, Tyler was confident and believable in his description of his inner 
seeing experience.   
Sample 3.2: Tyler was walking and a cool breeze had come up.  At the moment of 
the beep, he was feeling the cool breeze on his face.  Tyler had closed his eyes 
when the breeze started and at the moment of the beep he was actively, 
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intentionally feeling the sensation of the cool breeze on his face.  He was also 
innerly seeing an Asian peasant, who, like all the other peasants, whenever a 
breeze came across the hot paddy, broke off from planting and stood to face the 
breeze full on.  Tyler saw the man clearly, straight-on, saw his smiling face and 
blowing hair, and saw also other details, for example, the field rising up like steps 
to the right and left.  This inner seeing was a partial recreation of a scene from a 
movie Tyler had seen, although some details were different than the movie.  In the 
movie, there were two or three men in the field, but Tyler was only seeing one. 
In this sample, Tyler was creating a sensory awareness of feeling the breeze on his face.  
At the same time, he was innerly seeing a partial recreation of a scene from a movie he 
had seen.   
Inner Speaking 
 One (3%) of Tyler’s samples involved the experience of inner speaking.  Tyler 
was confident and believable in his description of this experience despite not 
experiencing inner speaking during any other sample. 
Sample 4.6: At the moment of the beep, Tyler was innerly saying to himself, 
“12,” the sum of the first two digits (9 and 3) of the serial number of the $10 bill 
he was looking at.  He innerly said 12 in his own voice.  He was also looking at 
the numbers 9 and 3 on the $10.00 bill. 
This sample showed that Tyler was able to apprehend inner speaking when it occurred.    
Feelings 
 Tyler had one (3%) sample that may have involved a feeling although it was 
difficult to discern whether a feeling was actually present.  This sample (Sample 2.4) was 
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discussed previously under the Hints of Thoughts Section.  In this sample, Tyler may 
have been experiencing some degree of frustration or consternation regarding why his 
son was worried about adult things.  With no other samples containing feelings, it is 
possible that this experience was more cognitive than affective.   
Discussion 
 Tyler inner experience overwhelmingly involved sensory awarenesses.   Over 
eighty percent of his sampled moments included sensory awareness, which is well above 
the frequency of sensory awareness for most participants.  He experienced sensory 
awarenesses with all senses except taste.  Visual sensory awarenesses occurred most 
frequently, occurring in 23 of his 30 sampled moments.  Tyler also had samples in which 
he was actively creating sensory experiences to focus on, which we called the doing of 
sensory awareness.   For example, he noticed that a breeze was occurring and he shut his 
eyes and paid attention to the sensory aspect of the breeze hitting his face.  Another time, 
he was sniffing to purposefully smell the scent of soup cooking in the kitchen.   
Tyler had very few other clear experiences beyond sensory awareness.  He 
occasionally experienced unsymbolized thinking (6% of his sampled moments) and hints 
of thoughts (47% of his sampled moments).  However, the majority of his thoughts were 
related to aspects of his sensory awarenesses, and were less salient than other aspects of 
his experience and vague or not well formed.  Furthermore, Tyler’s hints of thoughts 
involved ambiguity regarding whether they were present at the moment of the beep.  
Tyler only experienced one clear experience of inner speaking and one clear experience 
of inner seeing.  He also had one experience which may have involved a feeling.  Overall, 
Tyler’s inner experiences seem to be predominantly characterized by sensory 
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awarenesses with a few unclear occurrences of other forms of experience (i.e., 
unsymbolized thinking, inner speaking, and inner seeing).  The fact that Tyler did report 
rare instances of inner speaking, inner seeing and perhaps a feeling indicated that he was 
able to recognize and describe these types of experiences when they were present.   This 
lends further support to the proposition that the predominate feature of Tyler’s pristine 
inner experience was sensory awareness.  Lastly, at the time of sampling, Tyler disclosed 
that he was prescribed and taking several mood altering medications.  It is unclear what 
effect, if any, the medication may have had on his inner experience.   
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CHAPTER 10 
IDIOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF DANIEL’S EXPERIENCE 
 Chapters 6 through 11 provide idiographic descriptions of each participant’s inner 
experience. These chapters are divided into sections based on the salient characteristics 
that emerged across the participant’s sampled moments. Following these six idiographic 
profiles, Chapter 12 reviews the commonalities and differences of inner experience 
across all six participants. Chapter 13 provides a discussion of the results and 
implications for future research.  
 Daniel is a 49-year old, Caucasian, gay male who sampled with us from April to 
June 2012. Daniel met criteria for bipolar disorder as measured by the SCID-I (First, 
Gibbon, Spitzer, & Williams, 1997). Daniel received a CES-D (Radloff, 1977) score of 
23, suggesting a clinically significant level of depressive symptoms. He received a Global 
Severity Index score of 0.78 on the SCL-90-R (Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973; 
Derogatis, 1994), suggesting the presence of psychological difficulties. Daniel was not 
receiving any treatment for bipolar disorder at the time of sampling.  
 Daniel sampled on eight separate occasions, collecting a total of 43 sampled 
moments. Five of these sampled moments occurred during the first day of sampling, 
which is generally considered a training day and subsequently will not be discussed. 
After discarding the samples from the first day of sampling, we were left with 38 
moments of experience. The following salient characteristics of Daniel’s inner experience 
were identified.   
 Daniel sometimes had considerable difficulty conveying his inner experiences to 
us during the interviews despite being quite clear and believable in his descriptions of his 
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experiences once he was able to articulate them. At times he was also observably 
cautious, struggling to provide high fidelity reports of his experience. That is, we 
understood him to have substantially high fidelity apprehensions of his experience but 
difficulty describing them. It is our understanding that Daniel’s difficulties in describing 
his inner experience were in part caused by the complexity of his inner experiences. 
Feelings 
 Nine (24%) out of Daniel’s 38 samples involved a feeling. Furthermore, seven 
additional samples involved a thought/feeling, or an emotional experience that is so 
entwined with a cognitive/thinking process that it is impossible to label the experience as 
either just feeling or just thinking; rather the experience is a combination of both. Thus in 
total, 42% of Daniel’s samples involved some aspect of an emotional experience.  
 In terms of valence, Daniel experienced almost an equal number of positive and 
negative feelings. Three of the emotional experiences involved a recreation or re-
experiencing of a past experience. Six of Daniel’s emotional experiences were 
accompanied by bodily sensations.  
Daniel experienced an almost equal number of positive valence and negative 
valence feelings associated with bodily sensations. All of the bodily sensations associated 
with feelings were experienced in some aspect of his core (e.g., torso, stomach, chest). 
The following is an example of a sample with a feeling associated with bodily sensations.  
Sample 3.3: Daniel had just finished a phone conversation that involved a heated 
discussion. At the moment of the beep, he was feeling angry. His anger was 
decreasing as he felt angrier before the moment of the beep. His anger involved 
tension/tightness in his chest and upper abdomen muscles. He was also thinking 
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that he is in control now of his emotions/that it’ll be okay. His thinking was 
growing, getting stronger in his experience. His thinking was not experienced in 
words.  
This sample also reflects something seen in a number of other samples, namely the direct 
experience of the changing or shifting intensity of aspects of his experience.  In this case 
Daniel experiences both his feeling decreasing in intensity and his thinking increasing in 
intensity or salience.  This is unusual as most subjects find the “slice” of experience 
captured through sampling to be fixed in intensity within the moment of the beep.   
 Daniel had three samples in which he experienced a feeling that was a recreation 
or a re-experiencing of a past emotional experience. The following sample provides an 
example of this type of phenomenon.  
Sample 4.1: Daniel was watching a commercial about a video game on TV. At the 
moment of the beep, Daniel was attending to the commercial and re-experiencing 
excitement/anxiousness similar to what he had felt when he played these video 
games as a child. He was experiencing the excitement/anxiousness in his chest, 
part of which was the sensation of his heart racing and him taking deeper breaths. 
He was also somehow explicitly considering or knowing that his 
excitement/anxiousness was related to his past, that he was re-experiencing those 
feelings. 
The following sample provides another example of an emotional experience which 
involved a re-experiencing of a past experience. In this sample, Daniel was re-
experiencing a sense of shock he felt when he saw the barracks where he would be 
staying while serving in the military.  
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Sample 6.6: At the moment of the beep, Daniel was re-experiencing being in open 
barracks in Hawaii. He was innerly seeing, from first-person perspective as if he 
was standing in the middle of the barrack, two very long rows of bunk beds. The 
barrack had green tile floors. The barrack he was innerly seeing was the actual 
barrack to which he had been assigned when he was stationed in Hawaii. He also 
was re-experiencing being there and had a feeling of negative shock about what 
he had gotten himself into/that it wasn’t what he expected.  
 Daniel had six samples that involved a thought/feeling. These experiences 
included both an emotional and a cognitive/thinking process. The emotional and 
cognitive processes were intertwined to such a degree that they could not be separated 
into two distinct, separate experiences. Rather, the experience was both emotional and 
cognitive. 
Sample 8.3: Daniel was on the computer looking at a job opening for prosthetics. 
At the moment of the beep, he was feeling regretful/somber and inseparably 
thinking several things, Why didn’t I apply for it in the past; I did make orthotic 
supports for shoes before; I let myself down.. The feeling would not exist without 
the thoughts and the thoughts would not exist without the feeling. The experience 
did not have a location, but somehow involved a felt emptiness/missing 
something. The three thoughts were distinct, clear, and equally present. 
 The following sample provides another example of a thought/feeling experience. 
In this sample, Daniel had been watching a TV program about Dick Clark passing away 
and was experiencing a feeling/thought about Dick Clark’s death. 
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Sample 3.1: At the moment of the beep, Daniel was somber, which for him 
seemed to be primarily or entirely cognitive experience involving the realization 
that Dick Clark will not be there anymore/that we won’t see him anymore/if he 
saw him on TV from now on, it would be recordings of him. This realization did 
not involve any words or sensations. Daniel was also paying attention to the TV 
show, though this was somewhat less salient than his somberness/realization that 
Dick Clark is gone.  
 In sum, feelings occurred in slightly less than half of Daniel’s samples and were 
his most dominant form of experience across samples. His experience of feelings varied 
substantially including re-experiencing past emotional experiences, complex bodily 
sensations, and experiences that involved both feeling and cognitive/thinking processes.  
Meta-Awareness 
 Meta-awareness was present in 10 (26%) of Daniel’s 38 samples. This is an 
extremely high frequency of meta-awareness (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). Meta-
awareness refers to an experience in which a person was monitoring or noticing his 
mental processes or experiences as they occurred. For example: 
Sample 5.1, Daniel was in his backyard cleaning his pool. At the moment of the 
beep, he was noticing the bright, clean greenness of the plants in his backyard. He 
was also experiencing calmness, and (separately and simultaneously) noticing this 
psychological calmness. This was related to not having anything to worry about 
and being done for the day.  
The portion of Daniel’s experience that was experiencing and (separately and 
simultaneously) noticing his psychological calmness is an example of meta-awareness. 
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Meta-awareness generally involves two levels of experience, first the experience and 
second the active, ongoing monitoring or noticing of that experience. In this sample, 
Daniel was experiencing psychological calmness and was also separately noticing that he 
was experiencing psychological calmness.  
 Four (40%) of the ten meta-awareness samples involved meta-awareness of a 
feeling. Two of these meta-awarenesses regarding feelings involved Daniel monitoring 
his feelings and noticing how they related to past feelings. One of these samples was 
Sample 4.1, described previously, where Daniel was explicitly aware that his 
excitement/anxiousness was a re-experiencing similar to what he had felt when he played 
video games as a child. He was aware that his excitement/anxiousness was related to the 
past, that he was re-experiencing those feelings. The following sample provides another 
example.  
Sample 5.2: Daniel was working in his backyard. At the moment of the beep, he 
was feeling the heat radiating off the rocks. He was also recognizing that he was 
relaxed earlier and that he was not currently relaxed. He was also feeling 
frustrated which he experienced as tenseness/uncomfortable in his chest. 
Simultaneously he was recognizing that he had been relaxed earlier but that he 
was not currently relaxed. This was a meta-awareness because not only was he 
feeling frustrated, he was also explicitly comparing this frustration to a recalled 
relaxation.  
In both of these samples, Daniel was experiencing an emotion (excitement/anxiousness 
and frustrated, respectively) and monitoring or noticing the relation of that emotional 
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experience to a past emotional experience (how he felt when he played video games as a 
child and how he felt earlier that day, respectively).  
 The remainder of Daniel’s meta-awareness experiences involved his noticing 
aspects of what he was doing. 
Sample 7.4: Daniel was walking into the kitchen, coming in from outside and 
headed toward the living room. At the moment of the beep, Daniel was hearing a 
commercial about the dangers of texting and driving that was playing on the TV 
in the living room. In addition to listening to what they were saying, which was 
the primary salience of his experience, he was simultaneously thinking in a non-
specific, incipient way about the dangers of texting and driving and also 
simultaneously was noticing that he was speeding up to get into the other room to 
see what they were showing. His thinking did not have any words or other 
symbols nor was it more specific than about the dangers of texting and driving, 
but it seemed to have implied within it or in some context way present his history 
of catastrophic traffic scenes he had witnessed in his time as an EMT. His 
hurrying was experiences as him quickly moving through space to get to where he 
could see the TV, and he was also noticing that he was starting to step faster in 
order to get to the TV. 
In this sample, Daniel’s noticing that he was walking more quickly in order to see what 
was happening on TV is an example of meta-awareness. 
Doing Experience 
 Daniel had four (11%) samples that involved him attempting to control or alter or 
manipulate emotional or thinking experiences.  This has been called the “doing” of 
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experience (Hurlburt 1993; Hurlburt & Raymond, 2011). In the following sample, Daniel 
attempted to control the intensity of the emotion that he was experiencing.  
Sample 4.4: Daniel was watching the Price is Right on TV. They were playing a 
game where the contestant tries to guess each digit in the price of a car. For each 
guess, the contestant has to pay a dollar for every number she is away from the 
correct value of the digit. If the contestant runs out of money, she does not get the 
car. Daniel had been silently playing along, guessing the required digits. At the 
moment of the beep, Daniel was feeling euphoria/high/excitement regarding the 
fact that he had guessed the right number, and that he would be being closer to 
winning the car if he were the contestant. He was also simultaneously feeling 
bad/sad for the contestant who picked the wrong number and was further away 
from winning the car. Neither emotion was accompanied by physical sensations 
or any bodily or other experiential aspect. Those are two simultaneous feelings, 
neither of which qualifies as a meta-awareness. However, at the same moment he 
was also aware of both feelings in a self-reflective and self-monitoring way: he 
was actively balancing the feelings in the active attempt to be neither too 
euphoric/high/excited nor too sad. The two feelings, euphoria/high/excitement 
and bad/sad existed simultaneously for Daniel. He understood himself to be 
switching, at will, his attention/involvement/experience back and forth between 
ongoing and known-to-be-ongoing, feelings. At the moment of the beep, he was 
more into the euphoria/high/excitement, which was intensifying. However, his 
simultaneous self-monitoring process detected that this intensification was 
problematic (the contestant is losing, so I shouldn’t be too happy), so he was 
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simultaneously purposefully aiming his attention at the sad-for-contestant feeling 
as a way of reining in his euphoria/high/excitement. Daniel said that this process 
was “like his brain was spinning” but we did not adequately explore what he 
meant by that.  
In this experience, Daniel was not only having two simultaneous feelings 
(euphoria/high/excited and bad/sad), but he was also simultaneously explicitly 
monitoring those feelings. Furthermore, using that monitoring of his feeling, Daniel was 
actively and purposefully adjusting his attention to the separate feelings to balance their 
relative intensity. Hurlburt (Hurlburt 1993; Hurlburt & Raymond, 2011) has called the 
attempt to control or alter or manipulate emotional or thinking experiences the “doing” of 
experience. For Daniel this occurred frequently as part of his meta-awareness.  
 Daniel had three additional samples similar to Sample 4.4 that included “doing 
experience.” One of these samples, Sample 3.3, was discussed in the previous Feelings 
subsection. In that sample, Daniel was feeling angry and was trying to control his 
emotional experience. Another example of doing of experience was in Sample 7.4 
discussed in the Meta Awareness subsection. In that sample, Daniel was starting to and 
noticing that he was stepping faster in order to get to the TV. Overall, the doing of 
experience was observed most frequently with Daniel’s emotional experiences.  
Sensory Awareness 
 Sensory awareness occurred in 11 (29%) of Daniel’s samples. Sensory awareness 
refers to an experience in which one pays attention to a specific sensory aspect of 
something within one’s environment (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002; Hurlburt, Heavey, & 
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Bensaheb, 2009). Sensory awareness may be bodily (e.g, an itch, tingle, pain) or external 
(e.g., noting the color of grass).  
 Daniel’s sensory awarenesses encompassed a variety of sensory modalities, with 
four (37% of his sensory experiences) instances focused on visual aspects, three (27%) 
samples focused on textural characteristics, two (18%) focused on auditory aspects, one 
(9%) instance focused on taste, and one (9%) sample with multiple, different sensory 
aspects (visual and textural). The following is an example of one of Daniel’s visual 
sensory awareness experiences.  
Sample 5.1: Daniel was in his backyard cleaning his pool. At the moment of the 
beep, Daniel was noticing the bright, clean greenness of the plants in his 
backyard. He was also experiencing/noticing his psychological calmness. This 
was related to not having anything to worry about and being done for the day. The 
calmness was not experienced physically.  
In this example, Daniel was drawn to the bright, clean greenness of the plants. This 
aspect of his experience was purely sensory in that he was engrossed in the sensory 
aspects (bright, clean, greenness) of the grass and was not aware of any meaning or 
interpretation regarding the grass.  This is also another instance of meta-awareness.   
 Sample 5.4 provides an example of one of Daniel’s sensory awareness 
experiences focused on textural aspects. In this sample, Daniel was experiencing two 
sensory awarenesses with both experiences aimed at textural sensations.  
Sample 5.4: Daniel was doing dishes, specifically scrubbing a dish with a sponge. 
He was holding the sponge with the palm and fingers of his left hand, so that as he 
scrubbed, the side of his hand actually extended a bit past the leading edge of the 
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sponge. At the moment of the beep, he was noticing the texture of rough bread 
crumbs along with the sensation of the water. He was feeling the rough bread 
crumbs and the water with the side of his left hand above his pinky.  
This sample is a purely sensory experience in that Daniel was drawn to the sensory 
aspects of the textual sensations (texture of rough bread crumbs and sensation of water) 
and was not aware of anything else at the moment. 
 Two of Daniel’s samples that included sensory awarenesses occurred while he 
was engrossed in some task. In both of these experiences, the physical doing of the task 
was not in his experience, but rather his experience was aimed at the sensory aspects of 
the doing. For example, in Sample 4.3, Daniel was ironing his shirt. Rather than being 
focused on the doing of ironing his shirt (i.e., focused on moving the iron), Daniel’s 
experience was focused on the sensory results of his ironing (i.e., adequate creases in his 
shirt and no burns).  
Sample 4.3: Daniel was ironing his work shirt. At the moment of the beep, he was 
intently seeing the crease he was ironing in front of the iron (with the intention of 
making a good crease) and the shirt as it emerged from the back of the iron (with 
the intention of checking to see that it had not been burned or otherwise marked in 
the ironing process). That is, his experience was seeing the shirt. He also was 
aware that others would see the shirt and check it out for creases and burn marks 
(so he had the intention of not creating some). He was not thinking of anyone in 
particular, but others in general.  
In this example, Daniel was noticing the sensory aspects of his ironed shirt. His 
experience did not include the physical doing of the task. Similarly, the following sample 
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provides another example of a sensory awareness that occurred while Daniel was focused 
on doing something. In this sample, Daniel was wrapping his foot with an Ace bandage. 
His experience was focused on the sensory aspects associated with the bandage being 
wrapped on his foot. His experience did not include an experience of him actively 
wrapping the bandage on his foot.  
Sample 6.4: Daniel was sitting on the couch wrapping his leg in an ace bandage. 
At the moment of the beep, he was engaged in the task visually and sensorially. 
He was visually attending to the wrapping of the bandage, trying not to make it 
too tight and not making wrinkles, wrapping it correctly. He was also with his 
foot feeling the tightness of the bandage and with his fingers the tension with 
which he was pulling the bandage as he wrapped.  
 In two of Daniel’s samples, the majority of Daniel’s experience was blank but he 
was still experiencing a minimally salient sensory awareness. For example, in Sample 
7.6, Daniel was eating a salami and cheese sandwich. He tasted the elements of the 
sandwich, but estimated that the tasting encompassed less than 10% of his experience and 
the remainder of his experience was empty. Daniel was confident that the majority of his 
experience was blank and that there was still a less salient experience of sensory 
awareness present.  
Discoordinated Experiences 
 Daniel had several experiences in which it appeared that the threads of his 
experience may be uniquely intertwined and controlled. Specifically, Daniel separated 
and decreased/increased the saliency of the threads of his experience.  
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 For example, in Sample 2.1, Daniel had been watching television. At the moment 
of the beep, he was hearing the noise from the television. He was not understanding the 
meaning of what was being said on the television, rather he was hearing the sound from 
the television. That is Daniel was hearing the sounds of speech on the television without 
extracting the meaning of speech. 
 Similarly, in Sample 2.4, Daniel was playing a game of Bejeweled on his iPhone. 
He was simultaneously innerly seeing a different and distinct game of Bejeweled. With 
regards to the coloring of the game, Daniel’s inner seeing was different than the actual 
game he was playing in that his inner seeing included black and white shapes that were 
not present in the actual game. It was unknown if Daniel was seeing the shapes in his 
inner seeing as black and white or if the shapes in his inner seeing were not seen in color. 
It is also possible that the sensory aspect of this experience was not articulated or focused 
on, whereas the meaning of the game was expressed. Daniel may have the ability to 
separate threads of experience that are usually integrated and then choose what threads to 
hone in on.  Alternately, the typical automatic “coordination” of different threads of 
experience may not always occur in Daniel’s experience.  
Undifferentiated Threads 
 Daniel had several experiences where he experienced integrated threads of 
experience that merged to create distinct, blended forms of experience. For example, as 
discussed previously under the Feelings subsection, Daniel had six samples that involved 
a thought/feeling. These experiences were a blend of emotions and cognitions intertwined 
to such a degree that they could not be separated into two distinct, separate experiences.   
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 Daniel also may have had a sample that contained an integrated experience of 
sensory awareness and emotion. In Sample 6.5, Daniel was watching TV. At the moment 
of the beep, he was listening to the relaxing/soothing sounds of an older song a woman 
was singing. Daniel may have also felt relaxed. In this experience the sensory aspects of 
listening to the relaxing/soothing sounds of the songs and feeling relaxed appeared to be 
blended or intertwined into a distinct experience that was not a purely sensory awareness 
nor a purely emotional experience, but he was not sure. That is, Daniel could not (or at 
least did not) experientially distinguish between the recognition of a song’s being 
relaxing and the feeling of relaxation.  
 Another phenomenon that emerged from Daniel’s samples is the presence of 
incipient thinking, thinking processes that are not fully coalesced. It is possible that these 
experiences are incidents of undifferentiated threads of experience similar to the 
examples described above. Daniel had three samples that involved incipient thinking.  
Sample 7.1: At the moment of the beep, Daniel was watching Southpark on TV, 
but he was barely attending to it, perhaps 5% of his experience. His experience 
was mostly involved with the words “Japan,” “electronics,” and “technology.” 
These three words were somehow present to Daniel, perhaps heard or perhaps just 
the idea of the words with no directly experienced words present in any form. All 
three words/ideas were present at the same time. Daniel did seem fairly confident 
that it was the words that were present, not merely the ideas of concepts that the 
words connoted. He was not at all confident about the manner in which the words 
presented themselves. Daniel believes the words were or at least might have been 
the beginnings of some not yet directly experienced thinking, as if the words 
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would have sometime later coalesced into an explicit thought about something 
like how Japan produces a lot of electronics and technology. 
In this example, Daniel was experiencing what might be the beginnings of a thought that 
was not yet fully developed or coherently put together into a clear idea. Daniel had two 
other samples containing an incipient experience.  
Sample 7.4: Daniel was walking into the kitchen, coming in from outside and 
headed toward the living room. At the moment of the beep, Daniel was hearing a 
commercial about the dangers of texting and driving that was playing on the TV 
in the living room. In addition to listening to what they were saying, which was 
the primary salience of his experience, he was simultaneously thinking in a non-
specific, incipient way about the dangers of texting and driving and also 
simultaneously was noticing that he was speeding up to get into the other room to 
see what they were showing. His thinking did not have any words or other 
symbols nor was it more specific than about the dangers of texting and driving, 
but it seemed to have implied within it or in some context way present his history 
of catastrophic traffic scenes he had witnessed in his time as an EMT. His 
hurrying was experiences as him quickly moving through space to get to where he 
could see the TV, and he was also noticing that he was starting to step faster in 
order to get to the TV. 
In this sample, Daniel was thinking in a non-specific, incipient way about the dangers of 
texting and driving. The experience of incipient thinking is a rare phenomenon. Typically 
people either have a thought present or do not. The hint of the beginnings of thoughts is 
not a frequently occurring phenomenon. 
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 Overall, incipient thinking and undifferentiated threads of experience are 
relatively rare phenomenon. Most people who have participated in DES either have a 
thought present or do not. The hint of the beginnings of a thought or unclear boundaries 
between processes of experience is not common.  
Nothing in Experience 
 Daniel also frequently experienced moments in which there was nothing or very 
little present in experience. Nine (24%) of Daniel’s 38 beeps are best characterized as 
having nothing in experience. Daniel consistently experienced moments in which there 
was nothing in his experience across every sampling day. The following are a few 
examples of moments in which there was nothing in his experience: 
Sample 4.5: Daniel was walking from his kitchen to his living room holding a cup 
of coffee. At the moment of the beep, nothing was in his experience. 
Sample 4.6: Daniel was sitting on the couch drinking a cup of coffee. The TV was 
on, and his eyes were aimed at it, but at the moment of the beep, nothing was in 
his experience.  
Sample 7.5: Daniel was folding towels. Nothing was in his experience - not that 
task, not the feeling of the towel, not the seeing of the towel. 
  Daniel also had a three moments of experience in which the majority of the 
experience could be characterized as blank, but that there was still a presence or hint of a 
sensory awareness. For example, in Sample 4.2, Daniel was watching TV and his 
experience was mostly blank. However, there was a small (5-10% of his potential 
experience) visual experience of the commercial on the TV, specifically the lion in the 
commercial.  
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Inner Seeing 
 Daniel reported inner seeing in six (16%) of his 38 samples. Inner seeing refers to 
an experience of seeing something that is known to be not actually present (Hurlburt & 
Heavey, 1999). Daniel did not have samples containing inner seeing on every sampling 
day. He did not experience any inner seeing on the third, fourth, fifth, and seventh day of 
sampling. However, he experienced one inner seeing on the second day of sampling, two 
inner seeing on the sixth day of sampling, and three inner seeing on the eighth and final 
day of sampling. Despite not experiencing inner seeing every sampling day, Daniel was 
confident and believable in his description of his inner seeing experiences.  
 We have already discussed one of these samples previously, Sample 6.6 under the 
Feelings subsection. In that sample, Daniel was innerly seeing from first-person 
perspective as if he was standing in the middle of the open barrack, two very long rows of 
bunk beds. This was a re-experiencing of Daniel being in the open barracks in Hawaii. 
This inner seeing was related to a re-experiencing of an emotional experience, a feeling 
of negative shock.  
 The remaining five instances of inner seeing were all compelling from various 
standpoints, including multiple and complex inner seeing and inner seeings which 
appeared to have a reality on their own. The following is an example of one of Daniel’s 
inner seeing experiences: 
Sample 8.6: Daniel had been watching the newer version of Planet of the Apes. At 
the moment of the beep, he was innerly seeing a scene from the 1970s version of 
Planet of the Apes. He was seeing Charlton Heston walking on a beach with the 
head of the Statue of Liberty lying on the sand. Daniel was seeing Charlton 
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Heston from the perspective of looking down at the front of Charlton Heston, as if 
Daniel was standing on some nearby cliffs and Charlton Heston was walking 
towards him. The statue’s head was on the left of Charlton Heston. Daniel could 
not detect movement in what he was seeing; he was unsure if he was seeing a 
fixed scene, possibly from the movie poster, or a portion of the movie, but one 
where there was little or no movement. Although most of his attention was 
involved in the inner seeing, perhaps 70%, Daniel also experientially knew that 
his inner seeing was of a movie and that it was not reality. This knowing was 
explicit and distinct, perhaps 30% of his ongoing experience.  
In this example, Daniel was experiencing both an inner seeing and less saliently in his 
experience, a meta-awareness regarding the reality of his inner seeing.  
 One of Daniel’s inner seeing involved two separate and distinct inner seeings that 
were present simultaneously at the moment of the beep. These inner seeings also 
appeared to have a reality on their own such that even when not in “view” they still 
existed: 
Sample 6.1: Daniel was watching Cold Case on TV. The characters on the show 
were looking at a very bloody homicide victim who had been stabbed repeatedly. 
At the moment of the beep, Daniel was innerly seeing a series of scenes, two of 
which were present, that were recreations of things he experienced earlier in his 
life when he was a paramedic. These scenes were side-by-side and moving right 
to left with one going out of his view as the other was entering, but both were 
visible at the moment of the beep. The inner seeing that was primarily in his view 
was a bush with a couple of feet of human intestines coming out of the left side of 
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the bush and another couple of feet of human intestines coming out of the right 
side of the bush. He was seeing this from a first person perspective, looking up at 
the bush with the bush approximately 2 or 3 feet from him. This seemed like an 
accurate re-seeing of what he had seen when he responded as a paramedic to a 
plane crash. This inner seeing was more vivid to him than the second inner seeing 
because he was he was more focused on it. The second inner seeing was of a 
human leg lying on the ground. This was something he had seen when he 
responded to a bad car crash. Daniel was seeing the leg from ankle to below the 
knee. He could not tell from what he was seeing if the leg was attached to a body. 
The seeings moved from right to left, fairly quickly but not rushed (perhaps 2 
seconds to make the transit). As they moved into the center of his field they 
became more vivid and as they moved left out of the center they became less 
vivid; that is, the intestine bush seeing was more vivid than the leg seeing. Both 
(all) of these seeings occupied the full vertical extent of his visual field - that is, 
they were big, and it was like he was seeing the bush from up close, not seeing a 
picture of the bush from up close.  
 Another one of Daniel’s inner seeing experiences seemed to have a reality on its 
own such that it was changing without Daniel’s conscious effort or control. This was also 
unusual as Daniel was physically playing a game on his iPhone, Bejeweled, and was 
innerly seeing a separate and distinct game of Bejeweled.  
Sample 2.4: Daniel was on his cell phone playing the game Bejeweled. At the 
moment of the beep, he was playing the game on his phone and was innerly 
seeing a different game of Bejeweled from the one on his phone. The game he 
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was innerly seeing had a different pattern of shapes/colors. The game he was 
innerly seeing also included black and white shapes, which the real game on his 
phone did not. The interviewers of this sample were unsure if the shapes were 
black and white or if they were shapes not seen in color. The game he was innerly 
seeing was perhaps ten feet across, or perhaps size didn’t actually matter as it 
filled his entire visual field, and they were not as clear as the real game on his 
phone. The pieces on the game he was innerly seeing appeared to be moving on 
their own in a rapid and more or less random pace. Daniel was also recognizing 
the difference between the game on his phone and the game he was innerly 
seeing.  
In this example, Daniel was both playing the game on his phone and innerly seeing a 
different version of the same game essentially playing itself. With regards to the coloring 
of the game, Daniel’s inner seeing was different than the actual game he was playing in 
that his inner seeing included black and white shapes that were not present in the actual 
game. It was unclear if Daniel was seeing the shapes in his inner seeing as black and 
white or if the shapes in his inner seeing were not seen in color (i.e., the colors may not 
have been completely articulated).    
 A final example of Daniel’s inner seeing example involves a transparent inner 
seeing in which he saw reality through what he was innerly seeing: 
Sample 8.2: Daniel was outside his house smoking a cigarette. At the moment of 
the beep, he was innerly seeing his imagined college diploma (which he had just 
earned). The diploma was partially transparent. He was seeing it about 15-20 feet 
out in front of him. He saw his actual neighborhood behind and somewhat 
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through the diploma. The diploma took up much of his visual field even though it 
was 15 or so feet from him. The diploma had black lettering, but the lettering and 
the diploma was not very clear. Daniel saw the borders of the diploma 
distinguishing the semi-transparent diploma from the rest of his seeing. Daniel 
was more focused on the diploma than seeing the neighborhood behind and 
around it. 
This inner seeing was different from his other inner seeing samples in that his inner 
seeing appeared transparent and out in front of him, allowing him to see “reality” (his 
neighborhood) through his inner seeing (the diploma).  
 Overall, Daniel’s inner seeings included experiencing multiple inner seeings 
simultaneously, complex and detailed inner seeings, and inner seeings that seemed to 
have a reality of their own.  
Unsymbolized Thinking 
 Unsymbolized thinking refers to the experience of thinking a clear and specific 
thought without the content being represented in words, images, or other symbols 
(Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006). Daniel had one experience (3% of his sampled moments) 
containing unsymbolized thinking.  
Sample 5.5: Daniel was out front of his house smoking a cigarette when a car just 
drove by. At the moment of the beep, he was thinking that the car was not from 
his neighborhood. This thought was not experienced in words or images.  
In this sample, Daniel was confident that the wondering was directly experienced without 
words or other symbols present. The thought content about the car not being from his 
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neighborhood was clear and differentiated. This sample is similar to unsymbolized 
thoughts described by other participants. 
Inner Speaking 
 Daniel did not experience inner speaking in any of his samples. Inner speaking 
refers to an experience of speaking words in one’s own voice without the presence of 
external sound. Previous DES studies have found inner speaking with a frequency of 
approximately 25% across participants, though approximately 17% of participants had no 
instances of inner speaking (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).  
Discussion 
 Daniel was a motivated participant who observably worked to capture and 
provide high fidelity reports of his experience. Daniel often struggled to describe his 
experiences, although that struggle appeared to lessen as sampling continued. Although 
there is no way to know for sure, his difficulties in describing his experience may have 
been related to the complexity of his inner experiences or it may have been due to his 
concern about giving accurate descriptions of his experience.  It may also have been due 
to something about his actual experience, though it did seem he was eventually able to 
provide clear, believable descriptions of most moments of his experience.   
 Daniel experienced some aspect of feelings in almost half of his sampled 
moments, which is well above the frequency of feelings for most subjects. Other 
commonly occurring phenomena of experience for Daniel included sensory awareness 
(29%), meta-awareness (26%), and blank moments (24%) which occurred in 
approximately one-fourth of his samples. Although having sensory awareness present in 
29% of samples is common, the frequency of meta-awareness and blank moments in 
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Daniel’s experience were far above what is typical.  Daniel had below-average 
frequencies of unsymbolized thinking (3%) and inner speaking (0%). These two 
phenomena can be considered directly experienced cognition.  In other words, Daniel did 
not experience much cognition. Rather, his thinking processes were best described as 
either incipient or not coalesced thoughts, or cognitive processes enmeshed with 
emotional experiences.  
 Another finding of Daniel’s inner experiences was the presence of oddly 
intertwined threads of experience, sometimes seeming to be uncoordinated. Daniel 
appeared capable of separating, coalescing, and decreasing/increasing the saliency of 
specific threads of his ongoing experience. Similarly, Daniel often was “doing” 
experience, that is actively monitoring and adjusting or manipulating his emotional or 
thinking experiences. 
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CHAPTER 11 
IDIOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF JANE’S EXPERIENCES 
 Jane is a 41-year old, Caucasian female who sampled with us from May to July 
2012. Jane met criteria for bipolar disorder as measured by the SCID-I (First, Gibbon, 
Spitzer, & Williams, 1997).  Jane received a CES-D (Radloff, 1977) score of 34, 
suggesting a clinically significant level of depressive symptoms.  She received a Global 
Severity Index score of 1.49 on the SCL-90-R (Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973; 
Derogatis, 1994), suggesting the presence of psychological difficulties.  Jane was taking 
the following medications at the time of sampling: Geodon, Buspirone, and Ambien.  
 Jane sampled on ten separate occasions, collecting a total of 43 sampled moments. 
Three of these moments occurred during the first day of sampling, which is generally 
considered a training day and subsequently will not be discussed.  After discarding the 
samples from the first day of sampling, we were left with 40 moments of experience.  
 Jane experienced more difficulties working the beeper than most DES 
participants.  For example, on the third day of sampling Jane must have missed a beep 
which resulted in the beeper going into “chirp mode” where it emitted continuous distinct 
chirps close together in time.  The “chirp mode” sounds distinctly different than when the 
beeper is emitting beeps in its usual continuous beep.  When most participants experience 
the “chirp mode” they either turn off the beeper to reset it or call the researchers for help 
with the beeper.  Jane did not notice that the beep sounded different and tried to keep 
responding to each chirp in the same way that she was instructed to respond to each beep.  
Because of her difficulties, we disregarded sampled moments that were collected from 
the chirps.  Jane had other beeper difficulties as well including not collecting six samples 
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each day because for some reason all six beeps did not occur.  The cause of her beeper 
difficulties was unclear. The researchers could not find anything wrong with her actual 
beeper.  
 Overall, Jane seemed to have more difficulties with the DES task than do most 
participants.  Specifically, Jane struggled to identify what was in her experience at the 
moment of the beep.  Most of her descriptions seemed to involve a rudimentary noticing 
of her environment and/or her behaviors.  She had a few glimpses of coherent inner 
experience, but even these experiences seemed more vague and unclear than the inner 
experiences of most DES participants.  As a result, it was difficult to be confident 
regarding the characteristics of Jane’s inner experience.  The following sections provide 
an overview of Jane’s sampling.  
Little or Nothing in Experience 
 Jane seemed mostly to describe what she was doing at the moment of the beep 
rather than describing what was in her experience at the moment of the beep.  DES 
participants commonly comment on behaviors on the first day of sampling but improve in 
their skill of paying attention to their inner experience on subsequent days of sampling.  
Jane did not improve in her ability to apprehend her inner experience, perhaps because 
she had little or no inner experience much of the time.  
Jane had six sampled moments (15%) that we are fairly confident that there was 
nothing in Jane’s experience.  The following provides a few examples of sampled 
moments in which it seemed like there was nothing in Jane’s experience. 
Sample 2.5: Jane was tired of listening to music and was getting up to check on 
her kittens.  At the moment of the beep, there was nothing in her experience. 
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Sample 4.5: Jane had just finished reading an article on her iPhone about Fergie 
and how there was a rumor on Twitter that Fergie had died.  At the moment of the 
beep, there was nothing in Jane’s experience.  
Sample 9.4: Jane had been getting in position to pee (she was in the desert and 
was going to pee beside a truck).  At the moment of the beep, she was adjusting 
her shorts so she did not pee on them.  To our knowledge, this was a physical, just 
doing experience. She was not paying attention to any particular aspect of moving 
the shorts or the notion that she needed to move them.  She was just adjusting 
them. 
In each of these three samples, Jane did not seem to have anything in her experience.  
The comparison between samples 2.5 and 9.4 demonstrates how Jane had sampled 
moments in which there seemed to be nothing in her experience across sampling days.  
 Jane had 23 sampled moments (58%) that involved her attending to something 
within her environment with it being difficult to determine whether she was describing an 
experience or was simply describing events in her environment.  Seven of these sampled 
moments involved her describing herself as listening or hearing, but it was difficult to 
discern whether she was describing an experience or was simply describing ongoing 
auditory events in the environment.  The following sample provides an example of this 
phenomenon. 
Sample 2.3: Jane was listening to Simply Red on her iPod and was about to 
switch to a new song.  At the moment of the beep, she may have felt bored 
because the song wasn’t interesting, though it was difficult to determine with 
confidence if there was anything in her experience.  
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In this sample, it was unclear what Jane was experiencing at the moment of the beep.  It 
is possible that she had nothing or very little in her experience and instead she described 
what she was doing at the moment of the beep—that Simply Red was playing on her iPod 
but she was not hearing it or otherwise attending to it.  However, it is also possible that 
she was experientially hearing Simply Red.  We were unable to tease apart those 
possibilities.  Similarly, she found the song boring, but we were unable to tease apart the 
possibilities that boredom was experienced at the moment of the beep or that boring was 
an after-the-fact characterization of the song. Behaviorally, she was about to switch her 
iPod to a new song.  It is unclear if that behavior was in her experience. 
The following provide two additional samples in which we could not discern 
whether she was experientially listening to or hearing auditory stimuli or whether 
auditory stimuli was simply occurring in the environment at the moment of the beep.   
Sample 6.2: Jane was lying on her bed.  At the moment of the beep, she was 
moving her sheet and was hearing her kittens play.  She was not orienting herself 
to what she was hearing, but was passively listening.  The hearing of her kittens 
was more salient than moving the sheet, but neither was very salient in her 
experience.  
Sample 10.6: Jane was in the process of climbing into the truck.  At the moment 
of the beep, she was hearing various sounds: fireworks, firecrackers, bottle 
rockets, and ATVs. She was not paying attention to any one specific sound and 
was not focused the auditory aspects of the sound; she was just hearing them all at 
the same time.  She was also using her left hand to help herself climb into the 
truck.  Although it was difficult to feel confident about this, she said this was in 
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her experience but that she was not paying attention to anything specific about 
getting herself into the truck, that it was more of a global, physical experience. 
In each of these samples, we could not confidently conclude whether the listening or 
hearing (i.e., passively listening to her kittens play, hearing the sounds of fireworks, 
firecrackers, bottle rockets, and ATVs) where actually in her experience or if she was 
describing ongoing auditory events in the environment.  Behaviorally, Jane was confident 
that these various sounds were happening.  However, Jane had a difficult time clarifying 
what aspect of these things was in her experience, if any at all.  
 Jane had five samples that involved her describing herself as watching or seeing, 
but again it was difficult to discern whether she was describing an experience or was 
simply describing ongoing visual events in the environment.  The following were 
examples of this type of sample. 
Sample 2.1: Jane was watching a music video for the new Men in Black movie on 
her iPod.  At the moment of the beep, she was paying attention to the music 
video.  She was more focused on the visual aspect of the music video, but was 
also listening to the song.  There may have also been some experience of trying to 
get a sense of the music video as a whole/trying to figure out how it related to the 
movie.  
Sample 9.2: Jane was still riding in the backseat of a truck.  At the moment of the 
beep, she was looking out the front windshield.  She was seeing the roadway in 
front of them and was not paying attention to anything in particular.  She was also 
adjusting in her seat to look out the window but to the best we could understand, 
this was minimally, if at all, in her experience, perhaps 5-10%.  
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In both of these samples, Jane was confident that she was watching or seeing something, 
but we could not determine to what degree if any those things in her experience at the 
moment of the beep.  For example, in Sample 9.2, Jane was looking out the front 
windshield and seeing the roadway in front of her. It is possible that seeing the roadway 
was in her experience at the moment of the beep.  It is also possible that the roadway was 
in her visual field, but was not actually experienced at the moment of the beep.  
 Jane also had 11 sampled moments that involved her describing herself as doing 
something, but we could not be confident that what she was doing was an experience or 
was simply what she in the act of doing.  The following provides an example of these 
sampled moments. 
Sample 3.1: Jane was in the process of turning her sock from inside-out.  At the 
moment of the beep, she was focused on fixing her sock.  As best we could 
determine she was simply attending to what she was doing without any additional 
experience, but it was difficult to be confident of our understanding of this 
moment.  This may have been due to the fact that the second beep came before 
she could write notes about her first beep. 
In this sample, Jane was in the act of turning her sock from inside-out.  We could not be 
confident that this was in her experience (e.g., experiencing herself as turning the sock 
from inside-out) or if this is what she was doing and there was nothing in her experience 
about what she was doing.  T he following is another example of these types of samples.  
Sample 8.5: Jane was driving and had been talking to Christina about Jane 
wanting to start working out.  At the moment of the beep, Jane was talking out 
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loud to Christina about maybe taking spinning classes at the gym.  She could not 
say more about how talking was in her experience. 
In Sample 8.5, Jane described herself as talking out loud at the moment of the beep.  But, 
we could not determine to what degree, if at all, talking was in her experience.  For 
example, it is possible that experientially, she may have been paying attention to what she 
was saying.  She also may have been attending to how it felt to be talking (e.g., their 
mouths were moving). However, Jane could not describe how, if at all, she experienced 
herself as talking.  
 These three types of experiences (i.e., describing hearing/listening, describing 
watching/seeing, and describing doing without being able to differentiate if anything was 
in experience) seem related.  It is possible that Jane does not have much in terms of inner 
experience and as a result, she instead after the moment of the beep takes a quick noticing 
of her environment and reports what’s concurrently happening.  In contrast, it is possible 
that these events are actually in her experience – to what degree is unknown.  She could 
have been fully, experientially attending to these events and may have experienced 
difficulties in articulating how they were in her experience.  Our frequent difficulty being 
confident about Jane’s ongoing experience at the moment of the beep left us unable to 
confidently disentangle these two possibilities.  
 Jane had two samples (6%) that involved her describing what seemed to be an 
experience, but we could not be confident if it was in her experience and if it was, what 
specifically was experienced.  The following provides an example of one of these 
samples. 
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Sample 5.4: At the moment of the beep, Jane was reading the title of a book she 
was looking at, Lords of Deliverance.  It seemed as if her experience of reading it 
was of innerly saying the title, though we could not be confident this was in her 
experience and if it was, what were the characteristics of the experience.  She also 
was experiencing a hint of a thought or an idea, but it was so vague or indistinct 
that she could not say what the thought or idea was.  She was also listening to a 
song by Ellie Goldberg, Lights, though this was much less salient at the moment 
of the beep than reading the title of the book, perhaps 15% or so of her 
experience.  A moment before and a moment after the beep, the song had been 
more salient than the title of the book.   
In this sample, Jane’s description of reading the title of the book at the moment of the 
beep seemed to suggest the presence of an inner experience.  However, her inability to 
apprehend the details of that experience makes the presence of this experience 
questionable.   For example, most participants would probably be able to describe how 
the voice was present to them (e.g., innerly saying it in their own voice, seeing a mental 
image of the book’s title).   Jane was not confident that it was present exactly at the onset 
of the moment of the beep and could not provide many experiential details regarding her 
inner experience.  Consistent with the samples discussed above, to what degree listening 
to the song was in her experience at the moment of the beep could not be discerned. 
 Jane also had one sample (3%) which seemed to involve a thinking experience, 
but we could not be confident about what if any experiential details were present.  
Sample 6.1: Jane was lying down on her bed.  At the moment of the beep, she was 
thinking about moving (to Florida).  It was unclear if “to Florida” was explicitly 
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present of if it was just implied because that is the only place she might move to, 
thus “moving” implies “moving to Florida.”  This thinking was not likely in 
words or images nor was there any more specific content/detail/focus.  For 
example, as best Jane could apprehend, the thinking did not involve the actual act 
of moving or living in Florida or when she might move or whether or not it was a 
good idea to move or anything more specific than “moving (to Florida).”  Jane 
was also paying attention to her kittens playing by her feet.  She could hear them 
and (to a lesser degree) feel them on her legs.  She was not paying attention to any 
specific details of their playing. 
In this sample, Jane was convincing that somehow moving, possibly to Florida, was in 
her experience at the moment of the beep.  However, she could not elaborate regarding 
how something about moving was in her experience.  Based upon her description of the 
experience, it seemed to be more cognitive than affective in nature, although we were not 
very confident about that either.  Overall, this experience seemed to involve little or no 
detail, little or no content, and little or no specificity.  
Glimpse of Inner Experience 
 Jane had four samples (10% of her sampled moments) which appeared to involve 
clearer inner experience as compared to her other sampled moments.  Two of these 
samples involved an inner seeing.  
Sample 5.1 - Jane’s cat Pooh, had just knocked over a Green Lantern plastic cup 
and was attempting to climb on it.  At the moment of the beep, Jane was saying 
aloud, “It’s a round cup [beep] ...”  At the same time she was innerly seeing 
written words that said approximately the same thing, something like, “It’s a 
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round cup, you can’t climb on it.” These words were seen as a complete sentence, 
with perhaps each individual word not being distinct.  This seen sentence was 
written in black, typed words on a creme colored background.  She was also 
seeing her cat reaching for the cup, though the reaching for it was not 
significantly in her experience.  She was also monitoring, with perhaps 20% or so 
of her attention, the phone ringing as she had just dialed to call the doctor to make 
an appointment.  
In this sample, Jane experienced a coherent inner experience that was more involved than 
just monitoring the environment as was described in the previous section.  However, 
Jane’s description of her experience in this sample was not completely clear and it was 
difficult to discern the specifics about her experience.  For example, Jane had difficulty 
telling us if she said aloud, “It’s a round cup ...” or just “Round.”  Most participants in 
DES, especially on the fifth day of sampling, could make a clear distinction about what 
was said aloud at the moment of the beep.   
Sample 4.3: At the moment of the beep, Jane was reading an article on her iPhone 
about an actor who had gone missing but was actually in rehab and she was 
simultaneously innerly seeing the words she was reading.  She saw each word as 
she read them looking the same as they did on her iPhone, typed in black lettering 
on a white/cream background.  The words were present one at a time, but they 
were appearing so quickly in sync with her reading that she could not say which 
word was present at the moment of the beep.  Jane experienced the seen words as 
being towards the front of her head by her forehead.  Jane was mostly focused on 
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the words she was reading on her iPhone rather than reading the words she innerly 
saw. 
This sample is similar to sample 5.1 in that Jane described an inner experience that 
involved innerly seeing words.  Also, Jane’s description of this experience was neither as 
clear nor as confident as most DES participants are when they describe inner experiences 
from the fourth day of sampling.  
Jane also had a sample that involved a possible inner speaking experience, 
although her account of the experience was vague and unclear. 
 Sample 6.1:  Jane was on her iPhone logging into her Facebook account.  At the 
moment of the beep, she was focused on typing “yahoo” the domain of her email 
address.  We could not determine with confidence how this was in her experience, 
or even if it was in her experience.  As best she could determine, she was focused 
visually on the screen (not the keyboard) and on the movements of her fingers, 
but even these statements were highly subjunctified.  She may have been innerly 
spelling out “yahoo” as she typed the letters, but she could not provide details 
regarding any of the characteristics of the inner speaking.  She did not know if it 
sounded like her own external voice, or even if it was a male or female voice.  
She said it was the voice she usually hears, which left us wondering if she ever 
has clear experiences of inner speaking. 
 The final sampled moment that seemed to involve an experience was Sample 4.2.  
In this sample, Jane seemed to experience a sensory awareness. 
Sample 4.2: Jane was getting into bed and was pulling a blanket over her.  At the 
moment of the beep, the primary focus of her experience was feeling the warmth 
 175 
 
of her blanket on her right leg and feeling the smooth, hard feeling of the blanket 
with her thumb, index, and middle fingers on her right hand.  She was also 
listening to and watching her kittens play.  This was mostly auditory, hearing the 
kittens meow.  She was also seeing them in her peripheral vision.  She was also 
hearing music playing, but this was minimal in her experience.  
In this sample, Jane was experiencing a sensory awareness of feeling the warmth of her 
blanket and the smooth and hard feeling of the blanket on her hands.  It was difficult to 
discern whether the other aspects of the sample (i.e., listening/watching her kittens play) 
were in her experience at the moment of the beep. 
 In these four samples, Jane showed an ability to create inner experience beyond 
just monitoring her environment and behavior; however, her inner experiences in general 
appeared less developed and less clear than most DES participants.  
Attempts to Control her Experience 
 There were two sampling days (day 6 and 7) when Jane stated that she was tired 
and actively trying to sleep while she collected her moments.  However, she was not 
actually sleeping in any of her sampled moment.  For each of these beeps, it seemed as if 
there was little or no experience present.  The following are examples from those days. 
Sample 6.3: At the moment of the beep, Jane was petting her cat, Faith.  She was 
not paying attention to anything including any specific aspect of petting the cat.  
That is, she was petting the cat as a description of behavior.  What if anything 
should count as experience is not known, probably little or nothing. 
Sample 7.1: Jane was lying on her bed trying to take a nap.  At the moment of the 
beep, she was paying attention to/talking to/petting Pooh/watching her move 
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around while she petted her.  Jane said she was feeling Pooh’s fur as she petted 
her (but this was not particularly convincing).  She also said that she was speaking 
to her cat (which her report of this seemed believable as a state of nature but 
uncertain as a fact of experience; for example, she could not remember exactly 
what she was saying).  She also said that she was watching how Pooh does not sit 
still when being petted.  As best Jane could apprehend, all of these things were in 
her experience, though it was difficult to be confident that any of this was clearly 
present.  She was also listening to a Shakira song although that was less in her 
experience.  
In both of these samples, Jane was not asleep and there was little experience present.  
These samples are similar to the type of samples mentioned in the first section in that 
Jane seemed to be noticing her environment or behavior with little else in her experience.   
 There was also a sample that involved Jane attempting to create or change her 
experience because she experienced boredom.  This sample (Sample 2.3) was discussed 
previously.  Usually, Jane seemed to be going along with her environment or noticing 
something within her environment.  She generally seemed to not actively engage her 
surroundings, instead being a passive observer.  However, these few moments of 
experience suggest that Jane sometimes tries to control or shift her experience, perhaps 
unsuccessfully.  
Discussion 
Jane appeared to be a motivated participant who worked to capture and convey 
her inner experiences.  However, Jane struggled more than any other participant in this 
study to capture and convey her experience.  Overall, Jane sometimes had sampled 
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moments in which it seemed relatively clear that nothing was in her experience at the 
moment of the beep.  Most of the time, however, it was difficult to be confident whether 
or not there was anything in her experience.  In these sampled moments, she often 
described her behaviors (e.g., switching songs on her iPhone) or her environment.  Her 
description of the environment usually did not rise to the level of sensory awareness, 
where someone is actively paying attention to something within the environment (e.g., 
noticing the red color of a truck).  Rather, it seemed like Jane was usually noticing her 
environment in a passive, not focused, non-active way.  In these sampled moments, it was 
difficult to discern if anything was present at the moment of the beep.  There were a few 
times when we were confident about her having experience.  
Jane did not improve in her ability to capture and convey her inner experience 
across sampling days.  Jane collected sampled moments and engaged in an expositional 
interview ten times with the researchers, more than any other participant in this study.  
However, Jane’s final sample of inner experience collected on the tenth day was as vague 
and unclear as her first sample of inner experience collected on the first day of sampling.  
 Jane’s difficulty with this task could be a result of various things.  First, Jane 
could not have much actual inner experience.  We speculate that inner experience is 
created by individuals as they process the welter of inner and outer happenings into 
something coherent.  The lack of improvement in her ability to capture her inner 
experience across sampling days is consistent with the theory that she may not have much 
inner experience beyond perhaps a rudimentary noticing of her surroundings.  Also, Jane 
had four sampled moments in which she seemed to have somewhat more developed inner 
experiences.  This undermines the possibility that it was something about Jane’s inability 
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or unwillingness to convey her experiences that led to us being unable to determine what 
was present in Jane’s inner experience during most sampled moments. 
 Another possibility is that Jane has inner experiences, but she was not focused on 
them or did not attend to them.  Although it is difficult to rule this out, the fact that 
several samples contained more of what we consider experience also argues against this 
theory.  Furthermore, the fact that Jane worked hard at the task, stuck with it for ten full 
sampling days, and that her reports changed little or not at all over these sampling days 
all undermine this theory.   
 Another possibility is that she has inner experience but struggles to describe those 
experiences to the interviewers.  It is possible that she has phenomena of inner experience 
that we have not encountered before.  As a result, our questions aimed at trying to help 
Jane articulate her experience might actually dilute her experience and further complicate 
her ability to convey her experience to us.  With this possibility, Jane could capture her 
experience, but struggled to verbalize what those experiences were.  Although we cannot 
rule out this theory, nothing in our interactions with Jane led us to believe it accounts for 
her difficulties apprehending clear inner experience.  Considering the results of our 
sampling with Jane in total leads us to believe that the first theory, that Jane has little in 
the way of coherent inner experience, is the most plausible explanation for her sampling 
results.   
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CHAPTER 12 
ACROSS-PARTICIPANT RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Chapters 6 through 11 provided idiographic descriptions of the inner experience 
of the six participants separately.  In this chapter, we examine shared features and 
similarities, if any, of inner experience among these participants.  Three participants were 
selected because they met diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder (MDD) and 
three participants were selected because they met criteria for bipolar disorder (BD).  Thus 
these participants can be conceived of as both a group of six mood disordered individuals 
and two smaller subgroups suffering from specific mood disorders, MDD and BD.  
Although with such a small sample all speculations and observations must be viewed as 
highly tentative, shared features of experience may be related to or indicative of the inner 
experience of individuals with these distinct psychiatric disorders or, to the extent that the 
similarities span both groups, of individuals with a mood disorder in general, or as 
evidence that the categorizations are imperfect.  What follows are our observations about 
the themes and shared features observable among these participants.   
Difficulty with the DES Task 
 Five of the six participants (all but Devon) struggled with the DES task.  More 
often and more persistently than is typical, these five participants had difficulties 
capturing and conveying their inner experience.  They often struggled to identify the 
moment of the beep and sometimes even had difficulty operating the random beeper.  
There was variability with regard to the confidence the interviewers had regarding 
participants’ ability to capture and convey inner experience.  The one participant who did 
not appear to have difficulty with the DES task, Devon, was perceived as being very 
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believable in his accounts of inner experience and generally skilled in his ability to 
capture and convey his inner experiences.  All of the other participants were either judged 
to be not highly credible reporters or struggled at times to capture and convey their 
experience.   
 Robin and Jane had the most difficult with the DES task.  Both participants 
seemed to have considerable difficulty identifying what was ongoing in experience at the 
onset of the beep.  We at times struggled to discern whether anything was actually 
present in experience at the moment of the beep; this was especially true for Jane.  In 
fact, as best we could determine, approximately one-quarter of Robin and Jane’s sampled 
moments were mostly blank.  Robin and Jane’s descriptions of what was ongoing in 
experience at the moment of the beep were mostly unclear.  For example, Robin often 
described a sequence of events and she struggled to identify at what point in the sequence 
of events the beep sounded.  Finally, Robin and Jane did not seem to improve much 
across sampling days in their ability to capture and convey their inner experience.  The 
lack of improvement across sampling days is rare for DES participants.  Robin was 
diagnosed with MDD and Jane was diagnosed with BD, so this characteristic did not 
seem to be unique to one specific mood disorder.  
 Andrea, diagnosed with MDD, also struggled to describe her inner experience.  
Andrea only completed four days of sampling, whereas all of the other participants 
completed at least eight days of sampling, so we have fewer sampled moments from 
which to draw conclusions about her inner experience.  She also shared with us that she 
did not wear the ear piece on the first three sampling days, which could have negatively 
impacted her ability to pinpoint the moment of the beep.  Overall, her descriptions of her 
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inner experience were sometimes unclear, particularly experiences that were not sensory 
awarenesses.  She did not seem to have as many mostly blank moments as did Robin and 
Jane; rather she seemed to have more inner experience but struggled to describe those 
experiences.  It is difficult to determine if she would have continued to improve in her 
skill to apprehend and describe her experiences if she had continued sampling. 
 The other three participants (Daniel, Tyler, and Devon) seemed to be able to 
capture and convey their inner experience better than did Robin, Jane, and Andrea. 
However, Daniel and Tyler, both of whom were diagnosed with BD, still struggled with 
aspects of their experience.  For example, Daniel sometimes had considerable difficulty 
conveying his inner experiences to us during the interviews despite being quite clear and 
believable in his descriptions of his experience once he was able to articulate them.  Tyler 
had very few clear experiences except for those involving sensory awareness.  For 
example, he had many sampled moments that involved hints of thought with ambiguity 
regarding whether the thoughts were present at the moment of the beep.   
 There are broadly two possible explanations for a participant’s difficulty in 
performing the DES task: the task itself is not understood or difficult; or the inner 
experience is difficult.  It is possible to tease these apart to some degree, but not entirely.  
For example, if a participant is fluent in verbal interchange in all areas except the 
description of sampled experience, then we can rule out language deficiency as a cause.  
In fact, all of our participants were able to report sensory awareness with clarity, which 
suggests that when experience is clear they can report it.  Three skilled interviewers spent 
four to eight hours with each of our participants trying to discern the origin of the 
difficulty; we reached that the difficulties our participants’ had in capturing and 
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conveying their inner experience may have been related to underdeveloped or absent 
inner experience.  It is possible that this was a characteristic of some of these participants, 
perhaps related to their diagnosis of a mood disorder.  In fact, one diagnostic criterion for 
a depressive episode is diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, 
nearly every day (APA, 2000).  Diminished ability to think or concentrate could be 
impacting our participant’s inner experience or their ability to report their inner 
experience.  All of our participants endorsed elevated levels of depression on the CES-D 
(Radloff, 1977) at the onset of their participation in the study.  If we conceive of inner 
experience as something that must be skillfully created (Hurlburt, 2011), then there could 
be a connection between what is considered a difficulty thinking and concentrating, the 
widely observed symptoms of depression, and difficulty forming coherent inner 
experience as we observed in these five participants.   
The idiographic chapters were organized in order of increasing scores on the 
CES-D (Radloff, 1977).  There was a corresponding trend between endorsed depressive 
symptoms on the CES-D (Radloff, 1977) and degree of difficulty with the DES task.  For 
example, among the participants with BD, Tyler endorsed the fewest depressive 
symptoms and seemed to have less difficulty with the DES task compared to Jane, who 
endorsed the most depressive symptoms and seemed to have the most difficult with the 
DES task.  The corresponding trend between depressive symptoms endorsed and 
difficulty with the DES task for the participants with MDD was less clear.  Devon 
endorsed the fewest depressive symptoms, followed by Ruth, and finally Andrea.  While 
Devon had the fewest difficulties with the DES task as compared to the other two, Robin 
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seemed to have more difficulties than Andrea.  However, we know the least about 
Andrea’s inner experience as she participated in the fewest sampling days.  
Our final participant, Devon, seemed to have little to no difficulties describing his 
inner experience.  Devon’s skill in being able to apprehend his inner experience was also 
notable in our sample because Devon had the most complex inner experience.  It is 
possible that rather than having the underdeveloped inner experience that we observed in 
other participants, Devon actually has overdeveloped inner experience such that he puts 
substantial effort into constructing rich and detailed inner experience.  Devon also had 
moments of inner experience that involved inner seeing that seemed incomplete or inner 
seeing that involved aspects that were not integrating.  For example, he had sampled 
moments that involved flowey, vibraty, trasparenty inner seeing. He also had inner 
seeings that involved elaborate and incongruous aspects.  The occasional incompleteness 
of Devon’s inner seeing may reflect a different kind of underdeveloped inner experience.  
The overdeveloped and sometimes not integrating inner experience observed with Devon 
may reduce his ability to think or concentrate on things besides his rich and complex 
inner experiences.   
Additional research is needed to substantiate whether these are typical 
characteristic of the experience of people with mood disorders.  For example, these could 
be stable characteristics of the inner experience of people who are at risk develop mood 
disorders.  In contrast, these could be characteristics that only emerge for people when 
they begin to experience mood disorders.  It should be noted that even if the association 
between lack of clarity or the existence of inner experience and mood disorders were 
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establish to be reliable, we still would not know which direction the causality runs, or 
whether it is related to some other causal factor.   
 The difficulties most of our participants experienced in apprehending their 
experience is consistent with previous DES studies that examined the inner experience of 
individuals with mood disorders.  For example, Hurlburt (1993) found that participants in 
a depressed mood had more difficulties observing and articulating the characteristic of 
their experience as compared to when they were not in a depressed mood - it is possible 
that the two participants (Jane and Robin) who experienced the most difficulty with the 
DES task could have been experiencing a more severe episode of depression as compared 
to the other participants.  We did not track depressive symptoms across sampling days to 
compare the presence or severity of depressive symptoms with characteristics of inner 
experience; however, such a study would be advantageous to understand the impact of 
depression on inner experience.  
Also, Hurburt (1993) observed that one participant who had hypomania 
experienced inner seeing in 95% of his sampled moments and that inner seeing were 
characterized by clarity, color, rich visual details, movement within the inner seeing, and 
differences in the clarity of the inner seeing between the periphery and the central aspect 
of the inner experience. The description of this particular participant’s inner experience 
sounds very similar to the characteristics of Devon’s inner experiences.  Devon did not 
meet criteria for BD; rather he met criteria for MDD.  However, BD can be misdiagnosed 
as MDD particularly for someone who has yet to experience a manic or hypomanic 
episode but as a history of depressive episodes (Angst et al., 2011).  The participant 
discussed in Hurlburt (1993) had changes in his inner experience dependent on his mood.  
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For example, during his period of fatigue, his inner experience was dominated by inner 
seeing with abrupt edges, lacking motion, and with visual details indeterminate.  Devon 
also had sampled moments that involved inner seeing aspects that were disintegrated and 
incongruous.  We speculate that Devon’s rich and complex inner seeing may vanish or be 
impacted by his mood just in the same way that the participant’s inner seeing in Hurlburt 
(1993) was impacted by changes in his mood.  It would be advantageous to sample with 
individuals with mood disorders for a longer period of time being better able to describe 
the relationship between mood and inner experience.  
Another DES study examined the inner experience of older individuals who had 
cognitive impairment (Siebert, 2009).  Participants with cognitive impairment 
experienced substantial difficulty with the DES.  However, their difficulties seemed more 
pervasive than the difficulties demonstrated by our sample.  For example, each of our 
participants had moments of experience characterized with clear inner experience, 
suggesting that they are able to report experience if present.   
 As we said at the onset, another possible explanation is that our participants did 
have clear inner experience but we just did not understand their experience.  They may 
have had new distinct forms of inner experience that we did not know how to ask about 
in the expositional interview.  It is also possible that they just struggled with 
communicating about their inner experience, though the fact that almost all of them were 
sometimes able to describe a few clear moments of inner experience argues against this 
possibility.  
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Sensory Awareness 
 The exception to the lack of clarity of inner experience among all of the 
participants except Devon was when they experienced sensory awareness.  Those 
moments of experience were mostly clear and believable. There was variability among 
participants with regards to the frequency of sensory awareness experienced.  One 
participant (Tyler) experienced sensory awareness in over 80% of his sampled moments.  
Three participants (Andrea, Devon, and Daniel) experienced sensory awareness in more 
than one-quarter of their sampled moments.  Two participants (Jane and Robin) had a few 
sampled moments that involved sensory awareness.  Among the five “unclear” 
participants (Tyler, Andrea, Daniel, Jane, and Robin), their experience of sensory 
awareness was markedly clearer and more believable than their other forms of 
experience.  This was striking given the previously discussed difficulties these 
participants had in capturing and conveying their inner experience.  For Devon, inner 
seeing was the most clear and prominent phenomenon of inner experience he had.  
In examining the types of sensory awareness experienced by the participants, 
three participants had a distinct dominant sensory modality to their sensory awarenesses.  
Two participants (Andrea and Devon), both of whom met criteria for MDD, experienced 
tactile sensory awarenesses in more than 75% of their sensory awareness experiences.  
Another participant (Tyler), who met criteria for BD, and one participant (Devon), who 
met criteria for MDD, experienced visual sensory awarenesses in the majority of their 
sensory awareness experiences.  One participant (Daniel), who experienced sensory 
awareness often, did not seem to have a dominant sensory modality, although he 
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experienced slightly more visual sensory awarenesses (37% of the time) than other 
sensory awarenesses.  
There were also differences in the saliency of sensory awarenesses in participants’ 
experiences.  For example, the majority of Tyler’s sampled moments involved a sensory 
awareness, and in those moments, the sensory awareness was the most salient feature in 
his experience.  In fact, for Tyler most other experiences besides sensory awareness were 
unclear and difficult to be confident whether they were present at the moment of the 
beep.  In contrast, Devon experienced sensory awareness frequently in his sampled 
moments; however, none of Devon’s sensory awarenesses appeared to be the most salient 
feature of his experience; rather they all seemed to be less salient and embedded within 
his inner seeing experiences (his most dominant phenomenon of experience). 
The frequency and clarity of sensory awareness for this sample is consistent with 
other DES studies conducted with participants who were depressed (Perlotto, 2001; 
Cavenagh, 2003; Gunter, 2007).  Perlotto (2001) and Cavenagh (2003) found that 
participants with depressed had more sensory awarenesses as compared to participants 
who were not depressed.  Similarly, Gunter (2007) noted that participants with depression 
had more negative physical sensations as compared to participants without depression.  
He also found that those negative physical sensations were frequently coupled with an 
affective experience. Gunter’s (2007) finding is particularly consistent with the 
experience of Andrea and Devon, both of whom met criteria for MDD.  They 
experienced tactile sensory awarenesses in more than 75% of their sampled moments.  
 It is unclear how the high prevalence of sensory awareness may relate to the 
participants’ diagnoses of either BD or MDD as neither disorder includes any sensory 
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awareness features in its diagnostic criteria or the extant literature.  It is also unclear why 
many participants had clear experiences of sensory awareness, but not other clear 
phenomenon of experience. It is possible that sensory awareness is a more basic form of 
experience, such that when individuals do not have more developed or complex 
experiences, they may still experience some sensory awarenesses.  These sensory 
awarenesses may take less mental energy or skill to create.  This may be consistent with 
and related to the diminished ability to think or concentrate diagnostic criteria (APA, 
2000) of depressive episodes.  It is also plausible that the tactile sensory awarenesses may 
relate to the catatonic subtype of MDD (APA, 2000). This subtype is related to motor 
behavior disturbances including motoric immobility, excessive motor activities, extreme 
negativism or mutism, peculiarities of voluntary movement, or echolalia or echopraxia 
(APA, 2000).  None of our participants evidenced symptoms of MDD with catatonic 
features; however, MDD could involve a milder focus or attention on bodily sensations.   
Few Clear Thoughts 
Overall, the participants in this study seemed to struggle with the experience of 
thinking, some to a greater extent than others.  For five of our participants, the experience 
of thinking was absent, diffuse or inextricably intertwined with feelings, or at a very low 
level of saliency to the point of not being confident that it was at all present.  For 
example, these five participants had moments of experience that involved a hint of a 
thought, or a thought intertwined with another experience (i.e., thought/feeling).  In 
general, the presence of directly experienced cognition, which typically in comes in the 
form of inner speaking, unsymbolized thinking, or inner seeing, is common in other DES 
studies.  The pattern of fewer distinct moments containing the experience of thinking, and 
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many incidents of unclear or undifferentiated thinking, seems characteristic of this 
sample of individuals with a mood disorder.  This finding is also consistent with other 
DES studies of individuals with depression (Cavenagh, 2003; Hurlburt, 2001; Perlotto, 
2001).  In these studies, the participants with depression had infrequent inner seeing and 
inner speaking experiences (Cavenagh, 2003; Hurlburt, 2001; Perlotto, 2001).  However, 
the present study was unique in that our participants also had few incidents of 
unsymbolized thinking.   
As mentioned previously, the diagnostic criteria for a depressive episode and a 
manic episode include diminished ability to think or concentrate (APA, 2000).  The 
problematic and infrequently occurring experience of thinking among these participants 
could be related to this particular depressive symptom.  Additional research is needed to 
substantiate whether this is a typical characteristic of all or some individuals suffering 
from mood disorders.  
Few Feelings 
Feelings also occurred infrequently within our sample except for Andrea, who 
sampled the least (4 days).  Often, we had little confidence regarding the fidelity of 
Andrea’s reports of inner experience.  For all of our participants, the apprehension of 
feelings was not clear or intertwined with other experiences.  For example, two of our 
participants (Andrea and Daniel) often experienced incidents of thought/feelings.  These 
participants were unable to understand or differentiate the emotional and the cognitive 
aspect of their experience, something that is relatively clear to most other participants.  
Similarly, two participants (Robin and Tyler) had moments of experience that 
appeared to be emotional; however, it was difficult to discern whether a feeling was 
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present at the moment of the beep and, if there was one present, whether it was associated 
with any experiential details (e.g., bodily sensations).   As best we determined, Jane did 
not have any sampled moments that involved a clear feeling.  Finally, Devon had only 
one sampled moment in which we could be certain a feeling was present.  However, he 
had several sampled moments that involved complex, hyper-clear bodily sensations 
which may or may not have been associated with a feeling.  
In terms of frequency of feelings, we had three participants (Robin, Andrea, and 
Daniel) who had feelings nearly as frequently as what has been noted in previous studies 
with participants not selected based on the presence of a psychiatric disorder (Heavey & 
Hurlburt, 2008).  Two of those participants (Robin and Andrea) were diagnosed with 
MDD and one (Daniel) was diagnosed with BD.  Three participants (Devon, Tyler, and 
Jane) had very few clear incidents of feelings.  Two of those participants (Tyler and Jane) 
were diagnosed with BD and one (Devon) was diagnosed with MDD.  In contrast to our 
DES findings, the participants in this study endorsed experiencing more feelings on self-
report measures, such as the CES-D (Padloff, 1977), as compared to non-depressed 
individuals. There seems to be a disconnect between the experience of feelings as 
reported on a questionnaire and experience as captured by the DES method.   
The findings in this study regarding the frequency and clarity of feelings are 
consistent with previous DES studies conducted with participants with depression 
(Hurlburt, 1993). Hurlburt (1993) also found that participants experiencing depression 
evidenced few incidents of feelings and had a difficult time observing and 
communicating the characteristics of their experience.  
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The diagnostic criteria for depression include symptoms such as feeling sad or 
empty and feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilty (APA, 2000).  
However, our sample of individuals with MDD did not experience a higher frequency of 
feelings than what Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) observed in a stratified sample of college 
students.  In fact, the participants in this study experienced fewer feelings that the 
participants studies by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).  Our participants did not feel 
worthless or guilty in any of their sampled moments.  These findings are important to the 
mood disorder literature because of the hallmark symptoms of depression include 
negative affect (APA, 2000).  Perhaps there is something else impacting participants’ 
subjective reports of experience on such measures as the CES-D and subsequently as 
represented in the MDD literature at large.  It is also possible that our participants may 
have experienced clear feelings, but they may have had difficulties verbalizing their 
experience of the feeling or perhaps we struggled in apprehending their experience.  
However, the participants were able to describe experience when it occurred, such as 
sensory awareness, suggesting that they would likely be able to verbalize their experience 
of feelings as well.  However, it seems unlikely that their difficulty with apprehending 
feelings is somehow different then their overall deficit of clear experience.  It is likely 
that the low incidence of feeling was a result of our participants having less in their inner 
experience overall.  Additional research is needed to understand the frequency and 
characteristics of feelings for individuals diagnosed with mood disorders, especially 
given the importance of feelings on diagnostic criteria.  
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Doing of Experience   
The three participants (Daniel, Tyler, and Jane) who met criteria for BD each had 
moments of experience that involved the “doing” of experience.  Doing of experience is 
where a participant attempts to control, alter, or manipulate one’s inner experience 
(Hurlburt, 1993; Hurlburt & Raymond, 2011).  For example, in one of his sampled 
moments, Daniel was experiencing two feelings simultaneously (euphoria/high/excited 
and bad/sad) and he was simultaneously explicitly monitoring those feelings.  
Specifically, he was actively and purposefully adjusting his attention to the separate 
feelings to balance their relative intensity. Daniel and Tyler both appeared to be 
somewhat skilled or successful in their attempts to create or manipulate their experiences.  
Tyler purposefully created sensory experiences to be aware of.  For example, in one 
sampled moment Tyler was actively sniffing the good smell coming from the kitchen in 
order to pay attention to the qualities of the smell.  In another he was wiggling his toes in 
his socks to create the visual experience in which he was absorbed.   
The other participant, Jane, did not appear skillful or successful in her attempts to 
create or manipulate her experience.  On two sampling days, Jane told the interviewers 
that throughout the collection of her moments of experience, she was trying to take a nap 
or sleep.  However, no sampled moment involved her being asleep or close to being 
asleep. In general, Jane had little to no inner experience in the majority of her sampled 
moments.  Her lack of success at altering her experience may be impacted by her general 
lack of inner experience.  Nonetheless, Jane seemed to have some incidents where she 
was trying to impact her experience. 
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It is unclear what the significance of this phenomenon is for the sample of 
participants with BD.  None of the participants who met criteria for MDD exhibited this 
phenomenon. Further studies are needed to evaluate if this is indeed a feature of the 
experience of individuals with BD. 
Conclusions 
 Although there were no clear, consistent patterns of inner experience that emerged 
either within the MDD or BD subgroups, or across the two groups of mood disordered 
individuals, there were features of experience that were shared among most of the six 
participants.  Devon was an outlier, with extremely detailed and creative inner seeings in 
all of his sampled moments.   
 Five of our participants (Jane, Robin, Andrea, Tyler, and Daniel) seemed to all 
have a deficit of clear experience, particularly thinking and feelings.  They had few clear 
inner seeings, feelings, unsymbolized thinking and almost no inner speaking.  The 
exception seemed to be sensory awarenesses, perhaps as it represents a more rudimentary 
form of experience.  There were individual differences with regard to how pronounced 
the deficit of clear experience was and what phenomenon of inner experience it impacted. 
However, overall there seemed to be a broad theme of a lack of clear inner experiences.  
This theme was present for our participants with MDD and BD and may be a 
characteristic of individuals with a mood disturbance.  It is also possible that our 
participants did in fact have more clear inner experiences but that we just did not know 
how to access it or that they were unable to articulate those experiences.  This 
observation is speculative and further research is needed to determine the reliability of 
this pattern.  
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The exception to this pattern of experience in our sample was Devon.  Devon had 
inner seeing in 100% of his sampled moments  His inner seeing was highly detailed, 
often involved perceptual distortions or exaggerations, often involved elaborate and 
incongruous backgrounds, and often (if not always) involved him seeing himself 
including sometimes reflecting concern regarding how he appeared to others.  Consistent 
with our other participants, however, he also experienced many sensory awarenesses and 
few incidents of feelings, inner speaking, and unsymbolized thinking.  He also had many 
sampled moments that involved a disintegration of his experiences which seems related 
to the other participants’ deficit of clear experience and consistent with previous DES 
studies of individuals with mood disorders (Hurlburt, 1993).  
 The present study’s findings have important implications for the diagnostic 
categories for MDD and BD.  For one, we found substantial individual differences among 
our participants in terms of their inner experience.  The diversity in inner experience 
found in this study suggests that those with these diagnoses may not be homogeneous, at 
least in terms of inner experience.  Furthermore, we did not find clear presence of the 
type of experiences that the diagnostic criteria suggest would be present.  For example, 
given the diagnostic criteria for MDD, we would expect our participants to have more 
moments of experience that involved feelings, particularly negative feelings, than 
participants without MDD.  Our sample of participants with MDD did not evidence more 
feelings as compared to previous samples of participants without a known psychiatric 
disorder (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).  This seems like an important discrepancy to 
highlight, especially given how several therapeutic orientations and techniques are aimed 
at changing one’s inner experience (e.g., content of one’s negative feelings and/or 
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thoughts).  Research aimed at understanding the individual differences in inner 
experience among individuals who share a diagnostic label, especially one with 
implications pertaining to inner experience, seems imperative.  In addition, it is important 
that future research focuses on clarifying and, if confirmed, understanding the 
discrepancy between diagnostic criteria of mental disorders and characteristics of inner 
experience observed in this study.  Overall, the findings in the study highlight the 
importance of increasing efforts to explore the inner experience of individuals, 
specifically those with diagnosed mental illnesses. This study also demonstrates the 
utility of the DES method for exploring inner experience.  Inner experience can be 
captured and described.  Moreover, DES may provide valuable insights pertaining to the 
inner experience of individuals suffering from mental illnesses.   
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The present study had a number of limitations.  A major limitation was the small 
sample size.  Our limited sample size provided a lower than ideal situation for identifying 
relationships and differences among our participants.  DES is a very labor and time 
intensive method, making it difficult to collect larger samples.  For example, this study 
took approximately 8-months to collect data with three DES researchers involved with 
the collection of the data.  On average, Dr. Heavey, Dr. Hurlburt and I spent 
approximately 9 hours with each participant collecting the data and about 5-10 hours per 
participant in writing beep descriptions and understanding the nature of his or her inner 
experiences. We included three researchers on each interview whenever possible and in 
the discussion of our participants’ inner experience in order to minimize the likelihood 
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that our own biases distorted what we found.  This often included re-watching videotapes 
of our interviews and looking at this data in various ways.   
Another limitation of our study was that we did not control for other variables that 
may impact our participants’ experiences.  For example, many of our participants take 
medication daily to control their mood disorders.  However, it was impossible in this 
study to understand and identify the impact of those medications on our participants’ 
inner experience.  Similarly, our participants may have been using other substances (e.g., 
alcohol) that may have affected their inner experience. Additional research is needed in 
this area to explore the ways in which substances can impact a person’s inner experience. 
Another variable we did not control that may impact inner experience was when 
and how the participants collected moments of experience.  Participants were free to 
collect their moments in their own natural environments at a time of their choosing, 
increasing ecological validity. However, it is possible that the varying conditions under 
which the participants collected their moments of experience may have impacted the 
observed inner experiences. 
Finally, another limitation of the present study is the reliance on participants’ self-
report of their experience.  The DES method tries to circumvent some of the limitations 
associated with self-report in various ways.  DES is an iterative procedure (Hurlburt, 
2009; Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006) as most participants are not skilled observers of their 
inner experience during the first sampling day.  We expect participants to become more 
skilled at apprehending their inner experience overtime.  DES also rules out anything that 
is outside of a participant’s current awareness (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006) and thus 
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participant’s explanations, interpretations, “unconscious” processes, and events occurring 
before or after the beep are avoided.   
One issue related to relying on self-reports is constructive memory. To minimize 
constructive memory effects, the expositional interviews take place within 24-hours of 
the collection of sampled moments.  Participants are also told that they can choose to not 
discuss any particular sampled moment with the researchers.  Such sampled moments 
may include moments participants may feel uncomfortable or be embarrassed to discuss 
with the researchers or moments in which participants were not able to attend to their 
inner experience.  Giving participants this option reduces the chance that participants 
may feel the need to change their report of their inner experience due to discomfort.  
Finally, during the interview the researchers strive to remain non-leading in the 
questioning such that participants can describe their inner experience without researchers’ 
influences.  We are unable to estimate how effective we are at reducing constructive 
memory, although we believe this method limits those effects as much or more than other 
methods.  
Based on our findings, we believe that future research designed to further explore 
the inner experiences of individuals with BD, MDD, as well as other psychiatric 
disorders, would be advantageous in further our understanding the nature of inner 
experience and mental illness.  Such research would benefit from sampling with 
participants over a more extended period of time.  Additional DES studies may want to 
examine the inner experience of people with MDD and BD when they are and are not 
experiencing specific mood episodes (e.g., major depressive episode, manic episode) to 
explore how their inner experiences may be impacted by the mood episodes.  
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Furthermore, research aimed at understanding the significant individual differences we 
found in this study, as well as other DES studies, would be useful. 
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University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
· Responsible for providing mentorship and support to minority undergraduate 
students at UNLV who were interested in pursuing a mental health graduate 
degree. 
 
Incoming Graduate Student Mentor    2008 – 2011 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
· Was responsible for providing mentorship to incoming clinical psychology 
students through their first year of graduate study at UNLV. 
 
Student Government, Student Body President   2002 - 2004 
Nevada State College 
· Served as the student body president of Nevada State College.  
· Was responsible for relaying student concerns to the college’s faculty and 
administration, planning and implementing new student policies and procedures, 
spending and balancing budget of student fees, and representing the college at 
state board of regent meetings, state legislature meetings, and with the community 
at large.  
 
Safe Nest, Volunteer       2004 – 2005 
· Volunteered at Safe Nest, a shelter for victims of trauma or domestic violence.  
· Assisted with serving lunch daily to homeless individuals, sorting and counting 
donations, and assisting staff with various other tasks. 
  
 
AWARDS AND HONORS 
Graduate Assistant at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas  2007 –Present 
Valedictorian, Nevada State College Class of 2005   2005 
Nevada Regents Scholar Award     2005 
Millennium Scholarship      2002 – 2005 
Nevada State Academic Scholarship     2002 – 2004 
Lisa Cano Leadership Scholarship     2002 – 2003 
 
Professional Affiliations 
American Psychology Association (APA), Student Affiliate 2008 – Present 
Nevada State Psychological Association (NSPA), Student Affiliate 2007 – Present 
Society for the Teaching of Psychology (STP), Student Affiliate 2009 – Present 
National Academic Advising Association (NACADA), Member 2005 – 2007 
Psychology Club, Member, Nevada State College   2004 – 2005 
Nevada Student Association, Nevada System of Higher Education 2002 – 2004 
 
